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ABSTRACT 
This study set out to research the influence of a local non-state actor on the role and authority 
of the state, in the domestic environment. Accordingly, the research problem focused on the 
impact of a domestic actor on the association between the state and the society. This study 
only focused on the state at the level of local government and the impact of one specific 
actor, organised criminal groups, on social control by the state. Thus, state-society relations 
were discussed in this context. In order to guide this study, the main and two supportive 
research questions were stated as follows: What is the impact of organised crime on the 
social control by the state? What are the power dynamics between local governance, criminal 
agents and society? Has the state become criminalised at the level of local government, as a 
result of the activities of organised crime, and if so, to what extent? The state thus functioned 
as the dependent variable and organised criminal groups as the independent variable. The 
theoretical foundation of this study was located in state-society relations, and specific 
reference was given to the work of Migdal (1988) and his analysis of state social control, 
pyramidal and weblike societies. Furthermore, a neo-pluralist view of the state was followed. 
A conceptualisation of the criminalisation of the state was provided, as the criminalisation of 
the state was regarded as one possible impact of organised crime on the state. In order to 
analyse the criminalisation of the state, a framework was constructed from four main avenues 
of empirical observation.  
 
In order to answer the research questions, a case study research design and a predominantly 
qualitative methodology was selected. As a case, the City of Cape Town was selected and 
Manenberg, located on the Cape Flats, as the site for the research. A case study research 
design created the opportunity to describe the context in detail and to connect the micro level 
of analysis to the macro level; thus, it provided insight on the research topic that enabled the 
researcher to expand/build theory. The field research process occurred over a period of three 
months using a triangulation of methods: Key informant interview, small group discussions 
and observation with three categories of respondents. These three categories included: 
Community members of Manenberg, organised criminal groups and agents of local 
government and local governance.  
 
In order to set the stage for the empirical analysis, a contextualisation of the dependent and 
independent variables were provided. It was stated that there is a lack of a universally agreed 
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upon definition of organised crime, and as a result, a conceptualisation of organised crime 
was generated for this study. It was further argued that the majority of literature treats 
organised criminal groups and organised criminal gangs as two separate concepts, despite the 
fact that there are more similarities than differences. Thus, for the purpose of this study, a 
conclusion was reached that the difference is inconsequential. The development of organised 
crime in South Africa and an examination of the historical development of the gangs on the 
Cape Flats were described. With regards to the dependent variable, the context was provided 
for an analysis of local government in South Africa. The demographical and operational 
features of the municipal area of the City of Cape Town were explained, with specific 
reference to safety and security elements.  
 
The primary data collected was analysed according to the indicators of social control 
(compliance, participation and legitimacy), as identified by Migdal (1988). In addition, the 
framework to analyse the criminalisation of the state at the level of local government was 
applied on the case study. Based on the analysis, a different system, to what was described by 
Migdal (1988) in his narrative of a triangle of accommodation was found to be in operation in 
Manenberg on the Cape Flats. It was confirmed that there is the presence of a weakened state 
and accordingly, a weblike society, where social control is fragmented between local 
government and the criminal community. However, in this weblike society a system of local 
power dynamics exists between the criminal community, social community and local agents 
of governance, where dyadic collaboration occurs between all three the actors. However, 
despite the collaboration, the criminalisation of the state does not occur, but rather the 
statification of the organised criminal community, as it provides goods and service to the 
social community. The main findings can be summarised as: If a state lacks extensive social 
control and a rival authority has claimed a level of social control, this will not necessarily 
lead to the further weakening of the state, as a result of a system of power dynamics in place, 
where collaboration between the social community, the criminal community and local agents 
of governance occurs. This system is kept in place by: On-going efforts by the state to 
maintain (or regain) compliance, participation and legitimacy; corrupt agents of the state 
(specifically in the security sector); a level of operational ease that exists for the criminal 
community (and the interweaving of the criminal community in the social community) and a 
relatively strong society that acknowledges the benefits of criminal activities for the social 
community, but also recognises the authority and control of the state.   
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Opsomming  
Hierdie studie het ten doel om die uitwerking van ‟n plaaslike nie-staatsrolspeler op die rol en 
gesag van die staat in die plaaslike omgewing te ondersoek. Vervolgens fokus die 
navorsingsvraag op die impak van ‟n plaaslike rolspeler op die verhouding tussen die staat en 
die samelewing. Die studie fokus op die staat op plaaslike regeringsvlak en op die impak van 
een spesifieke rolspeler, georganiseerde misdaadgroepe. Staat-samelewing-verhoudinge is 
dus teen hierdie agtergrond bespreek. Om die studie te rig, is die hoof- en twee 
ondersteunende navorsingsvrae soos volg gestel: Wat is die impak van georganiseerde 
misdaad op die sosiale beheer van die staat? Wat is die magsdinamiek tussen die plaaslike 
regeringsvlak, kriminele agente en die samelewing? Is die staat gekriminaliseer op plaaslike 
regeringsvlak as gevolg van die resultate van georganiseerde misdaadbedrywighede en, 
indien wel, in hoe ‟n mate? Die staat vorm dus die afhanklike veranderlike en georganiseerde 
misdaadgroepe die onafhanklike veranderlike. Die teoretiese begronding vir hierdie studie is 
gevind in staat-samelewing-verhoudinge en die werk van Migdal (1988), spesifiek sy analise 
van staat-sosiale beheer en piramiede- en webvormige samelewings, word genoem. Verder is 
‟n neo-pluralistiese beskouing van die staat ingeneem. ‟n Konseptualisering van die 
kriminalisering van die staat word verskaf, aangesien dit voorsien is as een moontlike impak 
van georganiseerde misdaad op die staat. Ten einde die kriminalisering van die staat te 
ontleed, is ‟n raamwerk opgebou uit vier hoofrigtings van empiriese observasie.  
 
‟n Gevallestudie is as navorsingsontwerp gebruik om die navorsingsvrae te beantwoord, met 
hoofsaaklik ‟n kwalitatiewe metodologie. As ‟n geval is die Stad Kaapstad gekies, met 
Manenberg op die Kaapse Vlakte as die terrein vir die navorsing. Die gevallestudie-
navorsingsontwerp het die geleentheid geskep om die konteks in detail te beskryf en die 
mikrovlak-analise met die makrovlak-analise te verbind; derhalwe het dit insig verskaf wat 
die navorser in staat gestel het om teorie (uit) te bou. Die veldwerkproses het oor ‟n tydperk 
van drie maande deur drie metodes plaasgevind: onderhoude met sleutelinformante, 
kleingroepbesprekings, en observasies met drie kategorieë respondente. Hierdie drie 
kategorieë is gemeenskapslede van Manenberg, georganiseerde misdaadgroepe, en agente 
van plaaslike regering en bestuur.  
 
Ten einde die empiriese navorsing op te stel, is ‟n kontekstualisering van die afhanklike en 
onafhanklike veranderlikes verskaf. Dit is gestel dat daar ‟n gebrek is aan ‟n universeel-
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aanvaarde definisie van georganiseerde misdaad, en as gevolg hiervan is ‟n konseptualisering 
vir hierdie studie gevorm. Daar is verder geargumenteer dat die meerderheid literatuur 
georganiseerde misdaadgroepe en georganiseerde misdaadbendes as twee aparte konsepte 
hanteer, ten spyte daarvan dat hierdie groeperinge veel meer ooreenstem as verskil. 
Vervolgens is die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die verskil nie betekenisvol is nie. Die 
ontwikkeling van georganiseerde misdaad in Suid-Afrika en ‟n ontleding van die historiese 
ontwikkeling van bendes op die Kaapse Vlakte is beskryf. Rakende die afhanklike 
veranderlike, is die konteks verskaf vir ‟n analise van plaaslike regering in Suid-Afrika. Die 
demografiese en operasionele kenmerke van die munisipale area van die Stad Kaapstad is 
uiteengesit, met spesifieke verwysing na veiligheid- en sekuriteitselemente. 
 
Die primêre ingesamelde data is ontleed aan die hand van die indikatore van sosiale beheer 
(nakoming, deelname en legitimiteit) soos deur Migdal (1988) gedefinieer. Verder is die 
raamwerk om die  kriminalisering van die staat op plaaslike regeringsvlak te ontleed, op die 
gevallestudie toegepas. Op grond van die analise is daar bevind dat ‟n ander stelsel as wat 
Migdal (1988) in sy narratief van ‟n driehoek van akkommodasie beskryf het, in Manenberg 
op die Kaapse Vlakte voorkom. Dit is bevestig dat daar ‟n verswakte staat voorkom en, 
vervolgens, ‟n webvormige samelewing, waar sosiale beheer gefragmenteer is tussen die 
plaaslike regering en die kriminele gemeenskap. In hierdie webvormige samelewing bestaan 
egter ‟n stelsel van plaaslike magsdinamiek tussen die kriminele gemeenskap, die sosiale 
gemeenskap en plaaslike regeringsagente, waar diadiese medewerking tussen al drie die 
akteurs voorkom. Ten spyte van hierdie samewerking, kom die kriminalisering van die staat 
egter nie voor nie, maar eerder ‟n verstaatliking van die georganiseerde misdaadgemeenskap, 
aangesien dit goedere en dienste aan die sosiale gemeenskap verskaf. Die hoofbevindinge kan 
soos volg saamgevat word: As ‟n staat nie uitgebreide sosiale beheer het nie en ‟n 
mededingende gesag het ‟n vlak van sosiale beheer opgeëis, sal dit nie noodwendig lei tot die 
verdere verswakking van die staat nie, as gevolg van ‟n stelsel van magsdinamiek wat in plek 
is waar medewerking tussen die sosiale gemeenskap, die kriminele gemeenskap en plaaslike 
agente van bestuur voorkom. Hierdie stelsel word in plek gehou deur aaneenlopende pogings 
deur die staat om nakoming, deelname en legitimiteit te verkry (of terug te kry), korrupte 
staatsagente (spesifiek in die sekuriteitsektor), ‟n vlak van operasionele gemak wat vir die 
kriminele gemeenskap bestaan (en die vervlegting van kriminele gemeenskap en die sosiale 
gemeenskap), en ‟n relatiewe sterk samelewing wat die voordele van kriminele aktiwiteit vir 
die sosiale gemeenskap erken, maar so ook die gesag en beheer van die staat.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY  
 
1.1 Introduction and Background to the Study  
As social scientists we are concerned with the science of society, which includes two main 
elements: The structure of the society we live in and human behaviour. More specifically, in 
political science, we study states, governments and the practice of politics, including political 
systems and political behaviour. In essence, what we are trying to achieve is to give a detailed 
account of how the world of politics works. In order to provide an interpretation and 
description of the political space around us, we often ground our investigation in the concept 
of the state. There are countless conceptualisations of the state, as will be explored in this 
study. However, these definitions came forth from the traditional Weberian notion of the 
state, where the system of the state refers to a sovereign entity, with the monopoly of force 
and a recognised territory. Accordingly, the state is regarded as the building block of a 
legitimate world order and the most essential institution in the global political sphere. In 
addition, and of particular importance to this study, the state has also been regarded as the 
most important actor in the local sphere. However, as with any organisation, the structure of 
the state has changed and been modified through time. Some of these changes and 
modifications came as a result of external forces or internal pressure to adapt, and have 
always been present; however, there have been penetrating influences on the organisation 
which is the state. As summarised by Van Creveld (1999: vii):  
 
“…The state, which since the middle of the seventeenth century has been the most 
important and most characteristic of all modern institutions, is in decline. From 
Western Europe to Africa, either voluntary or involuntarily, many existing states are 
either combining into larger communities or falling apart. Regardless of whether they 
fall apart or combine, already now many of their functions are being taken over by a 
variety of organisations which, whatever the precise nature, are not states…”.  
 
Van Creveld made this observation a number of years ago (1999) in his seminal work: The 
Rise and Decline of the State. Although the position of the state could not have been better 
described at that time, there have since been several developments when discussing the 
authority of the state. For example, there is a growing discourse that the impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis (also known as the 2008 Financial Crisis) and the European Sovereign Debt 
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Crisis have acted as a catalyst for the re-emergence of the interventionist state. This comes 
after interventionist efforts of several states, such as the United States and United Kingdom to 
stabilise their economies and specifically the banking sector, with rescue or bail-out 
packages. However, regardless of whether the state is in decline or growing in importance, 
the hypothesis prevails that there are other important actors on both a global and a domestic 
level, which are challenging the authority of the state. Thus, there has been a move from the 
decline of the state‟s importance to a discourse of renewed interventionism; nevertheless, the 
authority and role of the state continue to be challenged. This study sets out to investigate 
exactly that: The influence of one specific actor on the state. Furthermore, this influence will 
not be researched on a global scale and provide a commentary on the role and the authority of 
the state on a global level, but rather at the state in the domestic environment. Thus, there will 
be an explicit focus on state-society relations. This study will rely on the Weberian concept of 
the state and the generalisations that come with that conceptualisation, amongst others: The 
separation between the state and society, and that the state is a self-contained organisation 
with claims to sovereignty. Within this framework, an analysis will be conducted of the 
influence of one organisation on the state and only state-society relations will be analysed in 
depth. To be more specific, the organisation that will be studied to assess how it influences 
the state is organised criminal groups.  
 
As with the state, organised crime is a widely studied subject. In general, the term is used to 
describe a set of relations between illegal organisations or to indicate the function of a group 
of illegal activities, performed by a set of specific agents (Fiorentini and Peltzman (eds), 
1995:3). In addition, the structure of organised crime is a: “…concentration of illegal power 
in society that can significantly influence political, economic and social life…” (Williams, 
2002:165). When studying organised crime, it is important to start with the conceptual 
difference between organised crime and un-organised crime. Williams (2002:164) comments 
that definitions of organised crime focus on characteristics such as an: “…enduring 
association for criminal purposes, a minimum number of people, some kind of organisational 
structure or hierarchy, and the use of corruption and violence…”. In addition, Williams 
places emphasis on the transnational element of organised crime, which can also be regarded 
as an important distinguishing factor between organised crime and un-organised crime. 
Transnational organised crime involves criminal activities that cross national borders 
(Williams, 2002:164). Thus, where crime will refer to an act or action that is criminalised by 
a specific legal system or society, there is no collective structure or the continuation of 
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criminal acts, as in the case of organised crime. Organised crime is synonymous with 
attributes such as structure, hierarchy, a group of individuals, violence, force and intimidation 
and of course illegal activities. Thus, the basis of the phenomenon is located in crime or 
illegal activities and as such, the majority of research on organised crime has been done in the 
discipline of criminology, complimented by sociology and economy. As such, research 
studies that merge organised crime with the discipline of political science are limited. The 
studies that have been done on organised crime in political science, including those in an 
international relations context, focus on organised crime and the challenges to democracy and 
the criminal economy of organised crime. With regards to the criminal economy of organised 
crime examples include: The Dark Side of Globalisation (Heine and Thakur, 2011), 
Gentlemen or Villains, Thugs or Heroes? The Social Economy of Organised Crime in South 
Africa (Irish-Qhobosheane (ed), 2007), The Globalisation of Organised Crime, the Courtesan 
State, and the Corruption of Civil Society (Mittelman and Johnston, 1999), The Illicit Global 
Economy and State Power (Friman and Andreas, 1999) and on the topic of organised crime 
and democracy (but with the criminal economy as a sub-topic) studies such as: Africa‟s 
Pablos and Political Entrepreneurs: War, the State and Criminal Networks in West and 
Southern Africa (Wannenburg, 2006), Organised Crime and the Challenge to Democracy 
(Allum and Siebert (eds), 2003), Transnational Organised Crime and National and 
International Security: A Global Assessment (Williams, 1997) have been done.  
 
Although the concept of the state and the impact of organised crime on the entity of the state 
are explored in a small number of cases, for example in the work of Shelly (1995 and 1999) 
Transnational Organised Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?, Transnational 
Organised Crime: The New Authoritarianism, Williams (2002) Transnational Organised 
Crime and the State and Williams and Brooks (1999) Captured, Criminal and Contested 
States: Organised Crime and Africa in the 21
st
 Century, these studies do not specifically 
research state-society relations or organised crime as a domestic actor, but rather the 
transnational element of organised crime. As a result, this study seeks to increase research 
done on organised criminal groups within the context of political science, by referring to 
theories related to state-building, state decay (including state weakness, state failure and state 
collapse) and most importantly state-society relations. Accordingly, this study will centre on 
the impact of organised crime on the state. There will be a specific focus on state-capabilities 
related to governance and social control and the dynamics between state governance, 
societies and the criminal impact, criminal control and criminal authority. It is anticipated 
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that such an analysis will provide a more complex conceptualisation of state-society relations. 
This study will assess shifts in state-society relations based on the presence of a domestic 
non-state actor: Organised criminal groups. 
 
Furthermore, and as will be explained in this first chapter, this study proposes that the impact 
of organised crime on the social capabilities of the state, with reference to governance, needs 
to be researched by taking an in-depth look at one specific cased study in order to assess the 
interaction between the relevant actors. Thus, this study will take the form of a single case 
study focussing on the City of Cape Town and the gangs on the Cape Flats, South Africa. As 
will be explained in later chapters of this dissertation, the Cape Flats is situated between the 
Cape Peninsula and the next range of mountains to the east, covering a distance of more than 
30 kilometres. Coloured communities relocated forcibly as a result of the Groups Areas Act 
from many parts of Cape Town during the 1960s and 1970s led to the creation of this area 
(Gastrow, 1998:15).
1
 In many cases families were torn apart and the majority of the people 
moved and had to leave their jobs, thereby creating large-scale unemployment and poverty. 
As a result, the fabric of extended families and working class culture that existed before the 
forced removals was gradually destroyed (Pinnock, 1984:64). As a result of the breakdown of 
the core social institutions of civil order (for example families, the workplace and interest 
groups), loosely structured gangs were formed to occupy this empty social space and these 
groups expanded rapidly.  
 
What also contributed to the growth and expansion of the gangs on the Cape Flats was the 
transitional period in South Africa and the country‟s many challenges to its democracy. 
Aspects such as more relaxed border controls gave organised crime and also the gangs on the 
Cape Flats the ability to consolidate and significantly expand their operations. At the time of 
writing, there was no clear indication of how many organised criminal groups were 
functioning on the Cape Flats or how many members each group had. Statistics of the 
magnitude of these groups are however, not necessary to realise that the gangs on the Cape 
Flats have an enormous impact on the society and the state. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The formation of the Cape Flats will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.  
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1.2 Problem Statement and Focus of the Study  
As previously mentioned, the state has for long been the most important construct in the local 
arena. This organisation, with supreme power over its territory and citizens, was the main 
provider of structure to society and also, amongst other things, safety and security. After all, 
an initial definition of the state stipulates that the state exists as a sovereign, autonomous 
political unit, as it has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
2
 Despite the 
organisational importance of the state, its traditional functional capabilities have been 
continuously and increasingly challenged by both external and internal elements. These 
elements have ranged from the new configurations in the global realm to domestic non-state 
actors, which are of particular importance to this study. This had and still has the impact that 
the traditional authority and role of the state have been challenged. In some cases the impact 
has led to a change in the way in which the authority of the state has been conceptualised
3
, 
but it can also be argued that in other cases, the supremacy and capabilities of the state have 
been reduced.
4
 Therefore, a central question coming forth from these propositions is to 
research: What is the influence of other actors on the construct of the state? Furthermore, 
what is the influence of a local non-state actor on the role and authority of the state, in the 
domestic environment? Has there been a shift, or a change in the power dynamics between 
the state and the society? Are there new rules that facilitate the association between the state 
and the society? Are there new actors emerging and if so, can all of these actors be 
accommodated in the domestic environment and how stable are these new associations? This 
study will acknowledge the presence and impact of global forces and various domestic 
elements on the traditional conceptualisation of the state, but it will predominantly be 
concerned with the examination of the impact that one specific domestic non-state actor has 
on the state. This actor is organised criminal groups. In addition to this, the study will not 
look at the impact of this domestic non-state actor on all the elements of the state. The focus 
will only be on the social capabilities of the state. The decision to focus on the social 
capabilities of the state, and accordingly state-society relations, was taken for a number of 
reasons. First, in order to retain and increase the general capabilities of the state, state social 
control or the successful mobilisation of the society by the state is needed. In this context, 
social control can be defined as: “…the successful subordination of people‟s own inclinations 
                                                 
2
 See Weber (1978).  
3
 For example: Inter-governmental organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund.  
4
 For example: The influence of transnational organised criminal groups on the state of Guinea Bissau has 
severely reduced the supremacy and capabilities of the state.  
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of social behaviour or behaviour sought by other social organisations in favour of behaviour 
prescribed by state rules…” (Migdal, 1988:22). Thus, a state will have social control if 
people behave socially as the state prescribes, rather than according to what they desire for 
themselves, or what other organisations may prescribe.  
 
As will be expanded on in the literature overview of this chapter, the social capabilities of the 
state will be measured by using three indicators of state social control, as identified by 
Migdal (1988): Compliance, participation and legitimacy. Accordingly, this study seeks to 
investigate the relationship between organised criminal groups and the social capabilities of 
the state. More specifically, this study will investigate the impact of organised crime on local 
governance through a single case study, using specific organised criminal groups in a specific 
location in South Africa. The features of the relationship between local governance, the 
society, and organised crime will be researched in order to determine the impact of organised 
crime on the state; or a shift in state-society relations. As will be explained, this study will 
focus on one case study, namely the relationship between organised criminal groups and local 
governance on the Cape Flats, located in the Western Cape, South Africa. The specific site 
that will be investigated is Manenberg, a suburb located on the Cape Flats.  
 
1.2.1 Contribution of the Study 
This study will contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, as noted earlier, 
research done on the specific influence of organised crime on state-society relations in the 
discipline of political science is limited. Therefore, this will be the main theme and 
contribution of this study. As will be explained, this study will follow a case study research 
design and as is recognised with case study research, a detailed account will be provided of 
one selected case; not in order to generalise, but in order to contribute to the existing theory 
on state-society relations. 
 
Second, the presence of organised criminal gangs can be confirmed in many cities in Africa, 
for example the Mungiki in Nairobi, Kenya, and the Area Boys in Lagos, Nigeria; however, 
despite their presence, limited research has been done on the impact of such groups on the 
state and the society. Traditionally, such research has focused on Latin America and has 
usually taken the form of case studies, such as: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; San Salvador, El 
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Salvador and Mexico City, Mexico.
5
 In most cases, these studies concentrate on the groups 
themselves, the structure and operations in a geographical location. As a result, there is 
insufficient research on these organisations and their influence on state-society relations in 
Africa. This study will contribute to research on organised criminal groups in the African 
context and encourage further research on the topic. It is anticipated that this study will 
provide insight on the relationship between illegal non-state actors and the state, in a state-
society framework, within the African milieu. 
 
The third contribution of the study is that the emphasis will be on the authority of the state 
with regard to state-society relations and the influence of local non-state actors (organised 
criminal groups) on the authority of the state. In addition, the state will be conceptualised at 
the level of local government, thus it will only be looked at on the domestic level. As has 
been stated earlier, research on the authority of the state usually has a focus on the state as an 
actor in the global world order. This study will provide a unique contribution of the state as a 
domestic authority and how the authority and rule of the state is challenged locally. Also, this 
analysis will be done within the framework of one case study, located in South Africa. 
Although research has been done on the gangs on the Cape Flats, most noticeably Standing 
(2006) and Legget (2004), this study will provide an updated insight into the relationship 
between the organised criminal groups, the state at the level of local government and the local 
society in Manenberg on the Cape Flats.  
 
1.2.2 Research Questions  
In order to analyse the impact of one domestic non-state actor, in this case organised criminal 
groups, on the social control by the state, a series of research questions have been identified 
to guide this study. The main research question that forms the focal point of this study is 
formulated as: What is the impact of organised crime on the social control by the state? This 
research question anticipates facilitating the examination of the rise of other non-state actors, 
on a domestic level and how that challenges the authority and role of the state, locally. 
Furthermore, the analysis will only be applied onto one aspect of the state, the social control, 
                                                 
5
 See for example the following studies: Richani (2011) State Capacity in Post Conflict Settings: Explaining 
Criminal Violence in El Salvador and Guatemala, Magaloni et al (2011) Living in Fear: Mapping the Social 
 Embeddedness of Drug Gangs and Violence in Mexico, Manwaring (2007) A contemporary challenge to 
state sovereignty: gangs and other illicit transnational criminal organisations in Central America, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil, Wolf (2010) Maras transnacionales: Origins and Transformations 
of Central American Street Gangs.  
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and only on the impact of one actor, organised criminal groups. The purpose of this research 
question is deemed as explanatory, as it will provide causes and reasons with regard to the 
impact of organised crime on the social control by the state, and by doing this, contribute to 
theories of the state and specifically state-society relations.   
 
In order to facilitate the answering of the main research question, two sub-questions have 
been developed. The first sub-question deals with the connections and associations between 
the state and the organised criminal groups, but also the community, since this study is only 
concerned with state social control. Accordingly, the first supportive research question has 
been formulated as: What are the power dynamics between local governance, criminal agents 
and society? It is anticipated that with answering this research question, a detailed account 
will be provided of how the three different actors (the state, society and organised criminal 
groups) function within one setting. Thus, the purpose of this research question is descriptive, 
as it will provide an informative analysis of the power dynamics between the three main 
agents of the study. The purpose of the research question will further be exploratory, as it will 
investigate these relationships.  
 
One of the possible impacts of domestic non-state actors on the state is the criminalisation of 
the state. However, this is a hypothesis that needs to be tested on the specific case study 
selected. Accordingly, the second sub-research question is: Has the state become 
criminalised at the level of local government, as a result of the activities of organised crime, 
and if so, to what extent? This research question is exploratory and explanatory as it will 
examine what the level of criminalisation of the state is, as a result of the impact of organised 
criminal groups, and also clarify the extent of criminalisation. In order to answer this research 
question, a framework for the analysis of the criminalisation of the state, as a result of the 
activities of organised criminal groups, will have to be created.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Points of Departure and Literature Overview  
The literature that will form part of this study can be divided into two categories, according to 
the dependent and independent variable. With regards to the dependent variable, the state, 
literature on the construction of an appropriate conceptualisation for the purpose of this study, 
will be used. This will include work done on the position of the nation-state in the global 
world order, such as Strange (1996), Friman and Andreas (1999) and Shelly (1995 and 1999). 
More general works from most noticeably Van Creveld (1999), Weber (1978), Zartman ed. 
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(1995), Herbst (2000) and Rotberg (2003) will provide invaluable insight into the 
development of the concept of the state.  
 
The concept of state decay will receive significant attention, in order to clarify state 
weakness, state failure and state collapse. Again, the work by Rotberg (2003 and 2004) will 
guide the analysis, complemented by predominantly Mentan (2004), Reno (1998 and 2000), 
Clapham (1996), Zartman (1995), Jackson and Rosberg (1986) and Dunn and Shaw (2001).  
 
As mentioned earlier, the focal point of this study is state-society relations. The primary 
theoretical foundation will come from Joel S. Migdal. For the purposes of this study the 
conceptualisation of theories is sets of logically related linguistic symbols that represent what 
we think happen in the world. Formally a theory is a systematically related set of statements 
including some law-like generalisations that is empirically testable. Theories are testable with 
reference to real world observations and they are used to explain complex realities. It should 
also be possible to apply a theory to a variety of real world circumstances (Manheim and 
Rich, 1991:17 – 19, Rudner, 1966 and Meehan, 1988:80 - 81). The theories that will be 
empirically tested in this study emanate from Migdal‟s work Strong Societies and Weak 
States: State-society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (1988). With 
specific reference to state-society relations, two relationships need to be identified: First, the 
direct impact of states on society; and second: Societies also affect states. This is noted by 
Migdal (1988) and with specific reference to the last mentioned relationship; he postulates 
that the structure of societies can affect the capabilities of the state. Furthermore, a set of 
theories on weak and strong states and weak and strong societies are provided. It is argued 
that for a state to survive and be able to gain strength it has to have the ability to mobilise the 
society and the capability to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, 
and use resources appropriately. Strong states are those with high capabilities to complete 
these tasks, while weak states find it difficult (Migdal, 1988:22). Thus, the endurance of a 
state is based on the relationship with the society. It is important to note that the proposed 
study will use Migdal‟s (1998) above mentioned proposition that strong states have high 
capabilities to mobilise society, penetrate society and regulate social relationships (amongst 
other things), while weak states find it hard, as a theoretical grounding. However, the aim of 
this study is not to explore why states weaken, but rather to assess the influence of another 
organisation (as an indicator of strong societies) on the state.  
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The discussion of the state in this study will further be conducted in the context of the 
criminalisation of the state. There will accordingly be an analysis of the principal contributing 
factors to the criminalisation of the state and a framework will be established for the 
measurement of the level of criminalisation of the state. This will be done in terms of four 
main avenues of empirical observation. These are: the indicators of criminalisation of politics 
(Bayart et al, 1999), the states‟ orientation towards organised crime (Williams, 1997), 
organised criminal groups and the role of the state (Williams, 1997) and capacity gaps and 
functional holes in weak states (Williams, 2002).  
 
With regards to the independent variable, a general conceptualisation of organised crime will 
be constructed by focussing on literature from Abadinsky (2000), Allum and Kostakos 
(2010), Finckenauer (2005) and the comprehensive database of definitions of organised crime 
created by Klaus von Lampe (2012). Documents from the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (2004, 2010 and 2012) will assist in providing a general overview of organised 
criminal activities around the world.  
 
Secondary data of organised crime on the Cape Flats will focus on studies done by the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The work of Peter Gastrow (1998, 2001, 2003) and Mark 
Shaw (1996, 1998, 2002) will be valuable in understanding the development of organised 
crime in post-apartheid South Africa, with specific emphasis on the Cape Flats. However, a 
major contribution to the field comes from André Standing‟s work on the social 
contradictions of organised crime on the Cape Flats (2003) and his 2006 publication 
Organised Crime: A study from the Cape Flats. Supplementary works that explain in detail 
the organised crime world of the Cape Flats include two publications by Pinnock (1984, 
1997) The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town and Gangs, Rituals 
and Rites of Passage.  
 
1.4 Research Design and Research Methods 
The research design that has been selected for this study is a single case study as there will be 
an intensive investigation of one specific case. The single case study can be described as an 
intensive investigation of one unit, where there will be a detailed description of the context of 
that case. A few notes on why the single case study has been selected as the research design 
for this study: This design enables the researcher to make observations on a micro level and 
take it back to the macro level, so as to construct theory. Case study research design is not 
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supportive of the generalisation of its findings, but rather of the production of theory as 
confirmed by Yin (1984:42 - 43) when he states that a rationale of a single case study is that 
the case represents a critical opportunity in testing a well formulated theory. To be more 
specific, case studies: “…are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations 
or universes…” (Yin, 1984:21). 
 
As a specific case study, the City of Cape Town has been selected. This has been done for a 
number of reasons. First, there is a large presence of organised criminal groups in the city and 
more specifically on the Cape Flats. As explained earlier in this chapter, the social 
environment of the Cape Flats was conducive to the formation and expansion of gangs and 
organised criminal groups. The specific site on the Cape Flats selected to do fieldwork, is the 
suburb of Manenberg.  
 
The research methodology of this study will be primarily qualitative in nature. A qualitative 
methodology usually provides rich, detailed data. This is hoped for through the process of 
research. Furthermore, the qualitative method is more flexible, less structured and open to 
unanticipated data. The method examines ideas, motives, themes, words and observations of 
a small number of cases in detail, and hypotheses are generated during the research process. 
This stands opposed to quantitative research, which is more systematic and linear and where 
hypotheses are tested. Indeed, Standing (2006:xi) notes that quantitative surveys are not 
entirely successful when researching gangs on the Cape Flats as: “…people living and 
working on the Cape Flats are not willing to divulge sensitive and potentially dangerous 
information to strangers with clipboards…”. As such, this study will utilise a qualitative 
research design.  
 
Both secondary and primary qualitative data will be used. Secondary data analysis will 
predominantly take place in the earlier phases of the study and will focus on existing data 
relevant to the research topic, sourcing information from academic books and journals and 
the relevant local newspapers. Secondary quantitative and qualitative data will be used 
predominantly in the contextualisation chapters (four and five) of this study. Primary data 
will be gathered by conducting field-research in Manenberg. Furthermore, three qualitative 
research methods will be used, namely focus groups, key informant interviews and direct 
observation. Focus groups will be conducted in order to explore the attitudes and experiences 
of the participants regarding the interaction between organised criminal groups and local 
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government. The explicit purpose of the key informant interviews is to obtain information on 
the respondents‟ insight, involvement and perspective of organised criminal groups and the 
role and purpose of local government agents. It is anticipated that while spending time in the 
field, direct observation will occur. However, the researcher will remain an outside observer. 
Thus, observation will not take the form of participant observation. During participant 
observation the researcher forms part of the group that is studied, but also fulfils the role of 
the researcher (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:293). This will not be done in this study. Rather, 
elements that will be observed include the physical surroundings of the area in which the 
fieldwork will be conducted, the social significance of the specific site of fieldwork, social 
and economic development in the area, structures of houses, general infrastructure, body-
language of respondents and verbal characteristics of respondents.  
 
For the focus groups, the method of quota sampling will be used as predetermined categories 
for the inclusion and participation of individuals in the focus groups have been established. 
Quota sampling is a: “…nonrandom sample in which the researcher first identifies general 
categories into which cases or people will be selected, and then he or she selects cases to 
reach a predetermined number of cases in each category…” (Neuman, 2006:221). It is 
proposed that a minimum of four focus groups will be conducted. Focus groups have 
successfully been used in past research on gangs on the Cape Flats. In his 2004 study, 
Terugskiet (returning fire): Growing up on the street corners of Manenberg, South Africa, 
Ted Legget made use of focus groups (amongst other research techniques) consisting of gang 
members and community members of the Cape Flats, to research gangs and youth violence in 
the area.  
 
It is envisaged that two focus groups will be held with community members in Manenberg. 
Participants will be sourced from members of the Manenberg People's Centre. The 
Manenberg People's Centre describes its activities as being committed to the up-liftment of 
the Manenberg community, through the provision of social and economic development 
(Manenberg People‟s Centre, 2010). A further two focus groups will be held with 
rehabilitated members of gangs on the Cape Flats. Participants for this category of 
respondents will be sourced from community based organisations that deal with the 
rehabilitation of gang members, such as Proudly Manenberg and Silvertree Development 
Centre. Proudly Manenberg is described as a non-profit community based organisation, 
formed in September 2005 in response to the challenges Manenberg was and is still facing 
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and with the purpose to combat the pervasive stigma attached to the community (Proudly 
Manenberg, 2010). The Silvertree Development Centre is part of Selfhelp Manenberg. It is an 
independent non-profit organisation with several community support programmes and 
development initiatives (Selfhelp Manenberg, 2010).  
 
Key informant interviews (semi-structured) will be held with members of local government 
and actors of the state that functions on a local level, and members of community based 
organisations selected on the basis of their strategic positions in local government and the 
community. Five individuals have been identified that will be approached as key informant 
interviews. The first group of key informant interviews will come from members of local 
government and two ward councillors from the Manenberg constituency. In addition, one 
individual from the Western Cape Department of Community Safety, and the Director of the 
City of Cape Town Safety and Security will be interviewed. The final key informant 
interview will be conducted with the chairperson of a community based organisation, Proudly 
Manenberg. Although these individuals have been identified as key informants for this study, 
the recognition and interviewing of other participants through the process of snowball 
sampling is anticipated and hoped for. Chapter two will explain the research process in more 
detail and expand on elements mentioned here, such as the case study method and the 
qualitative research method.  
 
1.4.1 Variables, Units of Analysis and Level of Analysis  
In research, variables are the elements that assist with the identification of what needs to be 
observed in order to test theory. The dependent variable is the effect or result variable and the 
independent variable is the cause variable. To be clearer, the independent variable will act on 
the dependent variable, facilitating variations: Variations in the dependent variable are a 
function of the changes in the independent variable. Accordingly, the dependent variable of 
this study is the state, as it is the main object under observation. The cause or independent 
variable of this study is organised criminal groups, as it will have an influence on the 
dependent variable. The designation of the variables derives from the research question.  
 
With regard to the unit of analysis, or the units or components which are examined, this study 
works around three units of analysis. These three units are: Actors of local governance, the 
community and organised criminal groups. More specifically, it is actors of local governance 
functioning in the geographical jurisdiction of the City of Cape Town, the gangs on the Cape 
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Flats and the community of Manenberg. Each of these three units of analysis will be analysed 
on a local level, and accordingly the level of analysis for this study is the local level. Initially 
however, theories around the state will be discussed on the macro level in chapter two and 
organised crime will be contextualised on the macro, meso and local level in chapter three. 
When the case study is analysed, and the data collected and examined, which will only be 
done on the local level; as a result, the deductions of this study, hypotheses generated and 
recommendations made, will only be done on the local level, and not the South Africa state in 
general.   
 
1.4.2 Limitations and Delimitations  
This study is confronted with a number of limitations. It is acknowledged that when 
researching gangs, some information will be withheld as a result of the creed or ethical code 
of the gang and in fear of self-incrimination. Furthermore, despite all the research done on 
organised criminal groups and gangs, it is believed that some information will never be 
known, unless you are part of the group. Researchers sometimes have to rely on second-hand 
information and rumours to start the research process. With specific reference to the case 
study that will be analysed in this study, the Cape Flats can at times be very dangerous, 
especially when talking to gang members and members of the community on issues relating 
to crime, corruption and the criminal underworld. The Cape Flats is also divided into 
territorial districts for each gang and entry without knowledge of the boundaries or a guide, 
can be a serious mistake. Furthermore, the criminal nature of the topic may result in the 
questioning of the validity and reliability of the information provided by informants.  
 
In this context, the validity of the research refers to an accurate measurement of the proposed 
concepts that are studied. In a study there need to be high levels of reliability as this will 
minimise the errors and biases. Reliability refers to that: “…if a later investigator followed 
exactly the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same 
case study all over again, the latter investigator should arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions…” (Yin, 1984:40). As a result of these limitations, this study has been designed 
to obtain information from different populations of interviewees using different qualitative 
research techniques, but on the same subject. However, as mentioned, all informants will be 
selected for their inclusion based on preselected categories (quota sampling). It is believed 
that this process of triangulation of techniques will be able to produce recurring themes, 
which can later be analysed. Indeed, as stated by Babbie and Mouton (2001:175): 
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“…triangulation is generally considered to be one of the best ways to enhance validity and 
reliability in qualitative research…”. This is confirmed by Pollack (2003:472): “…a mixture 
of focus group discussions and one-on-one interviews is most appropriate in cross-cultural or 
cross-racial research and in correctional institutions, where issues of power and disclosure are 
amplified…”. In this study, triangulation of methods means that primary data will be 
obtained by using three qualitative research techniques: Key informant interviews, focus 
groups and direct observation. In addition, multiple sources of data are also an important 
element of case studies as they will provide a thicker, richer description and will contribute to 
replication and convergence (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:282; Gillham, 2000:13).  
 
To be more specific, this study has been designed to obtain information from three different 
groups of respondents (members of the community, members of local government and actors 
of the state functioning on a local level, and individuals with links to organised crime). This 
design is deliberate, as it is anticipated that some respondents may, for example, not want to 
discuss specific topics, or that different answers may be provided to the same question. If this 
occurs, it will in itself be a valuable research finding that will indicate the different opinions 
of the groups on the research topic. In order to obtain access to gang members and establish a 
mutual relationship of trust, a significant amount of time will have to be spent in the field. 
Access to members of organised criminal groups is usually obtained through a series of 
gatekeepers or informants and it is hoped that the opportunity for the establishment of such 
relationships can be created. A gatekeeper can either have formal or informal authority to 
give the researcher access to a specific research site. In the majority of the cases, access has 
to be negotiated. Gatekeepers can also set specific rules or just guidelines under which the 
data can be collected (Neuman, 2006: 387; Burnham et al, 2008:292; Bailey, 1996:50). 
 
This study will be conducted within the following delimitation: The geographical location is 
limited to the City of Cape Town and the Cape Flats. More specifically, the geographical 
limitation with regards to the field work process will be restricted to Manenberg. The state 
will only be researched on a local level, to determine the impact of organised crime on the 
social control by the state. Agents of the state operating on a local level will be included, thus 
it will not only be agents of the state directly linked to local government. Although religion 
may be a variable to observe when conducting research on the Cape Flats, it was not selected 
as a variable for this study.  
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The primary data for this study will be gathered by conducting field research in Manenberg. 
Manenberg has long been regarded as one of the areas of the Cape Flats notorious for gang 
activity. It was the operational centre of the Staggie brothers, Rashied and Rashaad - the latter 
was gunned down and torched by a vigilante group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs 
(PAGAD) in 1996. However, this is not the main reason why Manenberg was selected as the 
primary site to conduct this investigation. Despite the omniscient presence of gangs in 
Manenberg, the community
6
 has experienced a period of relative calm with regards to gang 
wars at the time of writing. In other areas of the Cape Flats, gang-related violence was still 
observed.  
 
Two aspects were of crucial importance during data collection: safety and ethical 
considerations. First, it is important to note that Manenberg should not be made out as a 
lawless and dangerous neighbourhood, not to be entered without armed protection; just as any 
suburb it is home to thousands of people. However, for an outsider with a recorder, clipbook, 
limited knowledge of the area and asking questions about gangs and local government, it can 
be an unsafe place. Therefore, the reliance on local guides and informants is essential. 
Second, the topic of organised criminal groups and their interaction (or lack thereof) with 
local government and the community is a very sensitive topic. Extra measures will be taken 
in order to protect the identity of and information provided by respondents and to make sure 
that the research accords with ethical guidelines. This will be further explained in chapter 
two.  
 
1.5 Outline of the remainder of the Study  
 CHAPTER TWO: The Research Process 
Chapter two will further explain the research design that guides this study. The following 
elements will be discussed in detail: The case study research design, the levels of 
analysis, the purpose of this study, the qualitative research methodology, the field 
research process and research techniques, research ethics and last, basic safety while 
doing fieldwork.   
 
 
                                                 
6
  In this study the concept of community refers to the community of the Cape Flats and more specifically, 
Manenberg. As will be explained later, rehabilitated members of gangs are rather regarded to be part of the 
criminal society, than the general community.  
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 CHAPTER THREE: Conceptual Framework  
This chapter will provide the theoretical foundation of this study. A conceptual 
framework for the state will be established, as it will be used in this study. Two other 
conceptual clarifications will also be provided as these concepts are central to this study: 
state-building and nation-building and state decay (state weakness, state failure and state 
collapse). There will be a focus on state-society relations, as it is the central theme of this 
study. The chapter will also look at the criminalisation of the state and a framework in 
order to analyse the criminalisation of the state (at local government level) will be 
constructed. 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR: Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Organised Crime. 
International and Local Developments and Trends 
This chapter will provide a conceptualisation and contextualisation of the independent 
variable of this study: Organised crime. In the first part of the chapter, organised crime 
will be conceptualised to create a clear foundation of how the concept will be used in this 
study. The chapter will also discuss transnational organised crime trends. In addition, 
there will be an explanation of organised crime in South Africa, starting with a 
description of the historical development of organised crime in South Africa, the 
expansion and the current situation. Since the selected case study for this study is Cape 
Town, and more specifically Manenberg, the chapter will end with an examination of the 
historical developments of the gangs on the Cape Flats and the current situation.   
 
 CHAPTER FIVE: Contextualisation: Local Government in South Africa and in the 
City of Cape Town.  
The main aim of this chapter is to provide a contextualisation of the dependent variable, 
the state. As the level of analysis of this study is the state at the local level, the 
contextualisation will first focus on a general conceptualisation of local government in 
South Africa and then move on to the City of Cape Town, which is the focal point of this 
chapter. To conclude the chapter, there will also be a focus on one specific aspect of local 
government, namely the security services.  
 
 CHAPTER SIX: Organised Crime and Local Governance Manenberg  
Chapter six will analyse the empirical data that will be collected for this study and 
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accordingly present the findings. The analysis of the data will be structured according to 
the three indicators of social control: Compliance, participation and legitimacy. The 
chapter will further provide insight into the power dynamics between the three main 
agents of this study, the state, the community and organised criminal groups, and also 
measure the level of criminalisation of the state, as a result of the activities of organised 
criminal groups.  
 
 CHAPTER SEVEN: Concluding remarks  
Chapter seven will conclude this study, containing the evaluation of the research 
conducted. In addition, the chapter will summarise the research process and provide 
commentary on future research.  
 
1.6 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to provide a detailed introduction to this study and to provide an 
brief overview of the research process. The following aspects were discussed: Problem 
statement and focus of this study (including the research questions and rationale), the 
theoretical points of departure and literature overview, the research design and research 
methods (including the variables, units of analysis and level of analysis), the limitations and 
delimitations of the research and an outline of the remainder of this study. The chapter 
accordingly provided a framework of how this study will be organised and executed.   
 
The following chapter sets out to explain in detail the research process that guided this study. 
The aspects that will be discussed include the case study research design, the levels of 
analysis, the purpose of this study, the qualitative research methodology, the field research 
process and research techniques, research ethics and basic safety while doing fieldwork. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE RESEARCH PROCESS  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Research can be regarded as the production of knowledge and the research process is the 
roadmap or guide used in order to produce knowledge about a specific topic under 
consideration. To provide a foundation for the research process, there is a reliance on theory. 
Accordingly, the theory in this study was used as an explanatory tool to guide the research 
process. This study contains elements of both the deductive direction of theorising but also 
elements of inductive generalisation. As noted by Neuman (2006:59): “…in practice, most 
researchers are flexible and use both approaches at various points in the study…”. Deductive 
theorising can be explained as an approach where theory is developed or confirmed and 
where the researcher begins with abstract concepts and moves towards more empirical 
evidence (Neuman, 2006:59). This study can be described as deductive, seen as it started with 
general theory (based on the state as the principal unit of analysis and centred on state-society 
relations) and then progressed to extract specific theoretical elements that formed the 
foundation for the empirical analysis in the study. Accordingly, new insights on the initial 
theoretical attributes were developed. The study described and analysed the general broader 
theory, and narrowed it down to be applicable to this specific research problem.  
 
The inductive direction of theorising is described as: “…an approach to developing or 
confirming a theory that begins with concrete empirical evidence and works towards more 
abstract concepts and theoretical relationships…” (Neuman, 2006:60). This study contains 
elements of inductive reasoning, as observations (data collected during the field work 
process) are made about real life,  the process of empirical generalisation is present, tentative 
hypotheses are developed and tested (against the theoretical foundation) and in conclusion, 
new theory can be constructed. As will be explained in section 2.2.1 of this chapter, the 
research design utilised here is a case study. As noted by Gillham (2000:12), case study 
research is inductive, as grounded theory is developed, meaning theory that is grounded in the 
data or evidence assembled during the course of the study. However, as mentioned, both 
directions of theorising occurred in various stages of the research process, as will be 
elaborated upon in this chapter. The main aim of this study was to elaborate on and contribute 
to the existing theoretical framework of the state and more specifically, state-society 
relations.  
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The following chapter will explain in detail the research process that guided this study. The 
specific research design and research methodology was selected in order to analyse the 
features of the relationship between local governance, societies and organised criminal 
groups. The following elements will be discussed: The case study research design, the levels 
of analysis, the purpose of the study, the qualitative research methodology, the field research 
process and research techniques, research ethics and lastly, basic safety while doing 
fieldwork.   
 
2.2 The Research Design  
The research design and methodology selected for this study was based on two central 
elements. The first element was the sensitivity of the research topic. Doing research on 
organised crime brings with it the inevitable consequence of criminal activities being 
exposed. Thus, it is not only regarded as a sensitive and delicate topic for the researcher that 
will be confronted with information regarding illicit acts, but also for the respondents, some 
of whom are, or may be, members of organised criminal groups, who have to acknowledge 
participation in such acts. In addition, members of the community could also be witnesses to 
such actions. Information about the criminal underworld and illicit economy sometimes also 
discloses acts of violence, such as clashes between gangs for territory or turf, instructed 
killings of rival gang members, brutality in prisons and common criminal activities such as 
the selling of drugs. Given that this study involved three categories of respondents, as will be 
explained in detail below, the sensitivity of the topic under consideration was not limited to 
criminal groups. The other category of respondents were local agents of governance and here 
the sensitivity was located in exposing the relationship between local government and 
organised criminal groups. It is not only the aspect of corrupt links with organised crime that 
can be exposed, but also a possibility of the existence of mutually dependent relationships 
and an acceptance of the presence of the illicit economy, that requires a level of caution when 
conducting research. The last category of respondents was members of the community. 
Factors related to the sensitivity of the research included poverty, the breakdown of family 
structures and the level of violence experienced when living in an area infested with criminal 
activities.  
 
The second element that was considered during the drawing up of this study was safety. 
Again, the focus here was not only on the researcher and those involved in the collecting of 
the data (research assistant) but also of the respondents. During the design of the study it was 
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decided that the bulk of the field work will be conducted at the selected site, namely 
Manenberg on the Cape Flats, South Africa. This proposed a substantial safety risk for the 
researcher and research assistant.
7
 In addition and as previously mentioned, it was anticipated 
that some of the information that will be gathered will be of such a nature that it could 
incriminate respondents. Consequently, practical measures to ensure physical safety, the 
anonymity of respondents and general ethical considerations were regarded as a priority. As a 
result, the research design was developed to accommodate the elements of sensitivity and 
safety. The description that follows will justify and explain the selected research method, the 
research techniques, the data analysis process and the research ethics relevant to this study 
based on the sensitivity of the topic and the safety of all parties involved in the research 
project. All of these aspects were deliberately and systematically selected so as to assist with 
the research of the specific impact of organised crime on the state, the power dynamics 
between the three primary agents of the study and the level of criminalisation (if any) of the 
state, at the level of local government.  
 
2.2.1 The Research Design: A Case Study  
The research design of a study is regarded as the research plan or framework for that project. 
In addition, it is also a demonstration of what the end product will look like. Different 
research questions require different research designs, for example a comparative design, 
experimental design, or a case study design. The research design used for this study was a 
single case study as there was an intensive investigation of one specific case. Yin (1984:29) 
notes that there are five components of a research design that are particularly important. 
These five components are: The research questions of the study, the propositions of the  study 
(if used), the unit (s) of analysis, how the data will be linked to the propositions (the process 
after data collection) and what the criteria will be for interpreting the findings of the  study 
(the last two steps involve the analysis of the data). These components need to be present for 
a case study research design.  
 
Babbie and Mouton (2001:281) describe case studies to involve the examination of several 
variables, as part of an intensive investigation of one unit. “…The interaction of the unit of 
study with its context is a significant part of the investigation. Thickly described case studies 
take multiple perspectives into account and attempt to understand the influences of multilevel 
                                                 
7
 For more information on safety risks associated with doing research in Manenberg for this study, refer to 
section 2.3.3.  
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social systems on subjects‟ perspectives and behaviours…” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:281). 
For the purpose of this study, a case study research design was selected as it created the 
opportunity to describe the context in detail, in order to interpret the specific case. One case 
was selected in order to illustrate and analytically study the topic under discussion; the 
relationship between the state and a specific sector of society. As case study research design 
was used: “…to demonstrate a causal argument about how general social forces shape and 
produce results in particular settings…” (Walton, 1992:122), it was deemed relevant and 
applicable for this  study, where social forces observed in the context of the state have an 
impact on a specific community (setting). When using a case study research design, it enables 
the researcher to connect the micro level of analysis to the macro level; thus, it provides 
insight that will enable the researcher to expand/build theory. As a result, the case study was 
not selected as a design for this study with the aim of making generalisations, but rather to 
produce theory. Yin (1984:42 - 43) confirms this by stating that one possible rationale of a 
single case study is that the case represents a critical opportunity in testing a well formulated 
theory. Yin (1984) further explains that testing the theory entails determining if the 
propositions of the theory are correct, or if there are alternative explanations that are more 
relevant to explain the social phenomenon. The single case will be applied to confirm, 
challenge or extend the theory.  
 
Despite the fact that the case study design was deemed as most appropriate for this study, the 
design is criticised for certain weaknesses. As noted by Yin (1984:21) there can be a lack of 
rigour as a result of biased views by the researcher. Biased views can influence the findings 
and conclusions of the study. Another weakness of case study research is the problem of 
generalisation, in that one case is not enough to produce a valid generalisation. These 
limitations are addressed in this study in the following way: First, as will be explained in 
section 2.3.2, several research methods were utilised while collecting the data. It was 
anticipated that the triangulation of research methods will decrease researcher bias. The data 
also went through a rigorous coding process and was analysed in three phases, as will be 
explained in section 6.2 of chapter six. Second, as mentioned earlier in this section, a case 
study research design was selected for this study, not in order to make generalisations, but 
rather to confirm, challenge or extend the theoretical foundation that the study was based on. 
To be more specific, case studies: “…are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations or universes…” (Yin, 1984:21). This principle was what guided this study.  
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The case selected for this study is based in South Africa. The specific case chosen in South 
Africa is the city of Cape Town. Thus, the impact of organised crime on the social control by 
the state was analysed through observation of the interaction between local governance in the 
City of Cape Town, South Africa.  
 
The City of Cape Town was selected as the case study for a number of reasons. First, there is 
a large presence of organised criminal groups, the primary non-state actor in this study, in the 
city. More specifically, there are significant and continuous gang activities in the area known 
as the Cape Flats, which is a suburb of Cape Town. As explained in the first chapter, the 
conditions on the Cape Flats encouraged the formation and activities of loosely structured 
gangs. Still today, the members of these groups come from the community and have close 
relationships with the community. More specifically, Manenberg is one of the 
neighbourhoods on the Cape Flats. The boundaries of the neighbourhood can be traced by 
following Duinefontein Road which mostly runs parallel to the main railway line that 
separates Manenberg from Gugulethu. The boundaries extend to Lansdowne Road to the 
south and Klipfontein Road to the north (See map 2.1 and 2.2). Manenberg is a 
predominantly Coloured suburb of Cape Town, located in the centre of the Cape Flats. 
According to the City of Cape Town (using 2001 Census data supplied by Statistics South 
Africa) the population of Manenberg exceeds 50,000 residents. Almost 35% of the population 
was unemployed at the time of the Census and more than 58%  had an income of between 0 – 
R1,600 per month and more than 37% an income between R1,601 and R6,400 (City of Cape 
Town, 2002).  
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Map 2.1: The location of Manenberg on the Cape Flats  
(Source: Adapted from Google Maps, 2012).  
Map 2.2: Google Earth Satellite Image of Manenberg on the Cape Flats  
(Source: Adapted from Google Maps, 2012) 
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As previously mentioned, the objective of this study was not to generalise the findings of the 
study on all areas with similar characteristics. Also, the purpose was not to generalise the 
findings of the relationship between the state and the society and the impact of a non-state 
actor on all communities, or areas of the City of Cape Town, but rather only the site where 
the fieldwork occurred. Furthermore, the purpose was to be in the position to comment on the 
theories of state-society relationships, state strength and weakness and the criminalisation of 
the state. Based on the main theoretical position that this study was grounded in, Migdal‟s 
1988 work on state-society relations, a case had to be selected that represents all of the actors 
relevant to the theory. Indeed, the South African state in general, but also the level of local 
government has specific limitations or a lack of state capabilities. Thus, the state exhibits 
restrictions with regard to its social control. In conjunction with restricted social control there 
is also the presence of a non-state actor in the form of organised criminal groups, more 
specifically the gangs on the Cape Flats. The gangs originate from the local community and 
accordingly the focus was kept on state-society relations. The case of the City of Cape Town 
was deemed an adequate case of state-society relations that will help facilitate the answering 
of the main research question and the two supportive research questions.  
 
2.2.2 Levels of Analysis of this Study 
The unit of analysis can be described as the units or components which are examined in order 
to create summary descriptions of all such units and to explain differences among them. In 
addition, units of analysis are fundamental elements during concept development and they 
assist to empirically measure and observe concepts. In this study there were three units of 
analysis: Actors of local governance functioning in the geographical jurisdiction of the City 
of Cape Town, the gangs on the Cape Flats and the community of Manenberg. To be more 
specific, each of these units was analysed on one level, namely the local level. Accordingly, 
local governance in the City of Cape Town was analysed as an administrative unit with a 
specific geographical jurisdiction. The gangs on the Cape Flats were analysed as an informal 
authority that is community based, that exercises control and has influence over a specific 
territory. These territories are usually geographically defined; however, the actions of the 
gangs can take place outside of the territory under control. Last, the community of 
Mannenberg was analysed as a geographical administrative region, including various 
community structures, both formal and informal (See figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1: Units and Level of Analysis  
(Source: Produced by the author for this study).  
 
2.2.3 Purpose of this Study  
The purpose of this study contains elements of descriptive, explanatory and exploratory 
research. The research is descriptive as it provides a representation or depiction of the 
specific case under consideration. The key elements of descriptive research are to describe a 
present situation and focus on how and who questions. Descriptive studies: “…present a 
picture of types of people or social activities…” (Neuman, 2006:35). This study described the 
social setting of the Cape Flats and local government in the City of Cape Town in South 
Africa (contextualisation), while also explaining the relationships between the three central 
agents analysed in this study: Agents of the government functioning on a local level, 
organised criminal groups and members of the community of the Cape Flats.  
 
When conducting exploratory research the goal is to become familiar with a little explored 
research topic. The primary purpose is to: “…formulate more precise questions that future 
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research can answer…” and the focus is on the what question (Neuman, 2006:33). This study 
is exploratory as it researches not only what the impact of organised crime on the state is, 
what the power dynamics between local governance, criminal agents and society is, but also 
what the level of criminalisation of the state is, as a result of the impact of organised criminal 
groups.  
 
Explanatory research answers the why question and builds on exploratory and descriptive 
research. It provides causes and reasons for why something occurs. This is done in order to 
build, elaborate, extend or test theory (Neuman, 2006:35). This study is explanatory as it 
hopes to contribute to the theoretical foundations of state-society relations. The contribution 
of this study is located in the application of Migdal‟s (1988) theory on state-society relations 
(with specific reference to strong societies and weak states) on the selected case of the City of 
Cape Town. As will be explained in chapter three of this study, it forms the main theoretical 
framework for analysis. This framework is applied to the case study in order to confirm or 
complement the original assumptions of the theory.  
 
2.3 The Research Methodology  
It is a common mistake among researchers, to confuse the concepts of research design and 
research methodology, or use it interchangeably, as noted by Babbie and Mouton (2001:74). 
The research methodology of a study refers to how the research will be conducted; thus, the 
research process. The research methodology will focus on the steps in the research process 
and the procedures used to obtain the most unbiased (valid and reliable) answers to the 
research questions.  
 
The research methodology of this study can be described as qualitative. A qualitative 
methodology was selected as it is more flexible and less structured. Gillham (2000:11) lists a 
number of advantages of qualitative research, which include carrying out research where 
other methods are not practical or ethically justifiable. Another advantage of qualitative 
research is that it is used: “…to explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more 
„controlled‟ approaches…” (Gillham, 2000:11).8 As this research topic is concerned with 
aspects such as the illicit economy, criminal activities and other sensitive matters, it was 
                                                 
8
  It is important to note that although the methodology of this study is qualitative, all evidence and data 
collected about the specific case under consideration was used. Quantitative data was thus used, but the 
qualitative method was primary.  
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important to select a research methodology that was open to unanticipated data. In qualitative 
research, ideas, motives, themes, words, observations and transcripts are examined and the 
context is essential to understand the research topic. This study is a detailed investigation of 
one specific case and hypotheses were generated through the research process. Barbour 
(2007:xiii) agrees that hypotheses are usually not formulated at the beginning of qualitative 
research, but rather developed and refined in the process of research.  
 
Thus, for this study, the research methodology was primarily qualitative in nature and both 
secondary and primary qualitative data was utilised. The qualitative research methodology 
was selected based on: first, the sensitive nature of the topic and second, due to the case study 
research design. To confirm, Standing (2006:xi) notes that quantitative surveys are not 
entirely successful when researching gangs on the Cape Flats as: “…people living and 
working on the Cape Flats are not willing to divulge sensitive and potentially dangerous 
information to strangers with clipboards…”.  
 
2.3.1 Secondary Data Analysis  
Secondary data analysis predominantly took place in the earlier phases of the study, but also 
during and after the fieldwork was conducted. Secondary data was mainly used in chapter 
three (theoretical foundation, conceptual clarification and framework for analysis), chapter 
four (contextualisation of organised crime in South Africa) and chapter five 
(contextualisation of local government in South Africa and the City Of Cape Town). The 
secondary data focused on existing data, relevant to the research topic, and information was 
sourced from academic books and journals. In addition, a source of secondary data that was 
regarded as essential to the research topic was community newspapers.
9
 These texts were 
used before entering the field, in order to identify key informants on the topic. Newspapers 
were also monitored during the fieldwork process to stay in touch with the situation on the 
ground, and after exiting the field, to stay up-to-date and informed on the developments in the 
community. The documentation used in this study also included primary documents and 
reports from the City of Cape Town and official government documents. Documentation was 
predominantly used for two reasons. The first was to provide background information and 
context before entering the field; and second, it was a source of information after exiting the 
field in order to stay up to date with local developments.  
                                                 
9
  The two main community newspapers that were consulted were Die Son and The Daily Voice.  
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The time dimension of this study can be described as cross-sectional research, given that a 
single timeframe was used. Thus, observations were made at one specific point in time. A 
disadvantage of cross-sectional research is that it does not capture change or social processes 
in the phenomenon observed (Neuman, 2006:37). However, as this study investigates a single 
case and the context and attributes of that case, not in order to generalise or track 
development, but rather to relate it back to the theoretical foundations of the study, this time 
dimension was deemed adequate.  
 
2.3.2 The Field Research Process and Research Techniques  
Primary data was gathered predominantly by conducting field-research in Manenberg, a 
suburb of Cape Town, located in the centre of the Cape Flats. A number of interviews were 
also conducted in the City of Cape Town. Several qualitative research techniques were used 
in this study, namely dyads, triads, mini-focus group discussions (referred to in the rest of the 
study as small group discussions), key informant interviews and direct observation. Face to 
face interviews were deliberately combined with the small group discussions, in order to 
overcome possible problems with authority and race. As mentioned in chapter one, 
triangulation of methods were implemented to eradicate bias. The majority of the interviews 
were conducted in English to ease the transcribing process.  
 
2.3.2.1 Small Group Discussions  
The main purpose of the small group discussions was to explore the attitudes and experiences 
of the participants regarding the interaction between organised criminal groups, the society 
and local government. During the data gathering process it emerged that these smaller group 
discussions are more suitable than for example larger groups of eight to ten people, for the 
sensitive themes that were discussed. The majority of respondents from the community 
preferred to be accompanied by a friend and felt more comfortable sharing their stories and 
experiences in the company of friends and relatives in a small group, rather than with 
strangers. Barbour (2007:60) agrees that for specific topics, smaller groups are preferable. 
This relates back to the research topic and the sensitivity of the topic. In total, five small 
group discussions were conducted: three small group discussions were held with members of 
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the community and two with rehabilitated members of gangs on the Cape Flats. The total 
number of respondents who participated in the small group discussions was 14.
10
  
 
Focus groups have been used successfully in past research on gangs on the Cape Flats. In his 
2004 study, Terugskiet (returning fire): Growing up on the street corners of Manenberg, 
South Africa, Ted Legget  made use of focus groups (amongst other research techniques) 
consisting of gang members and community members of the Cape Flats, to research gangs 
and youth violence in the area. As noted by Barbour (2007:18) focus groups have been used 
in the past to research sensitive topics, for example sexual behaviour, mental health and 
terminal illness, or where respondents originated from vulnerable groups.
11
 Focus groups 
have also been used to access marginalised groups or unapproachable populations, including 
minority ethnic groups and members of criminal gangs.
12
  
 
For the small group discussions, the method of quota sampling (a method of nonprobability 
sampling) was used, as predetermined categories for the inclusion and participation of 
individuals in the focus groups (and key informant interviews) were established. Quota 
sampling is a: “…nonrandom sample in which the researcher first identifies general 
categories into which cases or people will be selected, and then he or she selects cases to 
reach a predetermined number of cases in each category…” (Neuman, 2006:221). The 
categories of respondents were homogenous, as they shared common bases. The three 
predetermined categories were: members of the community (either male or female living in 
Manenberg), rehabilitated members of organised criminal groups (either male or female, also 
residing in Manenberg) and local agents of governances (either part of the City of Cape 
Town, or functioning on a local level). All the respondents were older than 18 years. After 
these predetermined categories were selected, the sampling method was haphazard, as anyone 
that fitted in these categories had a chance of being selected. As explained by Burnham et al 
(2008:107) the researcher is free to select as a respondent, anyone who fits the criteria of the 
predetermined categories. In addition, this method was also selected given that during the 
course of the fieldwork, if a person was approached to be a respondent but declined, 
replacements were allowed.  
                                                 
10
 The n of the small group discussions was deemed adequate as the level of saturation was reached during the 
discussions (themes were echoed and repeated by the respondents).  
11
 See also Lee (1993:101 – 102) on the notion that sensitive topics are not suited for survey research.  
12
 For example, see the study of Valdez and Kaplan (1999) on Mexican-American gang members in the United 
States.  
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2.3.2.2 Key Informant Interviews  
As the second research technique, the purpose of the key informant interviews was to obtain 
information on the respondents‟ insight, involvement and perspective on gangs on the Cape 
Flats and the role and purpose of local government agents. Thus, key informant interviews 
were conducted in order to get access to detailed data through the process of in-depth 
communication. Similar to the rationale behind conducting small group discussions, face to 
face interviews were used due to the sensitivity of the topic. Gillham (2000:62) agrees that 
face to face interviews are preferred where trust is needed between the interviewer and the 
interviewee. Respondents are more likely to disclose information in a face to face interview 
than in a questionnaire. 
 
Key informant interviews were conducted with 15 individuals.
13
 The first group of key 
informant interviews came from members of local government or government agents, not 
necessarily working in local government, but functioning on a local level. The second group 
came from members of the community or community based organisations and the last from 
rehabilitated members of gangs. All the participants were older than 18 years. Participants 
from the community of Manenberg had to stay in the area permanently, participants from 
local government either had to work for the City of Cape Town or for the government in 
general, but functioning on a local level, and participants from the rehabilitated gangster 
group had to be part of a gang in the past, but no longer an active gang member. It was 
acknowledged that gangsters could also be regarded as members of the community, as they 
also stay in the area permanently; however, as a result of their affiliation with organised 
crime, they were regarded as part of the criminal society and not the general community. 
During the key informant interviews another sampling method was used, namely snowball 
sampling. Initial contacts were used to recommend other respondents. As noted by Burnham 
et al (2008:108) snowball sampling: “…is a valuable strategy for generating a sample of 
people or groups which otherwise would be impossible to access…”. As gatekeepers were 
used in the study to get access to rehabilitated members of organised criminal groups the 
method of snowball sampling was essential to obtain additional respondents. The process 
started with one respondent (the gatekeeper) and the sample expanded as a result of links or 
interrelationships with the initial case. Snowball sampling is acknowledged as an effective 
sampling technique when studying members of a vulnerable or stigmatised group. One of the 
                                                 
13
  The n of the face to face interviews was deemed adequate as the level of saturation was reached during the 
discussions (themes were echoed and repeated by the respondents). 
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reasons for the effectiveness of this sampling method in such cases is that: “…the 
intermediaries who form the links of the referral chain are known to the potential respondents 
and trusted by them…” (Lee, 1993:67). This element of snowball sampling also contributed 
to the safety and confidentiality of this study. However, the method of snowball sampling has 
limitations in that it can be regarded as a biased sampling process. This is a result of the non-
randomness of the method and respondents are selected based on their connections with each 
other. This may lead to a “…skewing of sample characteristics…” (Baxter and Eyles, 
1997:513). This limitation was first addressed by pre-selecting categories of key informants 
and second, by trying to interview a similar number of respondents for each category.   
 
2.3.2.3 Direct Observation  
Direct observation
14
 was an important data collection method used in this study. Direct 
observation was conducted in order to get an insiders‟ understanding of the topic under 
consideration. In addition, it was also an important method to support the interviews 
conducted. Observation, either direct or participant, is widely regarded to be an essential 
additional data collection method to interviews: “…even studies that rely mainly on 
interviewing as a data collection technique employ observational methods to note body 
language and other gestural cues that lend meaning to the words of the person being 
interviewed…” (Angrosino, 2008: 161). Accordingly, during the field research particular 
attention was drawn to a number of elements that were observed. These were the physical 
surroundings of the area in which the fieldwork was conducted. Physical surroundings were 
also important when interviewing individuals, serving as an indicator of social status. The 
leader of a particular organised criminal group, for example, was the only one who had a 
double-story house in the area. This also related to objects in place in a specific setting and 
the social significance of the specific site of fieldwork. Examples observed, include social 
and economic development in the area, structures of houses, quality of road infrastructure, 
schools and public spaces and the capacity of the local police station.
15
  
 
                                                 
14
  Direct observation can also be referred to as “…simple observation…” The researcher remains an outside 
observer. This is opposed to participant observation, where the researcher forms part of the group that is 
studied, but also fulfils the role of the researcher (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:293).  In addition, Gillham 
(2000:21) refers to “…detached observation…” or the “…fly on the wall approach…”   
15
  Bailey (1996:66 – 67) draws attention to the following elements to be observed with regard to physical 
surroundings: lighting, colour, smell, sounds, objects and weather and temperature.  
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With specific reference to the respondents interviewed, elements such as race, age, gender 
and clothing were observed.
16
 A very important aspect under consideration during this study 
was body markings or tattoos of the members of organised criminal groups. These markings 
not only indicated respondents‟ affiliation to a specific gang, but also the persons‟ rank in the 
gang. The respondents‟ body language was also an important observation. This was 
particularly important during the group discussions with former members of organised 
criminal groups. Aspects such as aggression, reaction towards members of other gangs, 
attitudes towards the police etc. formed part of essential observations. The majority of the 
respondents and people observed in Manenberg were able to speak English; however, the 
majority language spoken is Afrikaans. To be more specific, a dialect of Afrikaans is the 
dominant form of verbal communication. It was therefore important to become familiar with 
specific words and phrases used. In the cases where respondents were not able to conduct an 
interview in English, the interview was conducted in Afrikaans and translated before analysis. 
The advantages of direct observation included that it was the most direct way of engaging 
with respondents in their regular setting, and in the initial phases of this study it provided 
insight into the topic to be researched. Respondents were more at ease to share information; 
including life-stories and pictures.
17
 
 
2.4 Research Ethics  
When collecting primary data, the following questions are crucial to consider before 
embarking on the research process, as it will provide insight into the ethical risks of the 
proposed study. Can deception or misrepresentation while dealing with the research subjects 
be avoided? Will the identities of the research interests of all parties involved in the study be 
protected? Can the confidentiality of the information provided during the research process be 
guaranteed? These ethical elements were all considered during the fieldwork process.  
 
While collecting the primary data, a moral dilemma of not to get caught in or become part of 
criminal activity, was present. This dilemma also relates to what information (if related to 
criminal activities) should be declared to the authorities. The following basic guidelines were 
followed in this study in order to overcome this. First, personal boundaries were set before 
entering the field. These included elements such as: There will be no involvement in criminal 
                                                 
16
  Bailey (1996:67 – 69) draws attention to the following elements to be observed with regard to the 
observation of members: body language, verbal behaviours and characteristics of the speech and the 
speakers. 
17
  For more information on the advantages and disadvantages of observation, see Gillham, 2000:45.  
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activities and all information (such as locations and the witness of criminal actions) will be 
treated as confidential. It was decided that the only incident that will be reported to 
authorities if witnessed, was child abuse. Second, it was acknowledged that any attempt to 
mislead the respondents would undermine the purpose of the study. Accordingly, respondents 
were fully informed about the objectives of this study and what the data will be used for. It 
was essential to establish and maintain trust between the researcher and the researched for the 
duration of the study; honesty and openness as the objective of the study, contributed to 
create a trustworthy relationship. The research subjects were also guaranteed that they will 
remain anonymous.
18
 Second, it was realised that if ethical rules were not followed, it may 
bring disorder to the field and damage to the discipline, when studying similar research 
topics, involving organised criminal groups and their interaction with local government and 
the community. It could also have involved personal trauma for all people involved in this 
study. No money was paid to any of the respondents who participated in the interviews; 
however, if money was used by the respondents for transport in order to be present at the 
interview, it was refunded.  
 
A great emphasis was placed on the ethical considerations during the design of the study, the 
data collection phase and also the data analysis. As a starting point, to ensure a high standard 
of research ethics the study obtained ethical clearance from the Research Ethics Committee 
from Stellenbosch University. As explained by Babbie and Mouton (2001:528): “…the main 
responsibility of such a committee is to insure that the risks faced by human participants in 
research are minimal…”. In order to obtain ethical clearance from the committee, specific 
attention was given to a number of aspects. These were: first, to get informed consent from 
each respondent to participate in the study. For a respondent to give informed consent, the 
purpose of the study, the procedures, potential risks and discomforts, potential benefits to the 
research subject/and or society, payment for participation, confidentiality, participation and 
withdrawal, identification of investigators and rights of the research subjects had to be 
explained.
19
  
                                                 
18
  Lee (1993:97 - 98) confirms that confessions or sharing information that are intimate or personally 
discrediting are easier when privacy and anonymity are guaranteed.  Privacy, anonymity and confidentiality 
(amongst other aspects) create trust between the interviewer and the interviewee.   
19
  These elements are also mentioned by Bailey (1996:10 - 11). Although field researchers do not always agree 
on one set of ethical standards, informed consent is essential, based on the purpose of the study, procedures, 
risks and benefits, voluntary nature of their participation, right to stop the research, and confidentiality and 
anonymity. The research can only proceed if respondents understand and agree to these elements of the 
study.  
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As this research was deemed to fall in a high risk category, extra measures were taken to 
ensure the safety of all involved in the study, including the investigators and participants. The 
research assistant was requested to sign a confidentiality contract that stipulated that all 
information obtained while working on the project, in the capacity of research assistant, will 
be handled as strictly confidential and that no information obtained during and related to the 
study will be shared with a third party. During the majority of the small group discussions a 
therapist was present in case one of the respondents needed to be debriefed after a session. 
The therapist also signed a letter of confidentiality.  
 
The following documentation was submitted to the ethics committee of Stellenbosch 
University in order to obtain ethical clearance: A consent form that respondents had to sign 
when they participated in the research, the interview schedule, the research proposal and the 
Ethics Committee application form. The last mentioned document stipulated, amongst other 
things, that all data will either be stored electronically, on a password protected laptop or in a 
lockable cabinet in the Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University.
20
   
 
2.5 Basic Safety during Fieldwork  
While collecting the primary data, basic safety features were exercised, in order to ensure the 
safety of all parties involved. Before entering the field, physical risks (for example physical 
harm and criminal activities) were assessed and analysed. As mentioned before, access to the 
field was obtained by using gatekeepers. Another important element was to obtain a research 
assistant that was familiar with the local language/dialect and the location.  
 
The data was recorded by using a dictaphone. Several of the small group discussions were 
also video-recorded. However, the video data was not used in the analysis, only the audio 
data. During the interviews, extensive notes were also made. With regard to the method of 
recording data, it was essential to obtain permission of the interviewees to be recorded (video 
or voice) before the interviews started. Hiding the recorder or telling the respondents that, for 
example, only notes will be used, would have significantly impacted on the ethics of this 
study, as confirmed by Bailey (1996:76) when she states that recording interviews without 
explicit permission is unethical.  
                                                 
20
  See also Lee (1993:179 – 180) on protecting the confidentiality of data by storing it in a computer 
programme. It is believed that the securing of the confidentiality of the data collected in this study was 
increased by using a computer programme.  
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While doing fieldwork, the location of the key informant interviews and the small group 
discussions were carefully selected. As the site of the fieldwork was divided between the 
territories of different gangs, interviews and small group discussions were conducted in areas 
that were neutral territory. These locations included the local hospital in Manenberg, the 
police station, a primary school and three community centres.
21
 The site was never entered 
without the presence of a research assistant that was familiar with the area, or the primary 
gatekeeper.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter explained the research process of this study. The aim of the chapter was to 
provide a description of the research process, which drew attention to the nature of the 
research (the sensitivity of the topic) and how this impacted on the research design and 
methodology. A case study research design was selected, given that the aim of this study is 
not to make generalisations. The intensive study of one case is usually not associated with 
producing findings that could be applied beyond the boundaries of the context in which the 
research was conducted. Rather, the aim is to contribute to the theoretical foundations and 
construct new theory, through the analysis of a specific case. The research process as 
explained in this chapter was selected in order to analyse the relationship between organised 
crime and local governance in South Africa, so as to assess how organised crime impacts on 
the social control by the state. This research process was deemed the most applicable in order 
to investigate the impact of organised crime on local governance.   
 
The following chapter will provide the theoretical foundation of this study. A conceptual 
clarification will be provided of the dependent variable, the state, and several other concepts 
central to this study will be explained. The chapter will give a detailed account of theories on 
the state and state-society relations, as they will be used for the purposes of this study. This 
theoretical and conceptual basis is vital, as it will guide the research. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
  Barbour (2007:48) comments on the importance of the setting of focus groups and how it will impact on the 
focus of the data collected. Accordingly, and despite the safety element, it was essential to select a neutral 
territory, free from gang activity.  
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Introduction  
There exists a vast amount of literature on theories of the state, which mainly differs on what 
the nature of state power is and should be. In addition there are also different perceptions on 
what the role of the state is and/or should be. The purpose of this study is not to provide a 
complete literature review of the abovementioned topics. Instead, the purpose of this study is 
to answer the main and supportive research questions as presented in chapter one. In order to 
answer these questions, there is however, the need to conceptualise the notion of the state and 
position the concept within both the broad field of state theory and also other perceptions of 
the state. This will create the foundation of how the dependent variable, the state, will be used 
in this study.  
 
Following on the different theories of the state, there is a central proposition that grounds the 
majority of literature namely that: “…national states constitute the building blocks of 
legitimate world order…” (Rotberg, 2003:1). Accordingly, there is a focus on the search for 
the perfect formula and method in order to construct the state, which will indeed provide a 
system that will be the building blocks of a legitimate world order. These studies usually 
include an analysis of state failure and processes involving state reconstruction. However, 
there exists literature that is based on the proposition that the nation state is not the most 
important actor of authority in order to create a legitimate world order. Studies constructed on 
this proposition include an analysis of other actors of authority, both domestic and 
international. Accordingly, there is a broad theme that covers all literature: The question of 
the durability of the traditional Westphalian notion of the state. This study will be constructed 
on the proposition that the nation-state is the building block of a legitimate world order and 
the most essential institution in the political sphere, with specific reference to the local 
political sphere, and not the global.  
 
This chapter starts by providing an overview of the four classical theories of the state: 
Pluralism, Elite Theory, Marxism and Market Liberalism. This is done in order to provide a 
strong theoretical grounding for the study. The main research question that forms the focal 
point of this study is formulated as: What is the impact of organised crime on the social 
control by the state? The first sub-research question has been formulated as: What are the 
power dynamics between local government, criminal agents and society? The second sub-
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research question has been formulated as: Has the state become criminalised at the level of 
local government, as a result of the activities of organised crime, and if so, to what extent? 
Throughout this chapter, and for the remainder of this study, the underlying theme will be 
state-society relations.  
 
The next section of this chapter will provide a conceptualisation of the state. Two other 
conceptual clarifications will also be provided: State-building and nation-building and the 
process of state decay. These conceptualisations will be provided for a number of reasons: 
The concepts will be used throughout this study. Also, state-building and nation-building are 
concepts often used interchangeably, and for both processes state-society relations are 
essential. Similarly, with the concept of state decay, there are several variations of the 
concept used to indicate the process of the weakening of the state.  
 
Section 3.6 of this chapter will focus on state-society relations, concentrating on the work of 
Joel S. Migdal (1988). Migdal (1988) looks at strong societies and weak states, thus state-
society relations, with specific reference to state capabilities. In order to measure the social 
capabilities of the state, Migdal (1988) uses three concepts, namely compliance, participation 
and legitimacy. As these three concepts are used in chapter five of this study to measure the 
impact of organised crime on the social control by the state, this chapter provides a detailed 
conceptual clarification of the concepts. This consequently presents an analytical framework 
that guides this study and that is utilised in chapter six.  
 
The final section of this chapter, section 3.7, will discuss the relationship between the state 
and non-state actors (located within society). Within the state system, there can be the 
presence of non-state actors that may or may not work in favour of the state in sustaining the 
balance of power. Thus, there may or may not be a mutually beneficial relationship that 
works in favour of either the state or certain actors within the society. The contrasting view 
will also be discussed: An analysis of rival social organisations (as an indicator of strong 
societies), with specific reference to local rival social organisations (as opposed to regional 
and international). There will be a specific emphasis on domestic non-state actors and 
organised criminal groups, thus introducing the independent variable of this study. 
Accordingly, this will be an illustration of a situation where more than one authority 
exercises power on an intra-state level: The state and rival non-state actors, whose operating 
rules may not be reconcilable. This brings the discussion to a very important theme: The 
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impact of the non-state actor on the state. Here, the question is posed: As a non-state actor, 
what does organised crime threaten? One possible impact of organised criminal groups on the 
state is the criminalisation of the state. This study sets out to investigate how and to what 
extent organised crime criminalises the state. In order to do this, a framework with indicators 
needs to be constructed, with which to analyse the level of criminalisation of the state, 
specifically at the local government level. 
 
3.2 Four Classical Theories of the State 
There are several theories of the state, not all of which will be discussed in this chapter. 
Rather, an overview will be provided of four classical theoretical perspectives of the state, 
namely: Pluralism, Elite Theory, Marxism and Market Liberalism.  
 
3.2.1 Pluralism 
The theory of pluralism is based on the idea that there are several diverse centres of power in 
a society; groups that differ in size, aim and structure and approaches to knowledge. 
Accordingly, “…pluralism stresses the beneficial consequences of social and cultural 
diversity, of having many different institutions, values, groups and ways of life…” (Dryzek 
and Dunleavy, 2009:35). Thus, even more than acknowledging diversity, there is the 
recognition that it is advantageous and constructive.  
 
As mentioned, in pluralist theory it is argued that there are several centres of power in a 
society: This power needs to be dispersed, within the framework of a representative 
government and a constitutional, liberal democracy. This has the implication that political 
processes (and the creation of policy) are a result of the interaction between different actors 
and institutions. Groups and groupings are regarded as the building blocks of political life 
(Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009:131). In a pluralist state, power will be distributed amongst 
different and diverse interest groups, pressure groups and political parties, with the state 
acting as the mediator. As a result of the state acting as an arbitrator, it needs to be neutral in 
its relations to the different diverse groups.  
 
With reference to state-society relations, the state is accountable to society and there is a clear 
distinction between the responsibilities of the state and that of society: The state will uphold 
the mechanisms of order and the society will be the driving force behind the mechanisms of 
order, executing it. Schwarzmantel (1994:52) explained it by stating that the state is “…the 
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servant of society and not its master…”. According to this view, the government is more 
important than the state, as agencies of the state such as the judiciary and the police will be 
under the command of the elected representatives. According to the pluralist theory of the 
state, there will be maximum diversity with a central authority, guiding interaction between 
groups (Vincent, 1987:210).  
 
Pluralism as a political theory of the state became dominant in American political science 
during the 1950s and 1960s. However, during the late 1960s and early 1970s the popularity 
of the theory declined. As confirmed by Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009:131): “…Pluralism then 
had to repel attacks from market liberals who saw groups as obstructions to the public 
interest, as well as cope with the lingering hostility of elite theory and Marxism…”. 
Accordingly, neo-pluralism emerged. 
 
Some elements of classical pluralist theory are retained in neo-pluralism. There is still an 
emphasis on individual rights and the freedom of political association in order to participate 
in political processes. This, as well as, emphasis on the importance of competitive elections 
and a constitutional framework are preserved. Public policy is formulated from interactions 
between several groups and actors. However, the inequality and imbalance of these groups 
are recognised (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009:132). One particular type of imbalance exists 
between business and the rest of society. As noted by Dunleavy and O‟Leary (1987:293), 
neo-pluralists:“…are prepared to concede what conventional pluralists always denied, that 
business interests occupy a position of special importance compared with other social 
interests…”. Business interests will in general have a superior influence on policy decisions 
in liberal democracies, according to the neo-pluralist perspective. In addition to this, within 
the neo-pluralist perspective, the position of the state is also different in that the state acts 
more as a role-player and less as a neutral umpire: The state is regarded as an independent 
actor that looks after its own interests.  
 
As the neo-pluralist view acknowledges both state and society as important actors with 
responsibilities, this theory will be used as the theoretical foundation in this study. The theory 
stipulates that the interest of the state should accord with that of society, and a clear 
distinction is made between the government and the state.  
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3.2.2 Elite Theory 
Opposing the view of the pluralist and neo-pluralist theory of the state, where there are 
several diverse centres of power; according to elite theory, power is vested in a small minority 
situated in economic and political institutions. The elites, or small minority, will be in control 
of the resources within a state, which will confirm their position of authority. Accordingly, a 
clear distinction exists between the elite and the mass. The elite minority will rule; however, 
electoral processes will still take place, as this is not linked to the power of the elites. Dryzek 
and Dunleavy (2009:57) comment that earlier normative elite theory argued that the 
domination of a small elite is natural and desirable in a specific society.  
 
It is important to note that although the pluralist theory will acknowledge inequalities in a 
society, this will not however create the establishment of a cohesive elite. The reason for this 
is that elites are often concerned with their own rivalries. However, elite theorist will argue 
that inequalities exist and this confirms a unified power elite. Furthermore, the pluralist view 
concedes that public policy can sometimes involve the redistribution of resources to poorer 
members of society. However, elite theorists will argue that “…any such redistribution does 
not represent any real political influence on the part of ordinary people, merely a way of 
stabilising society in the interest of the elite…” (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009:77). The power 
elite will be in control of the resources of the state and the distribution thereof. As mentioned, 
although pluralists acknowledge that inequalities may establish different divisions, the focus 
remains on diverse organisations participating in the ruling of the state. As elite theory 
focusses on the power dynamics located in this one group of society, it will not be used as the 
theoretical foundation of this study.  
 
3.2.3 Marxism
22
 
The Marxist perspective of the state is characterised by several divisions and interpretations. 
One key element, however, is that the state is viewed through the lens of classes and class 
struggles (Pressman, 2006:6). In addition, the state cannot be understood separately from the 
economic structure of society. A traditional view of this theory sees the state as opportunistic, 
built upon the superstructure of the economy, and working against the interest of the working 
class. Furthermore, the state mirrors class relations in society in general, and acts as a 
                                                 
22
 As there are several Marxist theories on the state, this analysis of the Marxist perspective of the state will 
focus on classical Marxist theory.  
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regulator and repressor of class struggle. The state thus facilitates the class struggle. The main 
aim of the Marxist perspective of the state is to eradicate and eliminate the capitalist state and 
replace it with a socialist system, in order to create a classless society. Accordingly, and as 
noted by Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009:79) the focus of Marxism is on the capitalist state; how 
it came into being, how it functions and how it will cease to function. Marxism and the 
applicability of Marxist theories of the state declined with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) 
and the end of the Soviet Union (1991). In addition, “…the adoption by the Chinese 
Communist Party of a capitalist economic system open to foreign investment in the late 
twentieth century…” led to further deterioration of Marxism (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 
2009:80). For the purposes of this study, Marxist theory will not be used as a guideline, given 
the lack of focus on state-society relations. The focus of the theory is on the class struggle 
and not how the actors of state and society interact.  
 
3.2.4 Market Liberalism  
To end the discussion on classical theories of the state, market liberalism stands in direct 
opposition to the classical Marxist theory, the pluralist theory of the state and elite theory. 
Whereas in the case of pluralism the focus is on groups; in Marxism the focus is on social 
classes and in elite theory on the elites, in market liberalism the focus is on the individual. 
Individuals will compete in markets to satisfy their needs, which can be done most efficiently 
in a capitalist system. Capitalism is accordingly regarded as the optimal system (Dryzek and 
Dunleavy, 2009:101 – 107). Furthermore, according to market-liberalists, the state should be 
pro-capitalist, with minimal interference and acting in an oversight role. It will facilitate 
opportunities, but with limited intervention. It is noted that a specific grouping exists in 
market liberalism, known as anarcho-capitalists, who advocate that the state is not a 
necessary entity. However, in general, the importance of the state is recognised, and the roles 
of the state include the following:  
 
“…defining and protecting private property rights, establishing and enforcing laws of 
contract, preventing overt coercion of individuals by others, issuing and controlling 
money, regulating monopolies that cannot be avoided…providing some minimum 
basic infrastructure, protecting people who are unable to take care of their own 
interest, organising national defence and collecting sufficient funds to finance these 
activities…” (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009:108).  
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It has been noted that after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the terrorist attack on the United 
States in September 2001 and the 2008 financial crises in the United States and Europe, there 
has been a renewed recognition of the benefits of a strong state (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 
2009:331 – 332). In addition, there is the acknowledgement that: “…behind every 
contemporary market economy stands a state…” (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009:332), thus 
possibly signalling the decline of empirical liberal market theory.  
 
To summarise, according to the market liberal theory of the state, the state will only act in an 
oversight role and less government interference is desired, in addition to no, or minimal 
outside interference. This theory advocates for the continuous support for the free market, in 
order to maximise personal wealth development. As this theoretical perspective focusses on 
the individual rather than the group, it will not be used as the main theoretical perspective of 
this study.  
 
3.3 Understanding the State: A Conceptual Framework  
There have been a number of seminal academic works based on the position, authority and 
continuance of the state in the global world order (for example Van Creveld, 1999; Strange, 
1996 and Evans, Reuschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985 and Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009). Van 
Creveld (1999) notes that although the state has been the most important of all modern 
institutions, a number of the functions of the state have been taken over by other actors, both 
local and domestic, and as a result, he observed a decline in the power, functions and 
capabilities of the state. Factors that led to the decline of the state include: The retreat of the 
welfare state, the waning of major wars, globalisation and the advancement of technology 
and also the withdrawal of faith that citizens have in the state. For example, Susan Strange 
(1996) refers to the decline of the state as the retreat of the state. Strange (1996) postulates 
that the state has lost political authority over the society and the economy, and discusses a 
series of non-state authorities in the international political economy, which have taken over 
some of the functions of the state. Thus, as there has been a decline in state authority, there 
exists: “… a diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and 
regional bodies…” (Strange, 1996:4). One proposition that is provided as support for this 
argument is that a state‟s authority has been weakened by technological and financial change 
and the rise of a single global market economy.  
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As a result of the retreat of the nation-state, what exists is a: “…yawning hole of non-
authority…” (Strange, 1996:14). A power void or gap will accordingly exist, which will have 
the potential to be filled by an authority other than the state. This results in that the state as an 
organisation faces constant and increasing competition from other non-state organisations, 
who may challenge the authority of the state.  
 
Nevertheless, as noted by Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009:6): “…the existence of contested, 
failing and failed states should not disguise the pervasiveness of the state form…”. 
Accordingly, there is also the view that the retreat of the state is not as intense as described 
above. As with any organisation, external and internal elements will continuously have an 
impact on the structure and operations of the state. What is observed is that, the nation-state is 
no longer the only relevant actor (both domestically and in international relations) and that 
the monopoly that the state had over specific capabilities, tasks and roles has changed. 
However, the question remains: What is the effect of other actors on the role of the state and 
how will this change the authority and position of the state? For example, Friman and 
Andreas (1999:4) note that the: “…global division of labour and expanding power of global 
production and finance have increased the accountability of states to global markets and non-
state entities…”. Thus, according to Friman and Andreas (1999) the authority of the state is 
still confirmed in the global economy. Equally important is that the impact of globalisation 
on the state will differ in each case and it is important to take into consideration each state‟s 
position in the global economy, but also the historical context of each state (Friman and 
Andreas, 1999). Indeed, the Global Financial Crisis that started in 2007/2008, which was 
triggered by the housing bubble in the United States, and the European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, has brought about a renewed interest in the position of the state in the global economy. 
As a result of the global recession, caused by these economic failures, national governments 
were forced to provide rescue packages to financial institutions, in an attempt to stabilise 
various sectors, most notably the banking sector. Thus, as states interceded, it brought about 
the reality of the interventionist state.  
With specific reference to international relations, it is important to note that the majority of 
literature on state authority in international relations has been focused on the challenges to the 
state coming from above; thus, the top down approach of challenges to the nation-state (for 
example the impact of globalisation as described earlier). There has however been an 
acknowledgement of the bottom-up challenges to the state, with specific reference to the 
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criminal element or organised criminal groups:
23
 Strange (1996:110 – 120) writes on the 
symbiosis between the state and organised criminal groups, with the pre-1980s Italian state as 
the prime example. However, she claims that the symbiotic coexistence between the state and 
organised criminal groups, as a non-state actor, are not sustainable and will cease to exist in 
two cases: First, when there is a collapse in the hierarchy of power in the state and second: 
“…when the rival authority‟s power is perceived to threaten the state because it has acquired 
new foreign allies or new sources of wealth and influence…” (Strange, 1996:120).  
 
Other studies of the relationship between organised criminal groups and the state in 
international relations (Mittelman and Johnston, 1999; Shelly, 1995 and 1999) focus on the 
transnational element of organised crime. Thus, the organised criminal group is viewed as a 
global actor in competition with the state for authority. Shelly (1999) hypothesises that the 
authority of the state is diminishing, but that this has not resulted in the disappearance of 
authoritarianism: “…transnational organised crime represents a new form of non-state-based 
authoritarianism…” (Shelly, 1999:25). In addition, Williams (1997) comments that the 
increase in the activities of transnational criminal groups, as facilitated by globalisation and 
the decline of the authority of the state, leads to these non-state actors to be one of the most 
important security challenges facing the 21
st
 century. This study will similarly focus on the 
challenges to the state from below: Challenges from a sub-national group and non-state actor 
as a rival authority. However, this study will look at domestic groups who challenge the 
authority of the local state.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are several theoretical propositions regarding the 
state. In addition, there are just as many conceptual interpretations for the construct of the 
state. However, a number of these conceptual interpretations find their foundation in the 
seminal work of Max Weber. Weber (1978:56) provides a conceptualisation of the basic 
understanding of the modern state. He writes that:  
 
“…The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follows: It 
possesses an administrative order subject to change by legislation, to which 
the organised activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled 
by legislation, are oriented. This system of order claims binding authority not 
                                                 
23
 See also Williams (2002) as will be discussed in section 3.7.   
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only over the members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained 
membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking 
place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organisation with a 
territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate 
only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it…The claim 
of the modern state to monopolise the use of force is as essential to it as its 
character of compulsory jurisdiction of continuous operation…” 
 
A number of key elements can be extracted from this definition: Binding authority, 
administrative order, citizenship, territorial basis, legitimate use of force and a monopoly on 
the use of force. On the concept of state authority, it can be defined as: “… a psychological 
relationship, between the governed and their governors, which engenders a belief that state 
personnel and institutions, should be obeyed…” (Thompson, 2004:201). From this definition 
two essential subjects arise: First, the importance of state-society relations and second, the 
legitimacy of the state. It is postulated in this study that state-society relations should be 
regarded as an essential component of maintaining the organisation of the state. Accordingly, 
an imbalance or a breakdown in state-society relations will have a negative impact on a 
sovereign state. For the purposes of this study, the importance of the society in the construct 
of the state is acknowledged. 
 
On the topic of legitimacy, Thompson (2004:201) postulates that state authority is generated 
from two sources, namely legitimacy and coercion. He argues that governments use a 
combination of legitimacy and coercion to maintain their authority over a specific society. 
Furthermore: “…when the state‟s legitimacy declines, however, and rulers no longer 
command sufficient resources of coercion, authority is threatened…” (Thompson, 
2004:201).
24
 If the citizens of a state regard the system as legitimate, the state will have the 
ability to mobilise society. As noted by Migdal (1988:21 – 22) several elements are central to 
the survival of the state, the most important of which, is the ability to mobilise society.
25
 The 
mobilisation of the society: “…involves channelling people into specialised organisational 
frameworks that enable state leaders to build stronger armies, collect more taxes…and 
complete any other number of complicated tasks…” (Migdal, 1988:22). Thus, the capacity of 
the state to mobilise society is a functional part of the conceptualisation of the state. 
                                                 
24
 The concept of legitimacy will be conceptualised in section 3.6  
25
 Migdal‟s (1988) conceptualisation of state capabilities will be discussed in section 3.6 
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When further analysing conceptual clarifications of the state, Van Creveld (1999:1) 
postulates that the state is an abstract entity and furthermore, that it is an overarching 
invisible subject, which includes both the head of state and the common citizen of the state. 
In addition, Van Creveld (1999:1) suggests that there are three distinctive characteristics by 
which the state is defined: “…it authorises (other corporations) but is itself 
authorised…solely by others of its kind; secondly, that certain functions…are reserved for it 
alone; and thirdly, that it exercises those functions over a certain territory inside which its 
jurisdiction is both exclusive and all-embracing…”. The third element that is mentioned by 
Van Creveld (1999) is control over a specific territory: Failure to exercise control over the 
entire area of a state, may lead to state weakness and state failure. Indeed, this is recognised 
by Herbst (2000) when he addresses state development in Africa. Herbst (2000) explains how 
the process of state-building in Africa differs from state-building in Europe. He explains that 
a lack of permanent, well-defined boundaries in pre-colonial and colonial Africa is essential 
in terms of explaining a lack of state development. In addition, Herbst (2000) postulates that 
when explaining state weakness in Africa an important element is low population density as 
this complicates authority and control. In Africa, states were not centralised as in Europe as 
all leaders had to deal with the problem of low population densities, which in turn made it 
difficult for leaders to control the periphery from the capital. It was essential to control the 
main urban areas, and rural areas that were important in terms of the economy (for example 
region around the Nile river), but political control was limited to such regions and did not 
expand over the entire territory of states. Other elements, such as a lack of state institutions 
and the role of colonialism are also discussed by Herbst (2000). However, the inability of 
rulers to apply and maintain control over their territory is central to the clarification of why 
states in Africa fail. States can only survive if there is continuous control over their entire 
territory. In the introduction this central hypothesis is confirmed when he states that “…states 
are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders…” (Herbst, 
2000:3).  
 
Another significant definition of the state is provided by Stepan (1978:xii), when he claims 
that: “…The state must be considered more than the “government”.26 It is the continuous 
administrative, legal and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relationships 
between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial 
                                                 
26
 Van Creveld (1999) also postulates that the main characteristic of the state is the separation between the ruler 
and the organisation.  
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relationships within civil society as well…”27. From this definition, as noted by Skocpol 
(1985:7), other organisations and agents are essential for the continuation of the state as they 
also take part in and facilitate social and political relationships.  
 
These attributes of states are echoed by a number of authors. For example, Zartman (1995:5) 
stipulates three functions of a state. First, that the state is a sovereign authority (the arena of 
politics and the source of identity), second that the state is an institution (one single 
organisational entity, as also noted by Weber (1978), and an intangible symbol of identity and 
thirdly, that the state is the security guarantor for the populated territory, referring back to the 
legitimate use of violence noted by Weber (1978). In addition, what Zartman (1995) argues is 
that there is a significant blurring of these characteristics of the state and that it is difficult to 
perform the functional characteristics in isolation. Accordingly, each of these functions needs 
to be executed in order for the state to persist. Similarly, if one function is not executed it will 
result in a possible failing of the other.  
 
Williams (2002:164) similarly outlines four main interpretations of the state: a) the state is a 
sovereign territorial entity, which controls the area under its jurisdiction, thus controlling who 
and what enters; b) the state is a system of rules, and thus the state has both authority over its 
citizens and obligations towards them; c) the state is a set of institutions and people who act 
on its behalf; and d) the state is a set of functions, which range from the state as guarantor of 
order and security, to the role as the manager of economic activity and provider of economic 
and social welfare. As previously mentioned, in order for the characteristics of a state to be 
functionally executable, at the core of the state exist administrative, legal, extractive and 
coercive organisations. More practically speaking, the state will facilitate revenue generation, 
safety, security and justice, basic service delivery and economic governance. If these core 
functions of the state can be performed, the legitimacy of the state will increase. It is 
important to note that these organisational structures will differ from state to state, mainly 
based on the legislations of that state and governmental structures (Skocpol, 1985:7). Also, as 
noted by Dunn (2001:55): “…the nation–state as an institution reflected the needs and 
demands of a specific time and place…”28.  
 
                                                 
 
28
 Dunn (2001) discusses the African state in international relations theory and postulates that the generally 
accepted definitions of the state do not fit the reality in Africa.  
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To continue by looking at the state based on the neo-pluralist theory, Rotberg (2003:2) 
provides a normative conceptualisation of the state. He explains that the main function of the 
modern state is to provide political goods to the citizens; thus: “…state answers the concerns 
and demands of citizenries…”. What is important, however, is that there exists a specific 
hierarchy of political goods, of which the supply of security (specifically human security) is 
the most important one. As said, the provision of these political goods is regarded as the main 
function of the state. It includes the prevention of cross-border invasions and infiltrations; 
thus, the prevention of the loss of territory. Furthermore, domestic threats that may attack 
national order and social structure need to be eliminated. Also, crime and other related 
dangers to domestic security need to be prevented and last, citizens need to be enabled to 
resolve disputes with each other and the state, without fear of intimidation (Rotberg, 2003:3). 
A summary of the normative hierarchy of political goods, which the state needs to provide, as 
its main function, is listed in table 3.1 below.  
 
Table 3.1: Hierarchy of Political Goods  
 
Political Goods Description  
1. Security   Prevent loss of territory  
2. Political freedom  
Citizens can participate freely, openly and 
fully in politics and political processes 
3. Medical and Health care 
Include medical and health care at varying 
levels and costs 
4. The Knowledge Good  
Schools and educational facilities of various 
kinds and levels  
5. Physical Infrastructure  Including roads, railways and harbours 
6. Communications Infrastructure  
Including telephone networks and 
broadcasting stations  
7. Money and Banking system  
Including a national currency and system 
presided over by a central bank  
8. Fiscal and Institutional Context  
Citizens can pursue personal entrepreneurial 
goals/potentially prosper  
9. Civil Society  The promotion of civil society  
Environmental Commons  
Methods of regulating the sharing of the 
environmental commons  
 
(Source: Adapted from Rotberg, 2003:3, 4) 
 
To conclude this section, the state is regarded as: An abstract entity of administrative order 
with binding authority and a territorial basis and jurisdiction that is recognised by other 
similar organisations. There should be a separation between ruler and organisation and the 
organisational structure of each entity can differ, based on a number of elements including: 
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History, legislative and governmental structure and location. In order to attain benefits for 
society, the state needs to fulfil a number of functions, which are intertwined and cannot be 
executed in isolation. As part of these functions, the state needs to provide political goods to 
citizens, of which the provision of security is the most important. Accordingly, the state 
claims the legitimate use of force and a monopoly on the use of force. The lack of provision 
of political goods can facilitate the breakdown of state-society relations. Thus, the ability of 
the state to mobilise society will weaken, and consequently, there may also be a decline in the 
legitimacy of the state.  
 
3.4 A Conceptual Clarification: State-building and Nation-building   
In the processes of state-building and nation-building, state-society interaction is key. The 
constant interaction between (and interdependency of) the state and society need to be 
present, in order for either state-building or nation-building to take place. However, these two 
processes are often confused and used interchangeably (Hippler, 2004 and Goldsmith, 2007). 
Historically, state-building has focused on the state as the main and sometimes only role-
player in the process of state-construction. Thus, the main aim was the building of strong 
formal institutions of the state. This entailed a top-down approach, where the role of civil 
society in the state-building process was minimal. However, state-building can also be 
viewed as a bottom-up process, where the society is seen as an active agent in the process. In 
addition, there is also a stronger focus on state legitimacy and the political and social fabric 
of society (Haider, 2010:4). 
 
On the other hand, nation-building refers to constructing a cultural identity or: “…the 
establishment of a common national identity within a given geographical area, based on a 
shared language and culture…” (Goldsmith, 2007:26). It is acknowledged (Hippler, 2004 and 
Goldsmith, 2007) that state-building is an essential component of nation-building and that the 
development of a nation is facilitated by a well-developed state.
29
  
 
In contrast to this view, state-building and nation-building can be regarded as contradictory 
processes. As argued by Ottaway (1999)
30
, the aims of state-building and nation-building can 
be contradictory and the author claims that it is the case in Africa: Where state-building aims 
                                                 
29
 See also Lemay-Hébert (2009) where it is argued that state-building and nation-building should be 
understood as a single process.  
30
 The analysis of Ottaway (1999) focuses on the state in Africa.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
to develop politically inclusive systems based on democracy, nation-building promotes the 
acknowledgement of ethnicity and as a result, undermines multi-ethnic states. Ottaway 
(1999:83) writes:  
 
“…Two processes are underway in Africa simultaneously: a process of state building, 
aiming at the development of more democratic political systems…and a process of 
nation building, which threatens the integrity of existing multi-ethnic states as ethnic 
nationalist movements increase in militancy and make a bid for their own state…”. 
 
The argument follows that this can facilitate the disintegration of states and the rise of 
nationalist authoritarian regimes.  
 
However, this study will take the view that state-building and nation-building need not be 
regarded as counterproductive. Nation-building refers to the establishment of a common 
national identity as opposed to the development of individual ethnicities. To conclude, 
nation-building is understood as the process of the formation of a shared national identity and 
state-building, as the establishment of effective organs of a central government. In addition, 
state-building is also regarded as an essential element of successful nation-building and the 
two processes need not be regarded as contradictory. For both the state- and nation-building 
to be successful, the importance of state-society relations needs to be acknowledged. 
However, in some states political leaders will purposefully neglect building stronger state-
society relations. Such leaders will usually benefit from patronage and criminal activities, 
including organised crime; thus, there will be little to no incentive to engage with citizens 
(Haider, 2010:6).
31
 The result will be both a lack of state-building and nation-building.  
 
3.5 A Conceptual Clarification: State Decay 
A great deal of research has been devoted to analysing why states fail. This body of literature 
usually includes the reasons for state failure based on case study analysis. These cases 
typically include states such as Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia. However, there has been a 
move towards incorporating the themes of breakdown, restoration and prevention into case 
study analysis.
32
 It is important to note that the concepts of state weakness, -failure, -
                                                 
31
 For a comprehensive discussion of patronage as part of the criminal-political nexus, see section 3.7.  
32
 A number of case studies related to state collapse and reconstruction can be found in Zartman (ed) (1995). 
This collection includes a historical analysis of state collapse and reconstruction in Chad (Foltz, 1995), 
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fragmentation, -breakdown and -collapse are often used interchangeably to explain the 
deterioration and ultimate downfall of the state. This study will distinguish between state 
weakness (indicating initial fragmentation of the state, but also limitations on the capacity of 
the state), state failure (the visible non-functioning of state apparatus) and state collapse (a 
complete breakdown of most, if not all state systems). Thus, state weakness can result in state 
failure, which in turn can result in state collapse, and the process is referred to as state decay, 
as is presented in figure 3.1. It is important to note that states can progress or regress between 
the different categories of state decay, indicating that state reconstruction is also a possibility. 
For example Lebanon, Nigeria and Tajikistan have moved from collapsed to weak states, 
Afghanistan and Sierra Leone from collapsed to failed, and Zimbabwe from a once strong 
state to a failed one (Rotberg, 2003:10).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: The Process of State Decay and State Reconstruction 
(Source: Produced by the author for this study). 
 
3.5.1 State Weakness  
On the topic of state weakness, the most important element used to define a state as weak, is 
internal institutional weakness, as observed in a decline in the capacity of the state. Mentan 
(2004) argues that a state weakens when the state cannot provide citizens with a minimum 
level of security, when the state is vulnerable to external economic and political forces and 
when the state is not regarded as legitimate by groups of the population.  
 
With regards to weak state capacity and the identifiable elements of a weak state, Williams 
(2002) furthermore lists weak border controls, lack of business regulations and an ineffective 
                                                                                                                                                        
Uganda (Khadiagala, 1995) and Ghana (Rothchild, 1995). The book further addresses the topics of states in 
danger and agents of state reconstruction.  
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criminal justice system. Williams (2002) agrees with Mentan (2004), that weak states will 
have a low level of state legitimacy. Migdal (1988) also focuses on state capabilities when 
identifying weak states, in that such states will have low capabilities to extract resources, 
regulate relations between the state and citizens and amongst citizens themselves, and 
penetrate society and mobilize citizens. Accordingly, Williams (2002) refers to the 
weaknesses in the state as capacity gaps, which will lead to functional holes in the system of 
the state. These functional holes may then be utilised by non-state actors for their own benefit 
(Williams 2002:170).
33
 Similarly, Mentan (2004:20) claims that state weakness in Africa 
creates the ideal situation for violent non-state actors to capture the state. The author further 
describes several manifestations of weak states, including high rates of unemployment 
(specifically amongst historically disadvantaged groups), extremely high levels of corruption 
and a general absence of the rule of law. The result will be an abundance of unskilled and 
unemployed youths engaging in criminal activities, lack of law and order and a lack of 
legitimate government. Weak states can be summarised as states suffering from gaps in the 
capacity of the state, but also a lack of state legitimacy. Furthermore, a weak state will not be 
in control of its entire territory, with specific reference to areas where marginalised groups 
reside or peripheral areas. Indeed, Reno (1998:2) conceptualises a weak state as a state 
where: “…conventional bureaucratic state capabilities exists alongside (generally very 
strong) informal political networks…”. Informal local non-state actors and informal political 
networks may subsequently challenge the authority of the state.  
 
3.5.2 State Failure  
The next step in state decay is state failure, but (as mentioned) it is important to acknowledge 
that state weakness does not automatically lead to state failure. Accordingly: “…crossing 
from weakness into failure takes will as well as neglect…” (Rotberg, 2003:14). State failure 
is thus mostly man made and does not happen by accident. As catalysts of state failure, two 
elements can be highlighted: Internal violence and (non)-delivery (of) political goods. 
Rotberg (2003:1) states that: “…Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal 
violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants…”34. Indeed, 
failed states will only provide limited, if any, political goods. As explained previously, 
security is regarded as the most important political good and if there is a lack of security, the 
                                                 
33
 Capacity gaps and functional holes will be explained in section 3.7.5. 
34
 The concept of political goods is explained earlier in section 3.3. See table 3.1 for a summary of political 
goods.   
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result would be internal violence and conditions conducive towards state failure. Indicators of 
internal violence and an inability to deliver political goods are the following: enduring 
political violence, victimisation of citizens by the state, loss of control over peripheral 
territory, growth of criminal violence, flawed state institutions, deteriorating infrastructure, 
failing provisions of basic services, economic opportunity for an elite, in the context of a 
generally declining gross domestic product, and widespread corruption (Rotberg, 2004).
35
  
 
A number of elements relevant to the research questions posed in this study, need to be 
highlighted. First, Rotberg (2004:6) lists lack of control as an important indicator of a failing 
state. He says that: “…failed states cannot control their peripheral regions, especially those 
regions controlled by out-groups. They lose authority over large sections of territory…”. 
Furthermore, this can be measured by the actual control of government officials over a 
geographical area. A second important indicator of state failure to be highlighted is the 
increase of criminal violence. In this case, lawlessness as a result of the lack of authority by 
the state will become more apparent. Criminal gangs will increase and extend their control 
over territories. Strongmen will become central to communities, as they will provide 
protection and security (Rotberg, 2004:6). As explained earlier, as part of the 
conceptualisation of the state, one of the main roles of the state is to provide political goods; 
as the state breaks down, it will not be able to provide basic political goods. In the case of 
failed states, this function can be taken over by non-state actors. If a non-state actor has a 
significant armed following, prevention of failure will probably not be possible (Rotberg, 
2004). In addition, three other signs of imminent state failure can be highlighted: Rapid 
reduction in incomes and a decline in the standard of living, an increase in the levels of 
violence and the subversion of democratic norms (Rotberg, 2004). If these characteristics are 
present, the ultimate result will be state collapse. 
 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, Reno (1998) takes a look at state weakness and state 
failure from the perspective of warlord politics. He argues that warlords stay in power as a 
result of their ability to manipulate resources and garner support from external sources. 
However, in order to maintain power and the accumulation of wealth, rulers ensure that the 
bureaucracy and the military stay weak. Thus, institutional state weakness needs to be kept in 
place therefore state failure is a deliberate strategy by the ruler. Such states will have no 
                                                 
35
 According to these indicators, Rotberg (2004) identifies Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan as failed states.   
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legitimacy as they will fail to provide political goods to citizens.  
 
3.5.3 State Collapse  
A simplistic definition of state collapse is that the state can no longer perform its basic 
functions, including that of maintaining the role of the decision-making centre of 
government, being a symbol of identity and territorial entity, being the authoritative political 
institution and a system of socio-economic organisation (Zartman, 1995:5; Thompson, 
2004:211). Therefore, state collapse does not necessarily occur in the case of regime 
breakdown, such as a coup or rebellion, but when the: “…legitimate power of the state…” 
falls apart, together with the laws of the state and the political order (Zartman, 1995:1).
36
  
 
Zartman (1995:1) and Rotberg (2003:9) further explain that when a state collapses, a vacuum 
is created, with specific reference to authority. The vacuum of authority may be filled by non-
state or sub-state actors (also referred to by Zartman (1995) as local power grabbers): 
“…order and power (but not always legitimacy) fall down to local groups or are up for 
grabs…” (Zartman, 1995:1). Thus, a local non-state authority could consume the power lost 
by the central government and fill the vacuum of authority. The non-state actor could control 
a territory within the original boundaries of the state. One example is Somaliland, a region 
located in the Horn of Africa. It is a self-declared sovereign state and not internationally 
recognised.
37
 It is important to note that in the case of Somaliland (located in the state of 
Somalia) the lack of a formal, internationally recognised state did not result in anarchy and 
chaos. The institutional system is based on local authority (coming from the society) which 
maintains order.  
 
Thus, two important concluding remarks can be derived from the preceding conceptualisation 
of state weakness, state failure and state collapse: State collapse is the final stage in the 
process of state decay, preceded by state weakness and state failure. In the case of state 
collapse, a vacuum as a result of a lack of institutional capabilities of the state is created. This 
vacuum is often filled by a local non-state actor and although the authority exemplified by 
                                                 
36
 An example of a collapsed state is Somalia. Thompson (2004:211) writes that “… Although Somali clans 
were united enough to bring down Siad Barré‟s corrupt regime in 1991, these disparate groups collectively 
failed to reconstitute a national government in its place. Somalia…has not had an officially recognised 
central authority for the last 15 years…”.  
37
 For more information on statehood in Somaliland the following texts can be consulted: Buur and Kayed 
(2007), Menkhaus (2006 and 2007).  
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this actor would be in rivalry with the state (or what is left after state collapse), the authority 
of the non-state actor can have the ability to normalise and stabilise the situation, as in the 
case of Somaliland.  
 
3.6 State-Society Relations 
The focus of the discussion of state-society relations will centre on the 1988 work of Joel S. 
Migdal: Strong societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in 
the Third World. Migdal‟s (1988) main research question was stated as: Why specific states 
find it hard to foster strong state-society relations, by achieving high levels of social control, 
while other states find it easier to do? Thus, why does a specific state have the ability to 
successfully conduct policy implementation, as an indicator of high state capacity? 
Accordingly, Migdal (1988) creates a set of theories to examine state capabilities, which is 
based on state-society relations. What is central to the analysis is that states cannot be 
separated from society; and in order for a state to emerge and progress to a strong state, social 
control by the state, over society, is needed.  
 
Migdal (1988:24) further focuses his analysis on: “…sources of resistance to the state‟s 
efforts at achieving predominance…”. As part of this analysis, two themes are focused on: 
How the: “…rules of the game…” have been established and maintained in society and 
second, that there should be a focus on all organisations in a society that have exercised 
social control; thus, both formal and informal organisations. According to the classical 
pluralist theory of the state, the analysis of state-society relations needs to include all 
significant political actors and on different levels. With regard to the levels of analysis, 
Migdal (1988) focuses on three levels of the state, namely the central executive leadership, 
central state agencies and officials at regional and local level. What he postulates, as will be 
explained later, is that in weak states local strongmen will work against the central state 
agencies, as created by executive leadership. The leadership will be challenged. Fragmented 
social control may result with state leaders prioritising their own survival and engage in the 
reshuffling of state agents and even “…dirty tricks…”, such as corruption and buying of 
support (Migdal, 1988:257). This may however further weaken the state, through the 
deterioration of the capabilities of state agencies and a subsequent decline in legitimacy. As 
will be noted later, legitimacy is essential to foster strong state-society relations. 
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3.6.1 State Capabilities and State Social Control  
For the purposes of this study, state-society relations can be defined as:  
 
“…interactions between state institutions and societal groups to negotiate how public 
authority is exercised and how it can be influenced by people…They are focused on 
issues such as defining the mutual rights and obligations of state and society, 
negotiating how public resources should be allocated and establishing different modes 
of representation and accountability…” (Department for International Development, 
2010:15).  
 
The focus of this definition is on ensuring accountability of the state and to make the state 
responsive to society. An essential element of state continuation is the strong connection 
between the state and the society. Here, two relationships need to be identified: First, the 
direct impact of states on society and second, that societies also affect states. With specific 
reference to the last mentioned relationship and as noted by Migdal (1988), structures of 
societies can affect the capabilities of the state.   
 
State capabilities will be conceptualised in the following section. In order for a state to 
survive, a number of factors need to be present: “…including the organisational capabilities 
of its leaders, population size, potential material and human resources available, and larger 
international configurations…” (Migdal, 1988:21).38 In the case of states where all these 
elements are present, the state will technically survive. However, in addition to state survival, 
states aim to achieve a high level of specific capabilities, including the capability to penetrate 
society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and use resources appropriately.
39
 
Strong states are those with high capabilities to complete these tasks, which in turn will make 
it possible for them to achieve goals set out by leaders. On the other hand, weakened states 
will find it difficult to achieve changes sought by leaders (Migdal, 1988:4 - 5). State 
capabilities will increase if the state has social control or if the state can successfully 
mobilised society. Social control is defined as: “…the successful subordination of people‟s 
own inclinations of social behaviour or behaviour sought by other social organisations in 
favour of behaviour prescribed by state rules…” (Migdal, 1988:22). Accordingly, a state will 
                                                 
38
 This definition relates back to the conceptualisation of the state in section 3.3.  
39
 See also Mann (1984) on what he referred to as infrastructural power and the ability of the state to regulate 
society.  
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have social control if people behave socially as the state prescribes, rather than in terms of 
what they desire for themselves or in terms of what other societal actors prescribe. In order 
for a state to achieve high levels of social control, the strategies of survival, as prescribed by 
the state, have to be part of citizens‟ daily life. All social organisations, formal or informal, 
can each present symbols, rewards and sanctions to citizens. Social control will be achieved 
by the organisation that can provide key elements of survival strategies: “…strategies of 
survival, sewn from the symbols, rewards, and sanctions, are roadmaps used to guide one 
through the maze of daily life, ensuring one‟s existence…” (Migdal, 1988:27). Thus, the state 
needs to ensure that its symbols, rewards and sanctions are the survival strategies of the 
society. These prescriptions of the state are expressed in the laws of the state.  
 
As mentioned, in order to avoid state breakdown, a high level of state social control is 
needed. This level can be measured by three indicators: The compliance by the populace, the 
level of participation by the citizens in state sanctioned institutions and the legitimacy of the 
state (Migdal, 1988:32). The focus is accordingly on the criteria of compliance with state 
rules, participation in state structures and the legitimacy of the state.  
 
For a state to achieve compliance, the citizens should yield to the rules of the state. Initially, 
compliance can be found by the use of force and thus, it is essential for a state to exercise 
successful control over its security forces. This is only possible if the strategies of the security 
forces and the other organisations of the state correspond. Furthermore, control over the 
extraction and allocation of resources will also determine the level of compliance. If the state 
is successful in the reallocation of resources, citizens will more willingly accept the 
prescriptions of the state (Migdal, 1988:32). 
 
With regards to participation, the key factor is that the state should be able to mobilise 
citizens to repeated voluntary participation in the different institutional sectors of the state. 
Participation goes beyond only voting in elections; it should extend to engaging and 
contributing to state institutions. As participation increases, the state will gain strength. The 
practical example used by Migdal (1988:32) to illustrate participation is that a worker would 
rather make use of a state-licensed medical clinic, than of an illegal healer. 
  
Legitimacy, most importantly, refers to the right to rule by a state. Successful legitimation of 
a state will see citizens voluntarily accept and approve the authority of the state. The 
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legitimacy of a state is the most powerful indicator of the strength of a state – in the case of 
compliance and participation; citizens may conform to the prescriptions of the state in return 
for incentives or compensation (Migdal, 1988:33). Legitimacy can be conceptualised as: “…a 
psychological relationship between the governed and their governors, which engenders a 
belief that the state‟s leaders and institutions have a right to exercise political authority over a 
society…” (Thompson, 2004:108). Accordingly, legitimacy is only achieved if there is un-
coerced acceptance of all the systems of the state by the citizens. In addition, Weber 
(1964:324 – 392) identifies three pure types of legitimate authority: Traditional authority 
(shaped by a society‟s culture, history and traditions), charismatic authority (a belief in the 
authority of an individual, as a result of exemplary character or sanctity) and legal authority 
(a belief in the legality of rules and a support of the authority to issue commands). In the case 
of legal authority, Thompson (2004:108) notes that a legal-rational government is based on a 
social contract, where citizens follow the rules of the state, as state institutions in turn will 
look after their interests; thus, in accordance with the pluralist view of the state, citizens will 
trust the state and view it as worthy. As has been explained, a lack of legitimacy is also 
regarded as one of the main reasons for state failure (Rotberg, 2003). If a state has high levels 
of legitimacy, there will be a significant amount of trust between the state and the society. 
The state‟s ability to manage citizens‟ demands is also dependent on the level of legitimacy 
of the state.  
 
3.6.2 Strong/Weak States and Strong/Weak Societies  
Migdal (1988:35) distinguishes between different societies by measuring the distribution and 
the overall amount of social control exercised by the state. The following matrix is presented:  
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In this matrix, the associations between strong/weak states and strong/weak societies are 
clarified. Four relationships are highlighted: Strong states and strong societies, strong states 
and weak societies, strong societies and weak states and weak states and weak societies. In 
the first case, strong societies and strong states exist simultaneously. Migdal (1988) does not 
provide a description of such a situation. What is explained, however, is a situation where a 
pyramidal structure of social control is created. This results from social organisations with 
compatible and congruent rules and structures, with those of the state. In such a situation, the 
strong state will succeed in merging the survival strategies present within society, with those 
of the state. The resulting structure resembles a pyramid with the state at its apex. The key 
factor of a pyramidal structure of social control is that the survival strategies or rules of the 
state and that of the different societies will be reconcilable with each other (Migdal, 1988:34-
35). Thus, the rules and structures different organisations such as the church and interest – 
and community groups, the family and cultural organisations will be compatible and mutually 
reinforcing, also with those of the state, fostering strong societies within the regulations of a 
strong state.  
 
Du Toit (1995:24 - 25) further explains Migdal‟s (1988) theory on pyramidal structures of 
social control by stating that in a strong society with a pyramidal structure, a strong state will 
gain control by commanding the top section of the pyramid. The strong state will succeed in 
merging the strategies of the state and that of the society. This would be the ideal situation, 
which will lead to the continuation and further consolidation of the state and centralisation of 
state power. What is clear from figure 3.2 is that Migdal (1988:35) regards the presence of a 
pyramidal society the result of a strong state and a weak society. However, it is argued that a 
pyramidal society can be present where there is both a strong state and a strong society (See 
figure 3.3 below). As explained, if there is a society where there is a fused pattern of social 
control, the state will exercise control over the society by occupying the apex of the pyramid. 
Examples of pyramidal societies (as a result of the presence of a strong state and a strong 
society) include states with a strong and active civil society, but also high levels of legitimacy 
and state social control, such as the current situation in Norway and Germany. However, as 
mentioned, a situation can arise in which a society will have uneven levels of social control 
because of social organisations with diverse rules and structures, which are not compatible 
with those of the state. Thus, “…numerous systems of justices operate simultaneously…” 
(Migdal, 1988:39).  
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In the matrix presented by Migdal (1988:35) such a situation is referred to a diffused society, 
but it is later also described as a weblike society. Thus, there will be the presence of a 
weakened state and a strong society (See figure 2.3 below). In the case of fragmentation in 
the social control, weblike societies will emerge. 
 
 
 
Weblike societies can be conceptualised as follows: “…In weblike societies, although social 
control is fragmented and heterogeneous, this does not mean that people are not being 
governed; they most certainly are. The allocation of the values, however, is not 
centralised…” (Migdal, 1988:39). In addition, as further explained by Du Toit (1995:25): 
“…in weblike societies no single strand of social control holds the social fabric together, but 
rather a network of such strands…”. Thus, several systems of rule and law operate at the 
same time. In the case of weblike societies, where the social control is fragmented between 
numerous rival organisations, states will find it very difficult to achieve policy 
implementation. 
 
Accordingly, weblike societies operate around strongmen who usually attempt to facilitate 
the disintegration of state social control by dominating aspects of the state. For strongmen to 
be able to dominate aspects of the state, the process of bargaining has to take place between 
state officials, implementers and the strongmen. This is described by Migdal (1988:249) as 
the “…triangle of accommodation…” (See figure 3.4). Inside the triangle of accommodation, 
the: “…state officials will formulate policy at national level; implementers who are officials 
entrusted to oversee policy execution at the local level and strongmen…” (Du Toit, 1995:26). 
Migdal (1988) makes specific reference to the regional and the local level and asserts that on 
these levels the state, through its implementers, may become involved in bargaining 
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relationships with strongmen and with other implementers and other state and political 
officials. The result may be that mutually profitable agreements will be arranged between the 
actors and that each of the strongmen will succeed in creating its own set of rules for social 
control.
40
 To explain further, in the triangle of accommodation, various strongmen will 
function alongside each other, together with state implementers and state officials. Migdal 
(1988) further notes that where the triangle of accommodation is in place and where there is 
fragmented social control, the process is very difficult to turn around. The state will find it 
very challenging to claim back social control from the parts of the society where its control is 
fragmented. 
 
 
 
Such a configuration of power, as the one in the triangle of accommodation, can be 
maintained for a limited period, as it may lead to increased weakening of the state and place 
strongmen in a more powerful position. Thus, the continuation of the triangle of 
accommodation can act as an accelerator for state weakening; as explained above, state 
leaders will implement political strategies in an attempt to keep power, but in effect decrease 
state legitimacy and from the local level triangles of accommodation enforce the rule of 
strongmen and fragmented social control.  
 
                                                 
40
 As will be explained later in this chapter, Williams (2002: 172-173) uses Russia as an example where an 
different construction, the „iron triangle‟, is made up of an extremely complex relationship between 
politicians and government officials, businessmen, and criminals hamper democratic transition. 
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The third relationship in the typology of state-society relations is a situation where there is a 
strong state, but a weak society. This may occur in a totalitarian regime, or regimes that 
exhibit features of totalitarianism, where aspects of civil society, or all aspects of individual 
life and civil society, are strictly controlled by the state, usually in the form of coercive 
measures.  
 
The last relationship will occur in the case of both a weak state and a weak society. Such 
societies can be described as normless and anarchic, with a breakdown in social order. 
Migdal (1988:35) refers to China during World War II with the Japanese occupation and 
Mexico during the revolution between 1910 and 1920, as examples where both a weak state 
and a weak society existed. A more recent example is Haiti after the January 2010 
earthquake. During the period immediately after the earthquake the United States were forced 
to take control of airports as looting was widespread and vigilante groups attempted to 
control neighbourhoods.  
 
To summarise, with the increase of levels of compliance, participation and legitimation, a 
state will find it easier to achieve its goals (Migdal, 1988:32-33). A strong state will have 
high levels of social control, one set of survival strategies, high levels of capabilities and 
compliance, participation and legitimacy. In a weakened state societal organisations succeed 
in establishing their own survival strategies, alongside or in contention with those of the state; 
hence a multiplicity of survival strategies. This may lead to a weblike society. 
 
3.7 The Criminalisation of the State  
The notion of the state has been discussed in order to provide a clear conceptualisation of the 
construct of the state and how it will be used for the purposes of this study. In addition, the 
state was discussed in a number of different contexts, but with the focus on state-society 
relations. In the sections that follow, the discussion turns to a further analysis of the possible 
influence of non-state actors (with specific reference to organised criminal groups) on the 
state. More specifically, the criminalisation of the state will be discussed. The focus and 
location of this study is the state at local government level. Thus, a framework will be 
constructed to analyse the criminalisation of the state at local government level. 
 
The focus of this section continues to be on state-society relations and the main aims of the 
discussion are twofold: First, it is to assess what the principal contributing factors are to the 
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criminalisation of the state and second, to develop a framework in order to analyse the level 
of criminalisation of the state. The criminalisation of the state is one possible impact of 
organised crime on the state. Throughout the discussion on the criminalisation of the state, 
reference will be made to various non-state actors, for example transnational organised 
criminal groups. These other actors are also deemed important for the discussion, as they may 
have similar features and characteristics. However, for the framework of analysis to be 
assembled at the end of this section, there will be a focus on the criminalisation of the state 
by organised criminal groups as a domestic social organisation. This will be done in order to 
provide a conceptual foundation for the main research question and also one of the sub-
research questions: Has the state become criminalised at the level of local government, as a 
result of the activities of organised crime, and if so, to what extent?  
 
An analysis of the principal indicators of whether there is criminalisation of the state will be 
conducted. Relevant indicators with reference to this study will be extracted from four main 
avenues of empirical observation. These are first the indicators of: Criminalisation of politics, 
second the state‟s orientation towards organised crime, third organised criminal groups and 
fourth the role of the state and capacity gaps and functional holes in weak states. As a general 
note: Although it is acknowledged that other factors, such as widespread government 
corruption and/or global and regional forces could also aid the process of the criminalisation 
of the state, such aspects will be regarded as peripheral to the study, with organised criminal 
actors and their accompanying activities being the primary focus. The indicators of the 
criminalisation of the state will then be presented in a framework, in order to be analysed on a 
continuous scale, to explore to what extent the state has been criminalised.  
 
During the discussion, a few general notes will be provided on the description of 
crime/criminality and criminalisation. The discussion on criminalisation will be guided by 
Bayart et al‟s (1999) conceptualisation that will be further explained in the next section.  
 
3.7.1 The Criminal-Political Nexus  
To start the discussion on the criminalisation of politics, a few brief notes on the concepts of 
crime, criminal and criminality are needed. In order for an action or deed to be regarded as a 
crime, an institutional body has to criminalise it (declare a prohibition on it). That body can 
be either local or international. In the case of a local body, the guardian will be the state that 
will provide a jurisdiction, which will in turn establish a background or backbone for rules, 
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regulations and laws to be formed; thus, the criteria for criminalisation. Furthermore, the 
historical and cultural composition (amongst others) of each state is essential as a source from 
which criteria of criminality are derived. Accordingly, what is regarded as a crime in state A, 
may as a result of cultural and historical factors not be regarded as a crime in state B.
41
 There 
exist several criteria of criminality. For example, in a society religion can be regarded as part 
of a culture, and what is regarded as criminal can stem from religious motivations, or vice 
versa. Specific actions such a using marijuana, can be regarded as part of a culture, and as a 
result it will not be regarded as a criminal act to use it (Bayart et al, 1999).   
 
Bayart et al (1999) explain criminalisation by differentiating between two types of 
criminalisation: Primary and secondary. Secondary criminalisation refers to: “…the formal 
decision to prosecute the person or persons alleged to have committed a crime…” (Bayart, et. 
al, 1999:13). Before the submission, incrimination will take place; thus, there will be a formal 
decision, based on either local or international laws, to prosecute the relevant parties who 
allegedly committed a crime. This study will primarily be concerned with the processes and 
regulations that stem from primary criminalisation. Primary criminalisation is described as: 
“…those political, social and economic practices which are the object of a „primary 
criminalisation‟ either by the laws and other texts of the state which are under discussion, or, 
more particularly, in international law, or according to international organisations or 
acknowledged guardians of international morality…” (Bayart et al, 1999:15). An analysis of 
this definition confirms earlier comments: There is an institutional body present, either local 
laws of the state or international organisations/institutions. Furthermore, the criminalisation 
will either be political, social or economic in nature. It is also important to note that what is 
regarded as criminal can change over time. To illustrate, Bayart et al (1999:14) use the 
example of inter-racial sexual relationships during apartheid South Africa. In this case, the 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (Act No 55 of 1949) prohibited marriages between 
people of different races.  The act was revoked in 1985.   
 
In Africa, there has been an increasing blurring of the lines between the criminal and non-
criminal behaviour. Appropriately, Bayart et al (1999) find that politics in Africa is becoming 
markedly interconnected with crime.
42
 There are several reasons for this: Institutional 
                                                 
41
 Similarly on the concept of corruption, Thompson (2004:204) notes: “…What may be regarded as corrupt in 
one society may be acceptable, and even expected, behaviour in another…”.  
42
 See also Wannenburg (2006) on criminal states in West and Southern Africa.  
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weakness in Africa has for decades provided the perfect conditions for the rise and expansion 
of organised criminal groups. Law enforcement agencies, courts and prison systems were 
understaffed and underfunded and with out-dated equipment and procedures, mostly non-
functional.
43
 In addition, the socio-political environment in many African states also 
facilitates the spread of organised crime as it has created opportunities for criminals to exploit 
(Le Pere and Vickers, 2011:54). Politically weak and sometimes illegitimate governments 
have been unable to address the needs of societies, forcing marginalised groups to revert to 
survival strategies, which compete with those of the state (La Pere and Vickers, 2011; 
Migdal, 1988). In such a situation leaders will struggle to maintain control over society and 
they will turn to extreme measures to maintain authority: Nepotism, corruption and 
patronage. The chain of causality to the criminalisation of the state is therefore the following: 
Weakened states lack the capacity to provide goods and services to citizens. Marginalised 
groups will turn to survival strategies that are in opposition to that of the state; thus, political 
conditions are conducive to criminality in general as these groups set them up against the 
state. In order to retrieve lost control, leaders may take a number of actions, ranging from 
dealing with these rival authorities, the setup of informal networks to keep authority and 
secure wealth and the manipulation of markets and the political process, with the result being 
the establishment of a patrimonial system of rule, or what is referred to by Migdal (1988) as 
dirty tricks. 
 
What is important to note is that in a patrimonial system, there is not necessarily a lack of 
legitimacy or institutional capacity. However, in a patrimonial system of rule, the legitimacy 
of the state is not a result of the un-coerced acceptance of the state by the citizens, but rather a 
dependency of a client on resources and services controlled by a patron. In exchange, the 
patron will gain and maintain authority from support of the client. It has to be noted that the 
emphasis is on who has the authority and how that authority is preserved. Consequently: 
“…the modern African state is reduced to an instrumental role, as a compendium of resources 
that rulers and political elites use to enhance their power and status in society…” (La Pere 
and Vickers, 2011:55). Reno (2000) shares this opinion when he refers to the shadow state: A 
system of personal rule. Again, the emphasis is on authority and in the case of shadow states 
the: “…authority…is based upon the decisions and interests of an individual, not a set of 
written laws and procedure, even though these formal aspects of government may exist…” 
                                                 
43
 See also Rotberg (2003) for indicators of a failed state, with specific reference to flawed institutions.  
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(Reno, 2000:434). It is important to note that central to Reno‟s (2000) argument is the 
assumption that not all weak states have a power vacuum. In some weak states the power is 
vested in an informal network or several informal networks of power. The shadow state is the 
result of a relationship between personal rule and illegitimate economies. In addition, it is 
part of a well-defined political strategy. Rulers will manipulate markets and laws in order to 
create wealth for themselves and strengthen their authority through the parallel system of the 
shadow state. Thus, there is a deliberate aim not to support state-building initiatives or 
attempts to increase the capacity of the state.  
 
Reno (2000) further explains that economic motivations are the main driving force for the 
rulers of shadow states. Indeed, Chabal and Daloz (1999) discuss how disorder is used as a 
political instrument and they propose a new way to look at the development of African states: 
The political instrumentalisation of disorder. According to this hypothesis, disorder exists in 
African states as a result of ineffective institutions and corruption, which has initiated a 
unique development pattern for Africa that works: “…the political, social and economic 
„logics‟ of contemporary Africa come together in a process of modernisation which does not 
fit with the Western experience of development…” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:143). Central to 
the disorder that works in favour of all participating in the system, are personalised informal 
patron-client networks. Chabal and Daloz (1999) postulate that in weak states, violence (and 
the management of violence) is often used as an instrument in order to ensure economic (and 
also political) gain. The authors state that: “…the very weakness and inefficiency of the state 
has been profitable to the African political elites…” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:14). Similarly, 
Reno (1998) discusses warlord politics in African states and confirms that in states such as 
Liberia (under the rule of Charles Taylor), Sierra Leone (after the end of the Cold War), the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (under the rule of Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila) and 
Nigeria (under the rule of Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha), patronage linkages are used 
to exploit the resources of the state and the local population. Force is used to accumulate 
more personal wealth for the warlord or ruler. Rulers manipulate and control markets in order 
to expand their wealth and increase their power. Reno (1998:79) states that: “…strongmen 
rule through control of commerce rather than by mobilising a bureaucracy…”. 
 
The notion of shadow states further relates to what Jackson and Rosberg (1986) coined de 
jure and de facto states. The authors differentiate between empirical (de facto) and juridical 
(de jure) statehood in that, the first mentioned refers to a state that is able to perform the 
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functions usually expected of a state, including authority and power to govern over a specific 
territory or jurisdiction, for example Taiwan. Juridical states, however, refers to legal 
statehood, where a state is recognised by international law. In addition, juridical statehood 
refers to negative sovereignty, which means that no other state can intervene in state affairs. 
However, in such a case, statehood is derived more from right, rather than fact, implicating 
that a state will be a de jure state only and not de facto, for example Liberia and Angola 
during the countries‟ respective civil war periods. Juridical states can however have high 
empirical statehood; examples include Denmark and the United States. In addition, many 
juridical states may have low empirical statehood, and can thus be regarded as quasi-states. 
Such states will have juridical statehood, but will be dysfunctional on the empirical statehood 
level (Jackson, 1990). Examples include current day Somalia and Sudan.  
 
Kleptocracies
44
 (with the literal meaning of rule by thieves) are not a new phenomenon in 
Africa, both during colonial rule and in the post-colonial period. One example is the rule of 
Mobutu Sese Seko from 1965 – 1997 in what was then known as Zaire.45 In African 
kleptocratic regimes, as with the previous explanation of shadow states, the ruler administers 
the state system in order to assure the accumulation of their own wealth. The general model 
was that instruments of the state and parastatal companies were utilised, but the ideological, 
social and political variants can differ from one country to the other (Bayart et al, 1999:xvii).   
 
However, Bayart et al (1999:30) note that there is a move away from kleptocratic states in 
Africa and that: “…all suggest that…a slide towards criminalisation throughout the sub-
continent is a strong possibility…”.  The felonious state or a new form of politique du ventre 
(politics of the belly
46
) is new in two different respects: 
 
“…In the first place, international donors, in the name of good governance 
and the workings of the market, nowadays refuse to countenance practices 
which they previously tolerated in the name of the struggle against 
communism. In the second place, the international community has undergone 
                                                 
44
 Thompson (2004:206) also refers to “…vampire states…where resources were sucked out of society by the 
government, yet the government offered little in return…” Other terms include predatory states or pirate 
states.  
45
 See also Rotberg (2004:12) and Thompson (2004:217) for a discussion of the Mobutu regime in this context.  
46
 Politics of the Belly is a Cameroonian expression. It refers to a complex mode of government (Bayart et al, 
1999:8).  
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a number of profound changes, such as in the globalisation of trade, the 
deregulation of markets, and the growth of certain lucrative smuggling 
trades…” (Bayart et al, 1999:8).  
 
What is clear from the above analysis, is that the state in the past had an important role to 
play in kleptocratic or patrimonial regimes. It was used to facilitate wealth accumulation of 
either one ruler or a few elites. Recently, there has been a shift from the façade of a legitimate 
state to the felonious state. In particular, the growth in the illicit economy, enabled by 
predominantly globalisation, has acted as a catalyst for the felonious state.
47
 As a result, there 
are new opportunities for criminal groups and specifically organised criminal groups to 
exploit. This, coupled with the previously discussed weak and illegitimate states in Africa has 
provided momentum for the criminalisation of politics.  
 
2.7.2 Indicators of the Criminalisation of Politics  
Bayart et al (1999) provides six indicators of the criminalisation of politics in a state. The 
authors acknowledge that at the time of writing, only three states in sub-Saharan Africa could 
be classified as criminal states: Equatorial Guinea, Comoros and Seychelles. However, there 
are a number of states that: “…illustrate classical symptoms of la politique du ventre…” 
(Bayart et al, 1999:26). As the research by Bayart et al (1999) was compiled more than 10 
years ago, it is certain that the landscape of the criminalisation of politics in Africa has 
changed. One example is Guinea-Bissau that is now regarded by the United Nations (UN) as 
Africa‟s first narco-state.48 However, it is also a possibility that the conditions of specific 
states with regard to criminalisation have improved.
49
 However, the purpose of this section is 
to highlight the indicators of the criminalisation of politics as identified by Bayart et al 
(1999), in order to establish an analytical framework that will facilitate the assessment of the 
level of the criminalisation of a state, with specific reference to organised crime. The six 
indicators of criminalisation of politics are summarised in table 3.2. For the purposes of this 
study, the interpretation of the criminalisation of politics by Bayart et al (1999) will be the 
following: If one of the indicators is present, it will indicate symptoms of a criminal state. It 
                                                 
47
 A comprehensive discussion of the illicit economy and globalisation can be found in the 2011 publication 
The Dark Side of Globalization, edited by Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakur.  
48
 A description of Guinea-Bissau‟s involvement in the global drug trade will be provided in section 3.7.4.3.  
49
 Bayart et al (1999) also acknowledge that the process of criminalisation is best measured in a qualitative 
method as it involves a process of change and transformation in societies, that can also involve an 
improvement.  
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will not be regarded as a criminal state; however, the possibility of such a development is 
present. The indicators are not ranked.  
 
Table 3.2: Indicators of the Criminalisation of Politics  
 
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION 
Use of State Violence  
 The legitimate organs of state 
violence used by political elites for private 
purposes 
 Violence is used as an instrument, 
aimed at the accumulation of wealth  
Presence of Clandestine Structure of 
Power  
 There is a hidden, collective structure 
of power, which surrounds and controls 
senior politicians 
 The hidden structure of power has 
access to both legitimate means of force (for 
private use) and illegitimate means of force 
(for criminal gangs) 
Structure of Power active in Illegal 
Activities  
 The power structure participates in 
illegal economic activities (as considered by 
international law/organisations/moral codes) 
Part of International Criminal Networks  
 Illegal economic activities are part of 
international networks of crime 
Fusion of historical ‘criminal’ culture and 
transnational culture/processes of 
globalisation  
 A Fusion of the historical culture of a 
society specific to the conduct of illegal 
activities and the elements of a transnational 
culture 
Importance of criminal practices on 
power-holders and architecture of society  
 The illegal activities is of particular 
macro-economic and macro-political 
importance to the power-holders 
 The illegal activities have an 
important impact on the overall structure and 
functioning of society  
 
(Source: Adapted from Bayart et al, 1999:25 - 26).  
 
Williams and Brooks (1999) similarly refer to contested, captured and criminal states, as 
indicators of the progress towards the criminalisation of the state. In a contested state: 
“…politico-military factions trying to obtain control over the state will use crime to fund their 
military activities…” (Williams and Brooks, 1999:81). One example is the Angolan civil war 
from 1974, where the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) sold 
diamonds in order to fund their military operations. Accordingly, in a contested state, military 
factions can include local or national warlords and violence will be used in order to 
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accumulate resources of the state. This relates back to the first indicator of the criminalisation 
of politics, the use of (state) violence to accumulate wealth, as described by Bayart et al 
(1999). A captured state refers to a situation where criminal groups actively attempt to 
neutralise or take control over state authorities. Furthermore, in captured states criminal 
groups will use corruption to co-opt state agents, the criminal justice system and law 
enforcement agencies (Williams and Brooks, 1999:82). Here, there are similarities with what 
Bayart et al (1999) refer to as the presence of clandestine structures of power, which will 
ultimately control senior politicians. These power structures (criminal groups) will participate 
in illegal economic activities.  
 
To conclude, the final description of the progress of the criminalisation of politics is a 
criminal state. In a criminal state: “…authorities themselves will engage in the kinds of 
activities normally associated with criminal organisations…” (Williams and Brooks, 
1999:81). The state accordingly becomes a criminal enterprise and as a result of the 
accumulation of power through corrupt activities, state officials will be in the position to 
control the electoral process (Wannenburg, 2006:34). Similar to Bayart el at (1999), Williams 
and Brooks (1999) also refer to Equatorial Guinea as an emerging criminal state during the 
mid-1990s. The criminalisation of the state in Africa can be traced back to the need for 
political and economic power: “…Organised crime in countries such as the United States and 
Britain is marginal to political and economic systems, but in Africa it is sometimes run by 
government and is closely related to the exercise of political power…” (Williams and Brooks, 
1999:84).  
 
With regard to a framework developed and used in order to analyse the level of 
criminalisation of the state at local government level, the analysis will be limited to the 
following indicators, as this study is only concerned with the local level of the state: 
 
 Whether the state at the local level uses organs of the state in order to accumulate 
wealth. 
 Whether there is a presence of clandestine structures of power on the local level that 
control local state institutions and rival state structures. 
 Whether illegal activities have an important impact on the structure and the way the 
local community functions.   
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3.7.3 States‟ orientations towards Organised Crime   
Williams (1997) creates two sets of typologies that deal with the level of criminalisation of 
the state. First, there is the state‟s disposition towards organised crime or the states 
orientation towards organised crime. Thus, how does the state behave towards organised 
criminal groups and activities? Second, there is the role of the state in relation to the activities 
of organised criminal groups. Thus, how is the state used by organised criminal groups?  
The first typology (the state‟s disposition towards organised crime) describes the state‟s 
behaviour when dealing with organised criminal groups. Five behavioural characteristics that 
describe the nature of the relationship between organised criminal groups and the state are 
identified, namely: Confrontation, reluctant acquiescence, tactic connivance, active 
encouragement and collusion (See table 2.3 for a summary of the behavioural characteristics). 
In the first case (confrontation), there is an active struggle by the state in order to control, 
disrupt and destroy organised criminal groups. A variety of resources and combating 
mechanisms are used in order to ensure successful confrontation. Williams (1997:25) 
acknowledges that the confrontation strategy is usually only implemented (and for the 
purposes of this study, only possible) in strong states with a high level of legitimacy. Stronger 
states will possess the necessary tools (for example strong rule of law, trust in the law, and 
low level of corruption) for successful implementation. However, even in stronger states such 
as the United States that has the necessary capabilities to implement measures to combat 
organised criminal groups, such elements will still be present. The importance is however in 
the state‟s orientation to these groups and in the case of stronger states, there are active and 
successful efforts to combat organised crime.  
The second behavioural disposition (reluctant acquiescence) comprises of the 
acknowledgement by the state that it lacks the capabilities to actively combat the activities of 
organised criminal groups. The state accordingly accepts the presence and continuation of 
organised crime (Williams, 1997:24). Here, the examples of certain states in the European 
Union can be used. There are on-going efforts from member states in the union to combat 
organised criminal activity based on the collective need to eradicate such groups; however, 
some states lack the capacity to successfully combat the presence of organised criminal 
groups domestically, and as a result their operations are accepted. More specifically, 
countries such as Ireland and Spain can be identified in this category: Non-state actors in the 
form of organised criminal groups continue to be present and their presence is acknowledged 
by the state as a result of the lack of state capabilities to contest such groups.  
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Tacit connivance illustrates the same characteristics as reluctant acquiescence, where the state 
accepts the continuing presence of organised criminal groups. However, in addition the: 
“…advantages…” or “…benefits…” of organised criminal groups for three primary units are 
recognised, namely: The economy, the society and the agents of the state. A third element of 
tactic connivance is that organised criminal activity is actively denounced by, for example, 
legislation or state actors; however, the condemnation is purely “…symbolic…” (Williams, 
1997:24). The result is that organised criminal activity can continue without disruption – the 
criminal groups will continue to operate in an environment where they are free from 
prosecution. Williams acknowledges that such a position is sometimes obtained if the 
organised criminal groups act as benevolent actors, caring and providing for the community 
(Williams, 1997:25). For example: With specific reference to the Cape Flats, André Standing 
(2003:10) notes that the philanthropy by gang bosses is similar to those found in South 
America. However, acts of charity on the Cape Flats have in the past been more flamboyant:  
 
“…During the period of 1994 – 1996, Rashaad Staggie50 operated a loan scheme from 
a shop, assisting some poor families…As a more blatant tactic, he would also drive 
through the streets and throw money that was illegally obtained from his moving car 
to ensure that people will continue to support him…The act of throwing money was 
quite a spectacle. Staggie would first drive his car up and down the street and tell the 
children that he would be throwing money when he returned. As a consequence, 
hundreds of people, including adults, were drawn into the streets. They would wait for 
the car to pass and everyone would scramble at the first sight of fluttering money…” 
(Kinnes, 2000:16).  
 
The fourth type of disposition, which the state may exhibit: Active encouragement is where 
illegal groups profit from active protection by agents of the state. In return, the members of 
the state will benefit from organised criminal activities. In practical terms, such a situation 
usually manifests itself when the organised criminal group uses corrupt officials in order to 
establish and maintain a “…low risk environment…” (Williams, 1997:24 – 25). One example 
where this has occurred was in Russia during the first post-Soviet era. 
As noted by Stoecker (2000:130): 
                                                 
50
 Rashaad Staggie was the leader of the Hard Livings gang. He was gunned down and torched by a vigilante 
group People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in 1996.  
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“…In the wake of globalisation and the weakening of the state, criminal organisations 
have assumed the roles that the state previously played and…have asserted their own 
form of authoritarianism. Criminal organisations have penetrated the financial 
structures and political circles and block efforts to foster the growth of civil society in 
Russia…”.  
 
The final level is that of collusion, or a complete symbiotic relationship between the state and 
the organised criminal group. Williams explains this relationship as a: “…willingness of 
government officials to serve themselves rather than the state…” (Williams, 1997:25) as 
these officials will benefit from the organised criminal activities. In addition, agents of the 
state not only protect organised criminal groups but are active participants in activities 
(Williams, 1997:24). Two examples of low-key collusion between authorities from the state 
and criminal organisations are Italy and Japan during the Cold War.  
 
Table 3.3: The Disposition of the State towards Organised Criminal Groups 
 
CHARACTERISTIC OF STATE  SHORT DESCRIPTION  
Confrontation 
 The state attempts to control, disrupt, 
destroy organised criminal groups 
 These attempts are active and vigorous 
Reluctant Acquiescence 
 The state accepts the presence and 
activities (continuation of) of organised 
criminal groups 
Tactic Connivance 
 State weakness prohibits the active 
confrontation of organised criminal 
groups 
 The state acknowledges the benefits of 
organised criminal groups (to the 
economy, the society and agents of state)   
Active Encouragement  
 State agents protect organised criminal 
groups 
 State agents benefit from organised 
criminal activities  
Collusion  
 The state is in a symbiotic relationship 
with organised criminal groups  
 Agents of the state not only protect 
organised criminal groups but are active 
participants in such activities 
 
(Source: Adapted from Williams, 1997:24 – 25).  
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In order to analyse the level of criminalisation of the state at local government level, the 
following indicators will be extracted from the disposition of the state towards organised 
crime:  
 
 Whether the state at local government level accepts the presence and activities of 
organised criminal groups.  
 Whether the state at local government level acknowledges the benefits of organised 
criminal activity for the local economy, society and agents of the state and as a result 
organised criminal groups are protected.  
 Whether the state at local government level is in a symbiotic relationship with organised 
criminal groups.  
 
3.7.4 Organised Criminal Groups and the Role of the State  
The second typology that Williams (1997) developed, deals with the role of the state in 
relation to organised criminal groups.
51
 It focuses on how the state is used by organised 
criminal groups and states can be placed in four categories: Home states, host states, 
transhipment states and service states. See table 2.4 for a summary of the role of the state in 
relation to the activities of organised criminal groups.   
 
3.7.4.1 Home states  
In the first category, home states usually take on the form of weakened/weak states. Such 
states are also referred to as safe havens for organised criminal groups. As explained in the 
typology of the disposition of the state towards organised crime, the fourth and the fifth 
characteristic of the state can be observed here (to varying degrees): active encouragement 
and collusion. Thus, state agents protect organised criminal groups and benefit from 
organised criminal activities. In addition, the state is in a symbiotic relationship with 
organised criminal groups and in some cases state agents are active participants in the 
activities of such groups. In home states, combating criminal groups and their operations is 
both inadequate (as a result of collusion) but also restricted (as a result of the weakness of the 
state) (Williams, 1997:25 – 26).  
 
                                                 
51
 When conceptualising the role of the state in relation to organised criminal activity, it has to be noted that a 
state can fall within more than one category. Examples will be provided as part of the conceptual definition.  
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3.7.4.2 Host states  
In the category of host states, such states will be the markets of the criminal organisations. 
Williams (1997:26 – 27) provides a number of examples of host states, including the United 
States, Russia and South Africa. In the case of all three, however, the states take on dual 
roles; that of the home state and the host state. South Africa, for example, is a home state as it 
is a safe haven for a range of organised criminal groups. These groups include criminal 
elements from Africa, such as the Nigerian mafia
52
 and factions from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, but also international groups, such as the Russian mafia
53
 and Chinese 
triads.
54
 In addition, South Africa is also a host state. One example is the organised criminal 
groups that are operational on the Cape Flats, in the Western Cape. The community of the 
Cape Flats make up a substantial part of the consumers of the drugs that are traded by the 
gangs on the Cape Flats, thus acting as a market for the illegally traded goods.  
Williams (1997:26) further conceptualises host states by commenting that criminal groups 
usually operate with low risk as they are embedded in: “…ethnic networks providing cover 
and recruitment…”. It is important to provide a few comments on the link between organised 
crime and ethnic minorities. Bovenkerk (2001:110) observes that the victims of organised 
criminal activity are usually from the same ethnic minority as the members of the organised 
criminal group. This relates back to the earlier point of host states and that these states 
provide the markets for the criminal organisations. Furthermore, Bovenkerk (2001:111) 
confirms that where the organised criminal group is constructed from an ethnic minority, it is 
usually a sign of: “…social deprivation, the formation of an underclass or discrimination…”. 
He comments further: “…It has to do with the marginal social position some minorities 
occupy in addition to their low socio-economic status. Groups that are not assimilated yet or 
have been forced into periphery by their long-term structural disadvantages have very few 
ties to the conventional world…” (Bovenkerk, 2001:121). Accordingly, these groups will use 
the community as a safe haven to operate in, as the community are the consumers of the 
goods but also the providers of protection.  
                                                 
52
 See Irish-Qhobosheane (2007:89 – 113) for an analysis of Nigerian drug traffickers in South Africa.  
53
 To illustrate: In May 2007 the assassination of one of the most notorious figures in organised crime networks, 
Yuri “The Russian” Ulianitski, exposed the reality of the criminal underworld in South Africa. Ulianitski was 
shot numerous times in the Cape Town suburb of Milnerton, while returning from dinner with his wife and 
four-year-old daughter. His daughter was also killed in the attack. At the time of his murder, Ulianitski was 
out on bail in connection with charges of conspiracy to kidnap, possession of illegal firearms and drugs, and 
numerous other offences.  He was believed to be in control of the Russian mafia in South Africa. 
54
 To illustrate: In South Africa Chinese criminal groups have been active since the 1970s. Their activities 
include shark fin trading, abalone and rhino horn smuggling, importation of counterfeit goods, trafficking in 
illegal immigrants, prostitution, money-laundering and kidnapping (Gastrow, 2001).  
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3.7.4.3 Transhipment states  
Williams (1997) labels the next role of the state as transhipment states. Friman and Andreas 
(1999:11) make use of David Yoffie‟s definition to conceptualise transhipment: “…the 
shipment of goods to a third party en route to a final destination…”. Such states will usually 
be located on major transit routes (thus, they are selected, amongst other reasons, for their 
geographical location). The ease of transit in transhipment states is: “…largely a function of 
state capacity for interdiction. Such states suffer from the violation of their sovereignty and 
are particularly vulnerable to operational corruption…” (Williams, 2002:169). Furthermore, 
Williams (1997:26) notes that the transit routes can usually be related to a specific 
commodity, for example illicit firearms, illegal immigrants or counterfeit goods. An excellent 
contemporary example is the state of Guinea-Bissau and the global cocaine trade. Ellis 
(2009:174) comments that the emergence of West Africa in general as a major transit point of 
illegal drugs (en route to Europe) can be traced back to the 1960s. However, with the 
publication of a 2007 report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on 
cocaine trafficking in West Africa, the issue received renewed attention, especially the case 
of Guinea-Bissau. The report stipulates that West Africa has become the focal point of 
cocaine trafficking from Latin America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) to Europe. This can be 
noted from the increase in the annual cocaine seizures in West Africa (See figure 2.5 below). 
This indicates a shift in the traditional trafficking routes, seen as in the past the drugs were 
smuggled via Central America and the Caribbean to the United States and across the Atlantic 
to Europe. 
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Figure 3.5: Annual Cocaine Seizures in West Africa, 2000 – 2007 
(Source: Adapted from UNOCD, 2007:8).  
 
Guinea-Bissau can be regarded as one of the most prominent, but not the only, West African 
country that is used as a transit point. This is confirmed by the statistics of the seizures of 
illegal cocaine in West Africa: Seizures in Guinea-Bissau were 674 kilograms in 2006 and 
635 kilograms in 2007, placing it second and third, with regards to the most amount of 
cocaine seized (UNODC, 2007:10).  
 
A number of factors are cited by the report that has contributed to Guinea-Bissau‟s current 
status as a major transhipment state. First, there is the obvious factor of geographical location 
and typography, such as a myriad of small islands as well as a poorly resourced security 
service, especially the police, an inefficient justice system and a derelict correctional system 
(UNODC, 2007). Indeed, Friman and Andreas (1999:12) note of transhipment states that 
there are limited resources with regard to law enforcement officials. A lack of the state‟s 
capacity to control the flow of goods, in and out of its territory, will facilitate the 
criminalisation of the state.  
 
3.7.4.4 Service states  
The final role of the state is that of a service state. Service states can be conceptualised as 
having a specific sector that facilitates and promotes the activities of organised criminal 
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groups. The obvious example is the financial sector, which is utilised by criminal groups to 
conceal, move and protect their income from illegal operations (Williams, 1997:26).  
 
As mentioned earlier, states can be classified as having a dual role in relation to the activities 
of organised criminal groups. Thus, states can fulfil several roles at the same time. This has 
been illustrated in the examples of the United States and South Africa. Williams (2002:169) 
notes that ironically, criminals exploit the sovereignty of some states, particularly home states 
as safe havens and service states as banks, for defensive purposes, while: “…their trafficking 
activities are grossly violating the sovereignty of others…”.  
 
Table 3.4: The Role of the State in Relation to the Activities of Organised Criminal  
 Groups 
 
ROLE OF THE STATE SHORT DESCRIPTION  
Home states  
 Weak states (safe havens) that provide a 
positive environment for TCOs 
 TCOs ensure state agents accept, benefit 
and participate from/in activities  
 Efforts to combat TCOs are limited  
Host states  
 Markets of the TCOs 
 TCOs manifests in the form of 
ethnic/cultural networks  
 TCOs operate with low risk  
Transhipment states 
 Located on major transit routes for illicit 
commodities  
 Weak state capacity contributes to ease of 
transit (operational corruption)  
Service states  
 Assist TCOs to advance their activities 
(structural ease) usually in the financial 
sector  
 Ease for TCOs in the movement and 
protection of financial assets  
 
(Source: Adapted from Williams, 1997:25 – 27).  
  
3.7.4.5 Summary  
In the discussion of the role of the state in relation to the activities of organised criminal 
groups and the criminalisation of the state at local government level, the following indicators 
will be used:  
 Whether the state at local government level provide a safe haven for organised crime.  
 Whether the local environment acts as a market for organised crime.  
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 Whether weak local capacity of the state contributes to the ease of illegal operations.  
 Whether local government assists organised criminal groups to advance activities.  
 
3.7.5 Capacity Gaps and Functional Holes 
To conclude the discussion of the criminalisation of the state, the following section will 
discuss the capacity gaps and functional holes that are often visible in transitional and weak 
states, as developed by Williams (2002). The focus of the discussion is not to explore why the 
initial weakening of a state occurs, but rather to assess how organised crime as a social 
organisation further impacts on the state. More specifically, this discussion aims to examine 
how in weak states
55
 specific capacity gaps and functional holes exist and how these are 
utilised and explored by organised criminal groups. If organised criminal groups exploit these 
functional holes and capacity gaps, there is a high possibility that a state will rapidly 
criminalise.  
 
Weak – or weakened states and organised criminal groups are not a new phenomenon and 
several examples can be listed: the Italian state in the 19
th
 century and the rise of the Sicilian 
Mafia; a weak Colombian state and specifically a lack of control over the state territory 
(1970s and 1980s) and the rise of the cocaine industry; and states of the former Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) after the collapse of the Union (Williams, 2002 and 
Williams, 1997). In addition, Williams (2002 and 1997) claims that a link can be established 
between states in transition and the increased operations of organised criminal groups. For 
example, in the years leading up to the end of apartheid in South Africa and in the immediate 
post-1994 phase, the political instability and the reopening of South African borders for trade, 
provided ample opportunities for the growth of crime, and specifically crime of the organised 
nature (Standing, 2006).  
 
With specific reference to weakened states, an element that explains the possible rapid 
expansion of organised criminal groups is that the government lacks political will, 
institutional authority and organised power to provide basic functions of the state, amongst 
others to secure human rights and to ensure socio-economic welfare. If the state is unable to 
fulfil these functions, a power void will emerge. Again, the example of the Italian state can be 
                                                 
55
 Williams (2002) focusses on the capacity gaps and functional holes in weak and transitional states. For the 
purposes of this study, the focus will not be on the characteristics of transitional states, but rather on 
weakened states.   
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used. Gambetta (1993) analyses the Sicilian Mafia as an industry, providing specific services 
and in particular, private protection: “…The Mafia is a specific economic enterprise, an 
industry which produces, promotes and sells private protection. The Mafia represents this 
industry as it has developed in Sicily over the last one hundred and fifty years…” (Gambetta, 
1993:1).  Thus, the roots of the Sicilian Mafia can be traced back to when the Italian state was 
too weak to provide protection and arbitration for business and as a result the Mafia came 
into being to fill the void.
56
  
 
As explained earlier in this chapter, weakened states have specific broad characteristics that 
they share. These include: A low level of state legitimacy, weak border control, ineffective 
rules, with serving public interest being not the main goal of institutions and people 
representing the state, little economic or social provisions for citizens of the state, little or no 
regulation and protection of business and lack of social control as a result of an ineffective 
criminal justice system (in general state functions are not carried out effective) (Williams, 
2002:170). The hypothesis that Williams (2002:170 - 171) develops is that these 
characteristics of state weakness can be summarised as “…capacity gaps…” which 
consequently lead to “…functional holes…”. The functional holes can be described as: 
“…failure of the state to fulfil certain basic functions that are normally associated with states 
and are expected by the citizenry…” (Williams, 2002:171). The process is illustrated as a 
greenhouse effect, in that the conditions within the state are of such a nature, that it cultivates 
and protects organised criminal groups. The functional holes and capacity gaps will provide 
multiple opportunities within a low risk operational environment – the ideal conditions for 
organised criminal groups to prosper. The criminal groups will either fill the capacity gaps or 
functional holes, thus filling the void or vacuum that is left by a lack of state capacity and 
capability (as explained earlier) or they will exploit it in order to advance their activities. The 
following section will provide a discussion of each of the seven capacity gaps (social control, 
social welfare, business regulation, oversight and accountability, border control, legitimacy 
and electoral norms and patterns), the corresponding functional holes and the implications for 
organised criminal groups. See table 3.5 for a summary of the capacity gaps and functional 
holes. 
  
                                                 
56
 As will be expanded on later in this section, Williams (2002) refers to functional holes that open a void or a 
vacuum in the operational capabilities of the state. Thus, there will be capacity gaps in the state and as a 
result there will be functional holes.    
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3.7.5.1 Social Control 
The first capacity gap that Williams (2002:171) identifies is social control, which will 
facilitate the functional hole of an ineffective criminal justice system. Earlier in this chapter 
social control was identified as: “…the successful subordination of people‟s own inclinations 
of social behaviour or behaviour sought by other social organisations in favour of behaviour 
prescribed by state rules…” (Migdal, 1988:22). Thus, and of particular importance to this 
study, social control is an inclusive concept, as it covers all the other instances of capacity 
gaps and functional holes that will be discussed below. Social control relates to the laws of a 
specific state, but also the instruments and establishments in place that will enforce the law. 
Thus, the judiciary and the police force will be included here. If these instruments and 
establishments do not produce the expected level of social control by the state, organised 
criminal groups will be able to operate at a low risk level and without much objection from 
the state. Members of organised criminal groups will still be arrested, but the incarcerations 
of strongmen are highly unlikely. In the case where they are arrested, an arrangement will be 
able to facilitate a reduced sentence (Williams, 2002:172). This is but one of many ways in 
which a low risk environment may emerge in a state.   
 
With regard to social control by the state, Williams (2002:172) also mentions that this 
capacity gap extends beyond the criminal law of the state, to the regulation of business, 
consequently, regulatory gaps. This relates to the earlier discussion of the emergence of the 
Sicilian Mafia in Italy when the state was too weak to provide protection and arbitration for 
business as explained by Gambetta (1993). The following statement confirms this 
proposition:  
 
“…Some businesses turn to criminal organisations to collect outstanding debts or 
settle disputes. Recourse to these unorthodox methods had two consequences: it gave 
criminal organisations an entrée into the business world, thereby creating a seamless 
web between the licit and illicit, and it encouraged legitimate business to resort to 
increasingly ruthless methods against their competitors…”  (Williams, 2002:172).  
 
This blurring of the licit and the illicit gives rise to what Williams (2002:172) refers to as the 
“…iron triangle…” where three actors, political and government officials, businessmen and 
criminals, function in a complex and symbiotic relationship. The iron triangle can be 
compared to what Migdal (1988:249) describes as the triangle of accommodation, as 
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discussed earlier, which revolves around strongmen. For strongmen to be able to dominate 
aspects of the state, the process of bargaining has to take place between state officials, 
implementers and the strongmen. As a result, mutually profitable agreements will be arranged 
between the three units and the strongmen will succeed in creating numerous sets of new 
rules for social control.  
 
In several weak states, and with specific reference to states in Africa, a lack of regulatory 
frameworks in key economic sectors such as the extraction industry has been significantly 
exploited by a number of actors. These include transnational organised criminal groups, rebel 
armies and warlords that fill the capacity gap of a lack of state-instituted regulatory 
frameworks with self-established regulatory frameworks (Williams, 2002:173). This creates a 
continuing cycle of criminality. In addition, state weakness in the sense of a lack of state 
capacity will continue as the state resources are not utilised to improve the instruments and 
establishments of the state.  
 
3.7.5.2 Social Welfare 
Williams (2002) identifies the second capacity gap as economic management and social 
welfare. If there is a lack of provision of social welfare for citizens and not sufficient 
economic management by the state in order to create the opportunities for citizens to be part 
of the economic system, thereby indicating failure by the state to fulfil these basic functions, 
it will result in the functional hole of provision for citizens. “…While other dimensions of 
weakness offer opportunities for criminal behaviour; this type of weakness creates pressures 
and incentives for citizens to engage in criminal activities…” (Williams, 2002: 173). In 
communities where there is a lack of economic development and high levels of 
unemployment, citizens are prone to turn to the illicit economy in order to pursue economic 
welfare. The illicit economy provides a range of opportunities, not found in the licit, and as a 
result organised criminal groups can easily recruit workers. This capacity gap and resulting 
functional hole provides organised crime with a pool of labour.  
 
It can also be referred back to what was earlier described by Migdal (1988:29) as “…survival 
strategies…”. Social organisations that are in conflict with each other and the state will 
present citizens with different strategies of survival, to those presented by one another and the 
state. As the void of social welfare is subsequently filled by organised criminal groups, these 
groups or specific leaders (strongmen) present themselves as the saviours of the community 
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and receive support from citizens and may in some cases succeed to provide social welfare. 
In addition: “…very visible…support for charities is another aspect of the same tendency. In 
effect, organised crime becomes a surrogate of the state…” (Williams, 2002:174). 
Consequently, through patronage illicit groups receive encouragement, assistance and 
gratitude. Williams (2002:173) uses the example of Pablo Escobar
57
 in Columbia during the 
1980s. Escobar was reportedly involved in a number of charity organisations and provided 
money for the construction of schools and hospitals. In particular, he initiated and funded 
Medellin Without Slums, a project that provided houses for the underprivileged.  
 
To conclude this section: The second capacity gap is social welfare, which results in the 
functional hole of provisions for citizens. The result of the void is that citizens may possibly 
migrate to the illegal economy where they may easily be recruited by organised criminal 
groups. In addition, paternalism from organised criminal groups becomes a substitute for the 
state.  
 
3.7.5.3 Business Regulation 
The third capacity gap identified by Williams (2002:172) is in the field of business 
regulations, or rather a lack of business regulations. The practical manifestation of the lack in 
this capacity is that there will be: “…the failure of some states to provide adequate and 
appropriate regulatory frameworks for business…”. Williams (2002:172) uses the example of 
Russia where there was: “…the lack of an appropriate regulatory framework for business 
providing recourse for debt collection…”. If such a situation arises, organised criminal 
groups may become the replacement: They may possibly be utilised to collect debt and settle 
disputes. Similar to the previous capacity gap of social welfare, the criminal group can 
provide a separate set of rules, opposed to those of the state to citizens. Of course, these rules 
or the criminal regulatory framework will stand in direct opposition to those of the state.  In 
addition, a lack of a legal or state-driven regulatory business framework will open the void 
for increased illicit activity, as acts such as money-laundering and trafficking will be 
conducted with greater ease. 
 
                                                 
57
 Pablo Emilio Escobar was a Colombian drug lord. He was the leader the Medellin drug cartel and is regarded 
as the richest and most successful criminal in world history. He was killed on 2 December 1993 by the police 
in Medellin, Colombia. He was 44 years old at the time of his death.  
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3.7.5.4 Oversight and Accountability  
If a state lacks control and accountability, the primary implication for organised criminal 
groups is the opportunity for extensive corruption. Such a situation is as a result of a gap in 
the capacity of the state to provide oversight and create accountability (Williams, 2002:174).  
 
3.7.5.5 Border Control  
The next capacity gap is the inability of a state to control its borders and it will result in the 
functional hole of limited and weak interdiction capabilities by the state. Williams (2002:174) 
explains that this capacity gap is particularly visible in transitional states, given that during 
the period of transition, border controls may be more relaxed in order to promote trade with 
neighbouring countries so to as facilitate economic growth. In addition, border control can be 
directly linked to state sovereignty: The ability of the state to control its domain and express 
full command of the territory. The sovereignty also relates to the state determining what 
comes into the state (and how) and what leaves. Earlier in this chapter, a definition of 
transhipment states was provided: Sates located on major transit routes for illicit 
commodities, where the weak state capacity contributes to the ease of transit of the illicit 
goods. A gap in the capacity of the state to control its borders and the resulting functional 
hole of weak interdiction, will contribute to a state functioning as a transhipment state with 
relation to organised criminal groups (Williams, 2002:174).   
 
3.7.5.6 Legitimacy  
As explained earlier in this chapter, it is the obligation of the state to provide certain political 
goods to the citizens under its jurisdiction, of which political security is the most important. If 
a state fails to deliver the political goods, the legitimacy of the state will be questioned 
(Rotberg, 2003). Accordingly, Williams (2002:171) acknowledges that weak legitimacy may 
result in the functional hole of a lack of state authority and affiliation. If there is a lack of 
state authority, relationships between citizens and organised criminal groups may arise, that 
possibly will be more important than the loyalty to the state. Criminal groups may build on 
various patron-client relationships and as such, exploit the lack of state authority. 
Accordingly, there can be a network of mutually obligatory and beneficial relationships (and 
also symbiotic) between criminals, state actors and citizens (including businessmen).  
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3.7.5.7 Electoral Norms and Patterns  
The final capacity gap in weak states that Williams (2002) discusses is electoral rules. Free, 
fair and regular elections are one of the cornerstones of democratic states and essential for 
democratic state governance. It is also the most common way in which citizens can 
participate in the institutions of the state. Elements such as the voter registration of all eligible 
voters, information regarding where to vote, the secrecy of the vote and information about the 
candidates and parties are regarded as standard rules to ensure democratic state governance. 
Accordingly, if these norms are not adhered to, it may lead to a breakdown in the legitimacy 
of the state and thus, a weakening of the state. If there is a lack in the capacity of the state to 
ensure that such norms are upheld, it may provide organised criminal groups with the 
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. The participation will, of course, not be in 
the practical form or on the primary level as a candidate or political party, but on a secondary 
level, for example through campaign funding. The implication for organised criminal groups 
is that they will have the opportunity, as a result of funding, to influence the election 
outcomes, influence legislation and policy, but also to arrange affairs so as to suite them in 
their operations. As a result of weak electoral norms (thus the state lacks this capacity) 
several functional holes may open up: Incorrect voters‟ rolls, stuffing of ballot boxes, corrupt 
electoral officials, to mention only a few. Organised criminal groups can possibly exploit the 
vacuum by ensuring tactical support through funding and receive favours in return for votes. 
In addition, there may arise the feeling of on behalf of new government members that have 
been assisted by the organised criminal groups (Williams, 2002:175). The result would be the 
blurring of the lines between the legal and illegal, thus the criminalisation of the electoral 
institutions and processes of the state.  
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Table 3.5: Capacity Gaps and Functional Holes in Weak States with Relation to  
 Organised Crime 
 
CAPACITY GAPS 
FUNCTIONAL 
HOLES 
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ORGANISED CRIME (OC) 
Social control 
Ineffective criminal 
justice system 
Organised crime operates with 
impunity 
Social welfare  
Lack of provision for 
citizens 
Migration to illegal economy; 
Organised Crime recruitment; 
Paternalism substitute for state 
Business regulation 
Lack of regulatory 
framework 
Organised crime as arbitrator, 
protector, debt collector 
Oversight and 
accountability 
Lack of control and 
transparency  
Opportunity for extensive use of 
corruption; hijacking of 
privatisation processes 
Border control  
Weak interdiction 
capability  
Use state for transhipment of 
various illegal products 
Legitimacy  
Lack of authority and 
affiliation  
Build on patron-client links; other 
relationships more important than 
loyalty to the state 
Electoral norms and 
patterns 
Campaign financing  
Opportunity to influence election 
outcomes; cut deals with 
politicians  
 
(Source: Adapted from Williams, 2002:171).  
 
3.7.5.8 Summary  
From the above mentioned seven capacity gaps and functional holes, the following indicators 
are adopted for the analysis of the criminalisation of the state at local government level:  
 
 Whether an ineffective criminal justice system on local level results in operational 
ease for organised crime.  
 Whether citizens operate in the illegal economy as a result of the lack of provision of 
political goods by the state at local government level.  
 Whether organised criminal groups act as the business regulators in the local 
community. 
 Whether the relationships with organised criminal groups are more important to 
citizens than loyalty to the state at local government level.  
 Whether organised criminal groups have the ability to influence local electoral 
outcomes.  
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3.7.6  A Framework for the Analysis of the Criminalisation of the State at Local 
  Government Level  
The analysis of the criminalisation of the state, for the purposes of this study, is based on four 
main avenues of empirical observations: The indicators of the criminalisation of politics, the 
state‟s orientation towards organised crime, organised criminal groups and the role of the 
state and capacity gaps and functional holes in weak states. After an analysis of these avenues 
of empirical observation, a number of indicators were extracted in order to analyse the level 
of criminalisation of the state. For the purposes of this study, the indicators were adapted to 
analyse the state at local government level only. The identified indicators can be placed in a 
framework for the analysis of the level of criminalisation, at the level of local government, 
which will be measured on a continuous scale. What will accordingly be analysed is, to what 
extent the state has criminalised. The framework will be the following:  
Table 3.6: Framework for the Analysis of the Level of the Criminalisation of the State, 
 at the Local Government Level 
Indicators of the Criminalisation of the State 
The use of organs of the state by the state at the local level in order to accumulate wealth.  
There is a presence of clandestine structures of power on local level that control the local state 
institutions and rival state structures. 
Illegal activities that have an important impact on the structure and the way the local community 
functions.   
The state at local government level accepts the presence and activities of organised criminal groups in 
the local community.  
The state at local government level acknowledges the benefits of organised criminal activity for the 
local economy, society and agents of the state and as a result organised criminal groups are protected. 
The state at local government level is in a symbiotic relationship with organised criminal groups. 
The state at local government level provides a safe haven for organised crime and combating efforts 
are limited.  
The local environment acts as a market for organised crime. 
Weak local capacity of the state at local government level contributes to the ease of illegal operations. 
Local government assists organised criminal groups to advance activities. 
An ineffective criminal justice system at local level resulting in operational ease for organised crime. 
Citizens operate in the illegal economy as a result of the lack of provision of political goods by the 
state at local government level. 
Organised criminal groups act as the business regulators in the local community.  
Relationships with organised criminal groups are more important to citizens than loyalty to the state at 
local government level.  
Organised criminal groups have the ability to influence local electoral outcomes. 
(Source: Produced by the author for this study).  
This framework will be used to analyse the impact of a local non-state actor (and for the 
purposes of this study organised criminal groups) on the state.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to provide the theoretical foundation of this study. First, it was explained 
that this study uses a pluralist theoretical view of the state. Next, a conceptual framework for 
the state was established. This conceptual framework was primarily based on the position of 
the nation state, in that it is the building block of the legitimate world order. Furthermore, the 
state was conceptualised as an abstract entity of administrative order with binding authority, a 
territorial basis and jurisdiction that is recognised by other similar organisations, and a 
separation between ruler and organisation. In order for the state to prosper, it should perform 
a number of functions, ranked in a hierarchical order, of which the provision of security is the 
most important. Accordingly, the state claims a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The 
importance of state-society relations is emphasised as that the lack of provision of political 
goods may facilitate the breakdown of state-society relations. The state can lose the ability to 
mobilise society and ultimately lose legitimacy, which is the most important indicator of the 
social control by the state.   
 
Three other conceptual clarifications were also provided as these concepts are central to this 
study: State-building and nation-building and state decay. Nation-building was defined as the 
process of the formation of a shared national identity and state-building as the establishment 
of effective organs of a central government. The two processes were not regarded as 
counterproductive and the importance of state-society relations was acknowledged for both 
state-building and nation-building to be successful. Next, the process of state decay was 
explained as: First, the presence of elements of a weak state (gaps in the capacity of the 
state), second state failure (lack of territorial control, increase in criminal violence and the 
inability to provide political goods) and last state collapse (where the state can no longer 
perform any of its basic functions). This will leave a vacuum of authority, which may be 
filled by non-state actors. 
 
The following section of the chapter focused on state-society relations, the central theme of 
this study. These relations were discussed by focusing on the work of Migdal (1988) and his 
indicators of social control: Participation, compliance and legitimacy. If the state has low 
levels of social control there will be a decline in the capacity of the state, again opening the 
gap for rival social organisations to establish contending survival strategies that are in 
conflict with those of the state, for example organised criminal groups.  
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The last section of this chapter focused on the criminalisation of the state, which is regarded 
as a possible result of the impact of organised crime on the state. A framework in order to 
analyse the criminalisation of the state (at local government level as it is the focus of this 
study) was constructed from four main avenues of empirical observation. This framework 
will be utilised in chapter six of this thesis, in order to measure the level of criminalisation of 
the state, at the local government level, and with specific reference to the City of Cape Town, 
in which Manenberg is located. 
 
The next chapter of this study will provide a contextualisation of the independent variable of 
this study, organised crime. The chapter will start with a conceptualisation of organised 
crime, organised criminal groups and gangs, and transnational organised crime. Organised 
crime will also be contextualised in the South African context, which will include a historical 
account and present day analysis. The chapter will conclude with a description of organised 
crime on the Cape Flats, South Africa.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTUALISATION AND 
CONTEXTUALISATION OF ORGANISED CRIME- INTERNATIONAL 
AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide a conceptualisation and contextualisation of the independent 
variable of this study: Organised crime. In the first part of the chapter, organised crime will 
be conceptualised to create a clear foundation of how the concept will be used for the 
purposes of this study. Conceptualisations of organised criminal groups, transnational 
organised crime and organised criminal gangs will also be provided. The chapter will proceed 
to briefly discuss transnational organised crime trends. The focus of the chapter will then turn 
to organised crime in South Africa, starting with an explanation of the historical development 
of organised crime in South Africa, the expansion and the situation beyond 2010. The 
discussion will include comments on the main piece of legislation dealing with organised 
crime in South Africa: The South African Protection of Organised Crime Act (POCA). Since 
the selected case study for this study is Cape Town, and more specifically the Cape Flats and 
Manenberg, this chapter will end with an examination of the historical developments of the 
gangs on the Cape Flats and the situation, at the time of writing, in this area, with regards to 
organised crime.
58
  
 
4.2 A General Conceptualisation of Organised Crime  
Organised crime has for many years been and still is a disputed concept, seen as there is no 
universal definition of the term. This lack of a universal definition is noted in the amount of 
literature compiled by Klaus von Lampe on his website Organised Crime Research under the 
title Definitions of Organised Crime, where he has assembled over 160 definitions of 
organised crime (von Lampe, 2012). Accordingly: “…there seems to be as many 
descriptions…as there are authors…” (Allum and Kostakos, 2010:4). To add to the problem, 
the complexity of the phenomenon as noted by Longo (2010:15) is: “…it affects the social, 
economic, political and cultural spheres and the attempts to provide an adequate definition of 
this concept have given rise to a very controversial debate…”. While this chapter will not 
attempt to name all the different definitions of organised crime or provide a re-
conceptualisation of the concept, it will attempt to gain a deeper insight into the key attributes 
of organised crime. Furthermore, the first section of this chapter will identify and 
                                                 
58
 A full contextualisation of the City of Cape Town will be provided in chapter five.  
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conceptualise other relevant concepts such as: Transnational organised crime, organised 
criminal gangs, organised criminal groups and give a short overview of the history of 
organised crime and the trends of organised crime on an international level.  
 
4.2.1 Organised crime 
The search for a universal definition of organised crime has given rise to five main 
approaches to the study of organised crime as stated by Longo (2010: 18 - 20). These five 
approaches are first concerned with the identification of the semantic meaning of the term 
organised crime, while at the same time focusing on the analytical variables and using those 
to distinguish this specific phenomenon from other forms of crime. The first approach utilises 
organisational theory to explain organised crime. In this approach, organised crime is 
considered to be a classical organisation with emphasis on the associative dimension as the 
main variable of this sort of illicit activity. In order to distinguish this form of criminality 
from other forms, organisational variables such as hierarchy, differentiation, flexibility and 
the degree of formality of the organisation are used. 
 
The second approach stipulates that the main characteristic of organised crime, as opposed to 
other forms of crime, is the relationship between the members of the group, and in order to 
understand this relationship, the patron-client model is applied.  
 
The third approach is more concerned with the objectives of the criminal activity undertaken, 
rather than with the structure of organised crime as seen in the previous two approaches; thus, 
it is more epistemological in its nature. The third approach bases its conceptualisation of 
organised crime on the perceived entrepreneurial nature of the crimes undertaken, which 
would imply that organised crime is an economic and financial enterprise, aimed at garnering 
maximum profit with minimum cost, thereby indicating that it follows the economic 
rationale. 
 
The fourth approach applies a social network theory to the study of organised crime. In this 
approach, the relationships that link people in the organised crime structure are of great 
relevance, seen as the relationships among individuals and groups are aimed at providing 
illegal goods and service, thereby identifying organised crime to be a social system.  
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The fifth and last approach uses system theory and the accompanying conceptual tools of 
system analysis to study organised crime. In this approach, organised crime is seen to be a 
complex societal phenomenon, which requires complex and nuanced tools for analysis 
(Longo, 2010: 18 - 20). What is clear from these different approaches, is that organised crime 
can be studied as both an objective, measurable phenomenon, but also as a subjective 
formation, as noted by Allum and Kostakos (2010:3). Accordingly, a conceptualisation of 
organised crime needs to include elements of both the objective measurable nature and also 
the subjective construction of the phenomenon.  
 
On a more elementary level, and in order to focus the approach  on organised crime as it will 
be used in this study, Standing (2006:65 – 66) explains an orthodox understanding of 
organised crime, also referred to as the parasitic model. In this model, five tendencies of 
organised crime are used to create a way to understand the concept. The first tendency deals 
with the conceptualisation of organised crime and it is simply defined to represent groups of 
career criminals that are internally structured. There has however been a move away from the 
emphasis on the hierarchal structure of such groups, to recognise that organised criminal 
groups can be less structured and operate as fluid networks. The second tendency focuses on 
the predatory nature of organised criminal operations and holds: “…the view that organised 
crime feeds off opportunities inadvertently created by society…” (Standing, 2006:65). The 
third tendency of the parasitic model states that organised crime threatens both national and 
international security as it penetrates and attacks elements central to the security of a state: 
The legal economy and democratic forms of government. The fourth tendency of the 
orthodox understanding of organised crime deals with ways in which to combat it. The entire 
organisation should be targeted and not individuals; accordingly, the focus should not be on 
the criminal activities of each individual. The last tendency states that organised crime can be 
defeated and societies can be free of organised crime (Standing, 2006:65 – 66). As 
mentioned, the orthodox parasitic model does not provide a conceptualisation of organised 
crime per se, but rather a template to understand it. This model will be used as a foundation to 
construct a conceptualisation of organised crime.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, von Lampe (2012) has made a compilation of over 160 
definitions of organised crime, thereby indicating that attaching specific scientific meaning to 
a term such as organised crime, has a widely differing popular public definition, not only 
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internationally but also on a national level. To illustrate this, according to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (2012), organised crime is defined as:  
 
“…any group having some manner of a formalised structure and whose primary 
objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their 
position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, 
graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their 
locales, region, or the country as a whole…”.   
 
In 1975 the United Nations (UN) defined organised crime to be: “…large-scale and complex 
criminal activities carried out by tightly or loosely organised associations and aimed at the 
establishment, supply and exploitation of illegal markets at the expense of society…” (United 
Nations, 1975). More recently, the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNCTO)
59
 developed a conceptualisation of organised criminal syndicates 
but not specifically organised crime, as will be discussed in the next section.  
 
When analysing the definitions of scholars such as Cressey (1972) and Finckenauer (2005) 
they agree that the difficulty with finding a standardised definition of organised crime, lies in 
the word organised. Finckenauer (2005:65) argues that the main attributes that make a crime 
organised and thereby distinct from other forms of crimes, are: The level of sophistication, 
structure/hierarchy, self-identification, authority or reputation, size and continuity, lack of 
ideology, use of violence/force, restricted membership and corruption. Finckenauer (2005) 
continues by saying that the main goal of organised crime is the acquisition of money, 
whether through the provision of illicit goods and services in public demand, or the provision 
of legal goods and services in an illicit manner. However, organised crime may also penetrate 
the legitimate economy and in some cases, those involved in organised criminal activities 
seek political power in order to facilitate their greed for money. Abadinsky (2000) and 
Holmes (2007) list a number of elements of organised crime that correspond with 
Finckenauer‟s (2005) attributes of organised crime, namely: It is non-ideological, it is 
hierarchical, has limited or exclusive membership, it perpetuates itself, the use of illegal 
violence and bribery, demonstrates a division of labour, it is monopolistic and it is governed 
by explicit rules and regulations. Hess (2009) and Ianni (1974) agree that organised crime is 
                                                 
59
 The Convention against Transnational Organised Crime is multilateral treaty against transnational organised 
crime, adopted in 2000. It is also referred to as the Palermo Convention.  
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structured by cooperative association among a group of individuals, who use fear and 
corruption in order to achieve their goals.  
 
While the above mentioned conceptualisations of organised crime share similar attributes, 
academics and policy advisors continue to disagree on the meaning of the word organised, as 
mentioned previously. In addition, there is wide disagreement on what the size and nature of 
the structure is that constitutes organised crime. According to Maltz (1976) organised crime 
is: “…a crime committed by two or more offenders…”. However, Maltz (1990) also 
stipulates that organised crime is the: “…criminal and other unlawful activities of large, 
continuing, multi-enterprise organisations that were established primarily for criminal 
purposes, and that they employ corruption and violence in their activities…” (Maltz, 
1990:24).  
 
From the above mentioned it is evident that the establishment of a universal conceptualisation 
of the term organised crime is challenging; however, all of the above mentioned approaches 
and definitions (despite the different points in time when they were established) have a 
number of similar attributes. Furthermore, it is evident that the majority of these definitions 
are grounded in the orthodox understanding and accordingly, the parasitic model of organised 
crime, as explained by Standing (2006). Therefore, for the purposes of this study organised 
crime will be conceptualised as: Non-ideological, structured activities of a group or groups of 
individuals, whose main objective is material profit, acquired through illegal activities and 
use of force/violence when necessary, at the expense of the community in which those 
activities take place. It has to be noted that this conceptualisation will be revisited and put in 
contrast with the definition and understanding of organised criminal gangs in the South 
African context, as will be explained later in the chapter. 
 
4.2.2 Organised Criminal Groups 
As mentioned, the UNCTO does not have a conceptualisation for organised crime, but rather 
a definition of organised criminal groups. The UNCTO conceptualises organised criminal 
groups as: “…a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences…in 
order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit…” (UNCTO, 
2004:5). As with organised crime, the main points of dispute with regard to organised 
criminal groups are the size and hierarchical structure of the group. As was noted in the 
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previous section, the size can vary from two to three people as a starting point, to a large 
group of individuals. As will be discussed in the next section, the membership of these 
groups can be locally confined, or spread beyond the borders of a state, as in the case of 
transnational organised criminal groups. With regards to the structure of such groups, it can 
range from very formally structured organisations, to loosely structured, more fluid 
collections. In order to review the conceptualisation of organised criminal groups, one 
approach is to place it in contrast with organised criminal gangs, so as to identify the 
distinctions, but also similarities of the groups, as will be done in section 3.2.4 below. 
Accordingly, only the main elements of organised criminal groups, as highlighted by the 
UNCTO, will be used here as a foundation to conceptualise the phenomenon. These elements 
are:  A structured group of three or more people, existing for a period of time. The group will 
act in unison, committing serious crimes in order to obtain benefits.  
 
Even with this definition, there are several aspects that are vague and open for debate and 
interpretation. For example, the concept of structured is not clear and as discussed earlier, 
there is a tendency to include groups that are less formally structured. Therefore, the 
conclusion can be that there needs to be at least some sort of structure, which will be 
enhanced by the fact that the group acts in unison and with the same aim. The best way to 
describe it may be to state that the group needs to be internally organised, as stated in the 
parasitic model by Standing (2006:65). Furthermore, the understanding of serious crimes or 
illegal activities will differ depending on local area and country, and therefore, later in this 
chapter the concept will be discussed in the South African context. If activities spread and 
groups operate beyond the borders of a state, the element of trans-nationality comes into play.  
 
4.2.3 Transnational Organised Crime  
As in the case of organised crime, there is not one universal definition of transnational 
organised crime. Some organisations, for example the UNCTO, do not even have an exact 
conceptualisation of transnational organised crime. As mentioned earlier, the UNCTO only 
have a definition of an organised criminal group, as stated in article 2(a) of the Convention 
(UNCTO, 2004:5). The Convention does however state that transnational organised crime are 
not only offences committed in one state, but also crimes committed in one state and planned 
and controlled in another. Furthermore, transnational organised crime will include crimes 
committed in one state by groups operating in more than one state, and crimes committed in 
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one state, with considerable effects in another state. Accordingly, four characteristics of 
transnational organised crime can be highlighted from the UNCTO (2004):  
 
 Crimes committed by an organised criminal group in more than one state; 
 Crimes committed in one state, but planned and controlled in another; 
 Crimes committed in one state by an organised criminal group that operates in more 
than one state; 
 Crimes committed in one state, with substantial effects in another state.  
 
These characteristics indicate that according to the UNCTO, transnational organised crime is 
defined as all profit-making (monetary or material) serious criminal activities that have 
international implications. The rationale of the UNCTO to not have a formal definition of 
transnational organised crime is that new crimes emerge constantly and that global, regional 
and local conditions change frequently (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012).  
 
In addition to the non-existence of a common conceptualisation, the concept of transnational 
organised crime is also often used interchangeably with the terms transnational crime, 
international organised crime and multinational crime. These concepts are clarified by 
Madsen (2009). When analysing figure 3.1 below, the number 1 in the figure represents 
transnational crimes that violate international law, but are not organised in nature. Thus, there 
is not a network of illegal operations. One example is: “…a parental dispute over custody of a 
child, where one parent “snatches” the child in one country and transfers it to another…” 
(Madsen, 2009:8). Number 2 in the figure is organised crime violating international law 
without crossing borders, for example slave trading. Number 3 represents crime that is 
organised, transnational and that violates international law, for example international drug 
trafficking and the smuggling of weapons. The last category is number 4, which represents: 
“…crimes that are organised and transnational, but not violations of international law, for 
example the smuggling of genuine, but non-taxed tobacco product from country to 
another…” (Madsen, 2009:9). According to this classification, transnational crime involves at 
least two or more sovereign jurisdictions, it needs to be stipulated as a criminal act in 
legislation of these jurisdictions, but it can also be criminalised in international law (Madsen, 
2009:7-9).  
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual clarification of Transnational Crime, Organised Crime and  
 International Law.  
(Source: Adapted from Madsen, 2009:8).  
 
For the purposes of this study, transnational organised crime will be conceptualised by the 
four characteristics highlighted from the UNCTO. In addition, it is recognised that the 
activities are executed by a permanent organised group, which takes place outside of the 
formal legal economy, with the main aim of making a profit or monetary gain, with the use of 
force, violence, corruption or bribery. It will include (but not be limited to) activities such as 
illegal migration, trafficking of people, trafficking in body parts, theft of and trafficking in 
automobiles, fauna and flora trafficking, cybercrimes, software piracy, firearms trafficking, 
drug trafficking and money laundering.  
 
4.2.4 Organised Criminal Gangs 
The concept of organised criminal gangs in the South African context will be discussed in 
detail in section 4.4.4 of this chapter. This section will only provide a general overview of the 
concept organised criminal gangs. It has to be noted, as with organised crime and 
transnational organised crime, there is no universally agreed-upon definition of an organised 
criminal gang. In general, the concept stands in contrast with an organised criminal group, as 
this usually refers to a much more organised structure and the gang to a much loosely 
structured, less professional and less sophisticated grouping.  
 
1 
3 
4 
2 
Transnational Crime 
Organised Crime 
International Law 
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As a result of the continuous dispute of the conceptual attributes of organised criminal gangs, 
the term is often used interchangeably with other concepts such as youth gangs and street 
gangs. This is particularly the case in the Unites States (US). In this context, when referring 
to gangs, youth gangs are often the main point of discussion. To complicate the matter 
further,  in both practice and research, motorcycle gangs, prison gangs, hate groups, adult 
organised crime groups, terrorist organisations and other forms of security threat groups are 
frequently, but not always treated as separate from youth gangs.  
 
According to the United States Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland 
Security's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a gang is:   
 
 An association of three or more individuals; 
 Members collectively adopt a group identity, by employing one or more of the 
following: a common name, slogan, identifying sign, tattoo or other physical marking, 
style or colour of clothing hairstyle, hand sign or graffiti; with the aim of creating an 
atmosphere of fear or intimidation;  
 The purpose of the gang is in part to engage in criminal activity, by using violence or 
intimidation to further their criminal objectives; 
 The members engage in criminal activity or acts of juvenile delinquency, which if 
committed by an adult would be seen as crimes whose intent is to enhance and/or 
preserve the association's power, reputation or economic resources;  
 In addition to the above mentioned, the association may also possess one or several of 
the following characteristics: members may employ rules for joining and operating 
within the association, meetings conducted on a recurring basis, physical protection 
for members may be provided on behalf of the association, to protect them from 
others, exercising control over a specific geographical location or are, and/or defence 
of perceived interests from rivals and may have an identifiable structure (National 
Institute of Justice, 2011).  
 
One of the characteristics and also pitfalls of definitions is that the strength sometimes lies 
within what it excludes as opposed to what it includes. Accordingly, the above mentioned 
definition could also include the orthodox conceptualisation of an organised criminal group; 
however, the US Department of Justice clearly states that drug trafficking organisations, 
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terrorist organisations, traditional organised crime groups
60
 and groups that fall within the 
Department‟s definition of transnational organised crime, are excluded from the above 
mentioned definition of gangs (National Institute of Justice, 2011).  
 
Creating further difficulties with conceptualising gangs in the US context, is the fact that the 
definitions of gangs as used by individual state legislatures may to a certain extent differ from 
the federal definition, as stated by the Department of Justice and the ICE. To illustrate, the 
State of California legislature defines a gang as:  
 
“… any on-going organisation, association or group of three or more persons, whether 
formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or 
more of the criminal acts…having a common name or common identifying sign or 
symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged 
in a pattern of criminal gang activity...” (California Street Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act, 1988: section 186.22(f)).  
 
As mentioned, in research literature on gangs, the primary focus is directed at youth gangs as 
opposed to adult gangs. Researchers such as Decker and Curry (2003), Esbensen et al. 
(2001), Klein (1995), Miller (1992) and Spergel (1995) list the following criteria for 
classifying youth gangs:  
 
 The group has three or more members, generally aged 12-24; 
 Members have a shared identity, usually linked to a name and/or other symbols;  
 Members perceive themselves as a gang, and are recognised as such by others;  
 The group has some perpetuity and a degree of organisation;  
 The group is involved in a high level of criminal activity.  
 
With this definition, what separates gangs from youth gangs is just the age limit. However, 
there seems to be a need in the literature to give each sub-category of gangs a 
conceptualisation. Indeed, this is clear from the United States National Gang Threat 
Assessment, which is released annually by the National Gang Intelligence Centre. The 
assessment states that each gang type (street gangs, prison gangs and outlaw motorcycle 
                                                 
60
 Traditional organised crime groups refer to groups such as the Italian La Cosa Nostra.  
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gangs etc.) merits its own definition and a discussion of the characteristics differ at national, 
regional and local levels. However, the problem with conceptualising each gang type 
individually renders the operational definition a challenge. The most recent National Gang 
Assessment published in 2011 found, that around 1, 4 million gang members belong to more 
than 33,000 gangs in the US. Other key findings of the assessment were that gangs are 
increasingly engaging in non-traditional gang-related crime such as human trafficking, and 
prostitution. Gangs are also engaging in white-collar crime such as counterfeiting, identity 
theft, and mortgage fraud. Accordingly, gangs are becoming increasingly adaptable and 
sophisticated, with the ability to connect with criminal organisations (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2011).  
 
As has been noted with the conceptualisation of organised crime earlier (and a topic that will 
come under discussion again when conceptualising organised crime and organised criminal 
gangs in South Africa) the failure to define gangs hampers the ability to measure and combat 
operations of such groups. This goes hand in hand with Finckenauer‟s (2005:68) assessment 
of the issue that arises from the failure to find a universal definition of organised crime: 
“…because of how the problem of organised crime is defined, goes a long way toward 
determining how laws are framed, how investigations and prosecutions are conducted, how 
research studies are done, and increasingly, how mutual legal assistance across national 
borders is or is not rendered…”.  
 
Additionally, the conceptualisation of the term gang or organised criminal gang is further 
challenged by the perceived need amongst scholars and policymakers for the distinction 
between gangs and their crimes, from other forms of collective criminality. Siegel and Welsh 
(2009) claim that gangs and their specific „culture‟, often consisting of rituals, symbols and 
the like, have a tendency to convey a sense of identity, which is further strengthened by the 
use of violence and the accompanying „turf wars‟.61 Furthermore, Decker and Winkle (1996) 
and  Klein (2004) stipulate that, while criminal organisations use violence more strategically 
to consolidate long-term goals, gang violence is more of a tactical nature, in order to achieve 
short-term goals; therefore, gangs are not true market players, nor are they as sophisticated or 
as organised as criminal organisations. This last element does however, stand in contrast with 
the findings of the 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment, as mentioned earlier. Indeed, as 
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 Turf wars refer to the defence of a specific geographical location or area that is under the control of a gang.  
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argued by Hauck and Peterke (2010) in practice, the dividing line between gangs and 
organised criminal groups often becomes blurred. Criminal organisations often emerge out of 
gangs, as they continue to use their symbols and names; thus, they are: “…well-structured 
gangs that represent quite permanent associations and professionally commit serious and 
even transnational crimes…” (Hauck and Peterke, 2010:412). As a result, the relevance of a 
distinction between an organised criminal group and an organised criminal gang is 
questioned. Indeed, this study does adopt the hypothesis that the lines between organised 
criminal gangs and organised criminal groups are becoming increasingly blurred. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this study, the distinction is artificial and of little use.  
 
4.3 Transnational Organised Crime: Overview  
The historical developments of organised crime in South Africa will be discussed in detail in 
section 4.4. This section will provide a very broad overview of transnational organised crime. 
It will start off with a short overview of the history of organised crime and will then move on 
to describe how it has changed from being a locally driven process, to evolving into a more 
internationally driven one.  
 
4.3.1 Historical Development  
Presenting an accurate history of organised crime is virtually impossible; not due to the lack 
of literature but due to the lack of reliable academic literature. Rubinstein and Reuter 
(1978:57) illustrate this when stating: “…how difficult it is to collect accurate information 
even from legitimate organisations operating in a highly regulated environment. The 
challenges are immeasurably greater in collecting information about people who are 
consciously involved in illegal activities…”. Accordingly, the next section will only provide 
a brief description of the historical developments of organised crime.   
 
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2010) the term 
organised crime appears to have emerged in Chicago in 1919, retaining undertones of the 
bootlegging gangs prevalent during that era. However, the phenomenon of organised crime 
far pre-dates this denomination and the manifestations of organised crime have evolved 
considerably since that time (UNODC, 2010:25 - 36). Nevertheless, after organised crime 
rose in prominence in 1919, law enforcement authorities focused on it as an opponent that 
was organised similar to them. This impression was further reinforced in 1957, after the 
discovery of a gang meeting in Apalachin, New York, where some 70 senior gang members 
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from around the US were present. After this incident, it was widely believed that the enemy 
was a form of anti-government or criminal corporation, intended to secretly coordinate illicit 
activities. (UNODC, 2010:25 - 36).  
 
As time passed, law enforcement authorities and scholars have even gone as far as to suggest 
that the leaders of these traditional hierarchical groups, operating on a local level, were 
cooperating with similar organisations in other states, thereby coordinating their activities in 
a cosmic global conspiracy. This image has however begun to deteriorate over time, and what 
some believed to be concerted action, was in many instances regarded as activities of a range 
of actors responding to market forces; thus, the groups themselves were no longer the main 
focal point, but rather the global markets they operated in (UNODC, 2010:25 – 36).  
 
Historically, crime and organised crime across the US, Europe and Latin America, have had 
small beginnings and were mainly local endeavours, as can be noted from small-time street 
criminal cases such as the Gambino family, the Corleone family and other important crime 
syndicates, such as the Cali and Medellin drug cartels (Kinnes, 2000). However,  organised 
crime evolved into a more sophisticated undertaking, enabled by forces of globalisation, that 
make the transnational trade in commodities, such as cocaine, heroin, firearms, people, 
environmental resources and the like, easier than at the beginning of the 20
th
 century 
(UNODC, 2010:25 – 36).  
 
4.3.2 The Current Situation  
The UNODC (2010) document: The Globalisation of Crime-A Transnational Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment lists: Smuggling in migrants, trafficking in people, cocaine, heroin, 
firearms, environmental resources, counterfeit products, maritime piracy and cybercrime as 
the main forms of transnational organised crime (See map 4.1 below).  
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Map 4.1: Main Global Transnational Organised Crime Flows 
(Source: Adapted from UNODC, 2010:2).  
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While these forms of transnational organised crime have existed for a very long time, due to 
global economic shifts; the accompanying ease of flow of money, people and commodities; 
the rise in supply and demand; the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union; the transnational trade in illegal commodities has increased and continues to be 
on the rise.
62
  
 
4.4 Organised Crime in South Africa  
In the following section, the attention of this chapter will move from organised crime in 
general, the international development and the current global situation around organised 
crime, to examining organised crime locally, in South Africa. As will be explained, the trends 
and patterns in organised crime changed significantly during the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
with the end of apartheid. Domestic organised crime became increasingly transnational and 
as such, strengthened the operations and impacts of local groups. This has led to the current 
situation, where the assassinations of underworld figures are a too common occurrence. The 
City of Cape Town is no stranger to such incidents and in the past few years the reality of 
organised crime in the City has been exposed. This chapter will provide a general overview 
of organised criminal activities in the City of Cape Town, but with specific reference to the 
gangs on the Cape Flats.   
 
4.4.1 Organised Crime in South Africa: The Development  
Before an analysis of the development of organised crime in South Africa can be provided, it 
is necessary to outline a few elements of the expansion of organised crime in Africa. A 
number of factors contributed to the development of organised crime on the continent. With 
specific reference to the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
63
, after World 
War Two, mass urbanisation occurred in this region. This came as a result of the prospects of 
better job opportunities in the larger cities, such as Luanda, the capital of Angola. However, 
the majority of people forming part of the accelerated process of urbanisation failed to find 
employment, leading to mass poverty in the urban areas. As a result, informal settlements on 
the outskirts of cities expanded during the 1950s. Furthermore, following the increased 
                                                 
62
 For a detailed analysis of trends in transnational organised crime the UNODC (2010) document The 
Globalisation of Crime-A Transnational Organised Crime Threat Assessment can be consulted.  It is 
regarded as the only reliable and sufficient source of information on describing trends in transnational 
organised crime. 
63
 Member states of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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industrialisation, skilled workers were needed and as many Africans were illiterate, the 
number of settlers increased, in order to work in the industries. As domestic markets 
expanded, criminal markets developed under the urban poor. This development was however 
very slow, but the level of expansion rapidly increased with the period of independence. As 
many countries in SADC gained independence from 1960 – 1990, the region witnessed 
economic decline and an exodus or re-settling of Europeans (Gastrow, 2003:4 – 6).  
 
This resulted in a change of organised criminal activity from only low-scale domestic 
markets, to cross-border criminal activity, as explained by Gastrow (2003:7):  
 
“…After the Belgian Congo attained independence in 1960…some Belgians and 
others living there left for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Some retained contact 
with associates in the former colony and set about establishing whatever legitimate or 
illegitimate trading and smuggling links could be established for profit. Diamonds, 
cobalt and other minerals or semi-precious stones constituted valuable illicit 
smuggling items…”.  
 
This, coupled with post-independence struggles such as conflict, instability and loss of 
capital, further led to the increase of organised crime in the region (Gastrow, 2003:8). 
Furthermore, the porous borders contributed to (and still contribute today) to the smuggling 
of goods across borders, but also to the procurement of illegal documentation (passports and 
identity documents). This was amplified by corrupt state officials (South African Institute of 
International Affairs, 2003).  It is acknowledged that the above mentioned factors contributed 
to the rise of organised crime, but in fact, little is known about the pre-1990 manifestation 
and historical, social and political factors that contributed to the development of organised 
crime in Southern Africa (Gastrow, 2003:5).  
 
In South Africa, the relatively tightly controlled border posts and airports and the harsh 
discriminatory laws in place, made it very risky for Africans from states to the north to enter 
the country, in order to dispose of their goods or to make contact with local criminal groups 
(Gastrow, 2003:9). As Gastrow (2003:10) writes:   
 
“…The most popular route used to smuggle illegal goods into South Africa from the 
Congo and Zambia, was the heavy transport road from Zambia to South Africa used 
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by large trucks and trailers. Ivory, copper, cobalt and large quantities of Mandrax 
were transported in this way by the newly formed syndicates, also involving South 
African transport drivers…”.  
 
Furthermore, South African dealers had difficulty to pay in hard currency and therefore, 
motor vehicles stolen in South Africa became a key item in the barter trade. As a result, car 
hijackings dramatically increased in South Africa between the 1980s and 1990s, as the stolen 
cars were used to enable South African criminal groups to pay for the goods received. At the 
beginning of 1980, 36,762 cases of car theft were reported and at the beginning of 1990 
68,649. This shows an increase of 87% (Gastrow, 2003:10). These vehicles were often 
exchanged for firearms, drugs and other illicit commodities. The goods were then smuggled 
back to South Africa and disposed in the country‟s own criminal market (Gastrow, 2003:13).    
 
Another factor that influenced the nature of organised crime in South Africa was the ready 
availability of firearms. This was a result of on-going political conflict in South Africa and as 
mentioned earlier, the civil wars in other parts of Southern Africa. The wide-scale township 
revolts and the violent repression resulted in greater lawlessness and the weakening of an 
already disintegrating criminal justice system. Attempts to seal South Africa‟s long borders 
against an invasion by guerrilla groups placed a strain on the work force of the military and 
the police, and limited manpower was directed towards the policing of organised crime. In 
addition, the South African authorities at that time placed all their manpower in policing the 
violence of the last days of Apartheid (South African Institute of International Affairs, 2003). 
There was also an increase in corrupt officials at border posts, which contributed to an 
increase in the trafficking of illicit goods across borders (Gastrow, 2003:10-13). Thus, after 
the transition to democracy in South Africa, organised crime expanded dramatically and this 
growth caught the South African law enforcement agencies unprepared. Despite the lack of 
manpower, there was also a lack of resources and technical expertise to deal adequately with 
organised crime. This resulted in organised crime operations doubling after the elections in 
1994 (Shaw, 1998).   
  
To expand on the above mentioned analysis of the increase in organised crime, a number of 
other factors need to be mentioned as well. After the opening of the country‟s borders in the 
mid-1990s, the relatively well-developed infrastructure, modern telecommunication systems 
and technology and business practices in South Africa, contributed to the rapid expansion of 
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organised crime. In accordance with the corporatisation process of street gangs (as will be 
explained in section 3.4.1) criminal groups matured from generally small-scale local 
operations to international syndicates (Standing, 2003b:46-47). In order to illustrate this 
Shaw (1996 and 1998) references statistics from the South African Police Service (SAPS). It 
was estimated in 1996 that approximately 500 well-functioning crime syndicates were 
operating in and from South Africa. In 1998, there were 192 organised crime syndicates and 
1,903 primary suspects that were operating under police surveillance. Ninety six of these 
syndicates specialised in drug trafficking, 83 in vehicle-related crimes and 60 in commercial 
or a combination of crimes. A hundred and fifty of these syndicates were restricted to sub-
Saharan Africa and the remainder operated internationally.  
 
To conclude the discussion of organised crime in SADC, Goredema (2011:98) states that 
despite the development of organised crime in the region, transnational groups from both 
developing and developed countries regard Southern Africa as a lucrative region. This comes 
as a result of: “…a huge demand in affluent societies for resources and commodities. Most of 
these commodities are located in the less affluent parts of the world…”  (Goredema, 
2011:98). Organised crime in Southern Africa involves nine main markets, each with specific 
activities around which they are centred (See table 3.1 below).  
Table 4.1: Main Commodities of Organised Crime in Southern Africa  
Main Commodities  Description  
Smuggling and Illegal Importation of 
Goods and Counterfeit Goods 
Cigarette smuggling, Firearms smuggling, Audio-visual 
piracy, Counterfeit medicines and Cosmetics, Fuel 
smuggling, Liquor smuggling, Counterfeit currency.   
Drugs   
Cannabis, Cocaine, Amphetamines and 
Methamphetamines, Heroin, Subutex, Khat.  
Smuggling of stolen motor vehicles   
Armed robberies  
Smuggling of Endangered Species and 
Rare Resources 
Poaching, Abalone poaching, Timber, Mining.  
Financial Crime and Money Laundering   
People Smuggling and Human 
Trafficking  
 
Stock Theft and Cattle Rustling   
Corruption   
(Source: Adapted from Hübschle, 2010).  
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As a result of the country‟s geographical location within the African continent and bordering 
many other African countries, the operations of international crime organisations and 
transnational crime organisations had an even greater potential to flourish in South Africa. In 
order to measure the expansion of organised criminal groups in South Africa, Shaw (1998) 
identifies four indicators:  
 
 The degree to which organised criminal groups have consolidated either through 
merger or structured co-operation; 
 The role of former members of the apartheid security forces in organised crime; 
 If organised criminal groups have been successful in the penetration of the state and 
corrupting officials, and  
 The degree to which foreign organised crime groups operate within the country and 
have created connections with local crime syndicates.  
 
It is believed that all of these four elements were present in South Africa after 1994 and 
continue to exist; thereby facilitating the growth of criminal groups. Despite these four 
common characteristics, there is still much to be learned about the structures and functioning 
of organised crime in South Africa. In 1998, Shaw explained: 
 
“… There is little, if any, substantial work on the development of organised crime in 
the country and the growth, size and shape of criminal groups are poorly understood.  
Organised criminal operations have benefited: lack of analysis has meant that 
attempts to police the problem have often been poorly coordinated and the attention of 
policy makers, until recently, has been diverted to other seemingly more urgent police 
transformation issues…”.  
 
With specific reference to criminal gangs, their development can be traced back to the 1800s. 
The prison gangs or the „number gangs‟ (groups such as the 26s, 27s and 28s) have existed 
since 1836. Haefele (2003:9) writes that the prison gangs date back to a warrior from 
Pondoland
64
, Pomabaza, who left Pondoland in 1824 to work in coal mines in then Natal. His 
activities and conduct gave rise to these groups. The number gangs were formed in prison and 
                                                 
64
 Pondoland as it is known today is located in the Eastern Cape province of South Africa. It borders the Indian 
Ocean. It is the former Pondo Kingdom and home of the Pondo People.  
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initially, membership to such groups was granted after sentencing and spending time in 
prison. However, the gangs‟ involvement in the trafficking of drugs placed them in a position 
to extend their activities outside the prisons (Haefele, 1998). The two most prominent groups 
are the 26s and 28s and:  
 
“…each gang has its own code of conduct, initiations, symbols like flags and colours 
and hierarchical structures, with generals giving orders, judges enforcing discipline 
and soldiers or „madodas‟, the ordinary members. Stars indicating rank are tattooed on 
shoulders; the 28s „sonaf‟ (sun down) symbol, and the 26s „sonop‟ (sun up) are 
popular „tjappies‟ (gang tattoos), as are the numbers themselves…” (Haefele, 2003).    
 
Since the late 1990s, there have been attempts to provide a better conceptual clarification of 
organised crime and also to increase the combatting mechanisms against organised criminal 
groups. As will be seen in the next section, organised crime has been identified as a direct 
threat to national security by the state and harsh measures were implemented in order to deal 
with it. However, organised crime continues to prevail and expand, especially on the Cape 
Flats.  
 
4.4.2 Legislation and Responses to Organised Crime in South Africa  
The following section will provide an overview of legislation and responses to organised 
crime in South Africa. This will be done in order to provide more conceptual clarity on terms 
used in this study. Other policing methods regarding organised crime will also be discussed.   
 
4.4.2.1 Conceptualisation through Legislation: The 1998 Prevention of Organised Crime Act  
The main piece of legislation dealing with organised crime in South Africa is the 1998 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) (Act 121 of 1998). As mentioned in the previous 
section, there was a significant increase in the activities of organised criminal groups after the 
end of apartheid. Standing (2006:x) argues that during this time, it was noted that organised 
crime posed one of the major dangers to South Africa‟s new democracy and as a result, the 
POCA act was initiated. As stated in the preamble of the act: “…there is a rapid growth of 
organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities nationally and internationally 
and since organised crime has internationally been identified as an international security 
threat…” (POCA, 121 of 1998). However, the Act is described as “…far-reaching…” and 
one of the main features of the act is that it gives courts the authorisation to sentence a person 
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based on the fact that they belong to an organised criminal gang/group. In addition, the act 
increased the penalties for money laundering and it gives the state the ability to seize the 
assets of those found guilty of organised crime, through civil proceedings (Standing, 2006:x).  
The aim of this chapter is not to provide a detailed analysis of this piece of legislation and 
how successfully it has been implemented. However, it has to be mentioned that there has 
been a significant increase in the presence and activities of organised criminal groups in 
South Africa and particularly in the City of Cape Town and on the Cape Flats; despite the 
fact that the main aim of the Act was to drastically curb the activities of organised criminal 
groups.  
 
When analysing the POCA, it is clear that the Act follows an orthodox understanding of 
organised crime, as explained by Standing (2006). The Act adopts the view that organised 
crime is committed by internally organised career criminals. Such groups will feed from 
opportunities created by society and the organisations, and their operations threaten national 
and international security. Although the act creates specific measures to target the leaders of 
organised criminal groups, there are measures to tackle the entire group, for example with the 
criminalisation of the membership to a criminal gang, as will be explained below. Last, there 
is the belief that organised crime is a menace to society and it can be defeated in order to 
establish a world free of organised crime.    
 
An element that makes the POCA controversial is that it allows for the civil forfeiture of the 
proceeds of crime. This means that the state can seize the possessions and money of 
suspected criminals, which was acquired through suspected criminal actions, without a 
criminal conviction. The Act further criminalises the participation in racketeering, as stated in 
the preamble of the Act:  
 
“…bearing in mind that it is usually very difficult to prove the direct involvement of 
organised crime leaders in particular cases, because they do not perform the actual 
criminal activities themselves, it is necessary to criminalise the management of and 
related conduct in connection with enterprises which are involved in a pattern of 
racketeering activity..." (POCA, 121 of 1998: preamble).  
 
The controversy lies within the pattern of racketeering activities and how this concept is 
explained in the Act. The Act provides for a very broad scope of crimes to be included in 
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racketeering activities and furthermore says that it involves the participation or involvement 
in at least two crimes (crimes punishable with imprisonment for more than one year without 
the option of a fine) within ten years of each other (POCA, 121 of 1998:art2).  
 
With regard to criminal gangs, in article one of the Act, a criminal gang is conceptualised as:   
 
“… any formal or informal ongoing organisation, association or group of three or 
more persons, which has as one of its activities the commission of one or more 
criminal offence, which has an identifiable name or identifying symbol, and whose 
members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of 
criminal activity…” (POCA 121 of 1998:art1 iv).   
 
The POCA also describes a member of a criminal gang as a person who: 
 
“…admits to criminal gang membership, is identified as a member of a criminal gang 
by parent or guardian, resides in or frequents a particular criminal gang‟s area and 
adopts their style of dress, their use of hand signs language or their tattoos, and 
associates with known members of a criminal gang, has been arrested more than once 
in the company of identified members of a criminal gang for offences which are 
consistent with usual criminal gang activity and is identified as a member of a 
criminal gang by physical evidence such as photographs or other documentation…” 
(POCA 121 of 1998:art11 a-e). 
 
From the above mentioned conceptualisations, it is clear that the POCA criminalises gangs as 
a social organisation. The rationalisation behind this is twofold. As in the case of 
racketeering, first is the idea that based on criminal law, it is difficult and sometimes 
impossible to prosecute senior members of criminal gangs as their criminal operations are 
concealed and they are usually not the ones that carry out the criminal acts, such as a killing 
or a robbery. Consequently, the Act criminalises the participation and promotion of criminal 
gang activities. Second, the increase in punishment for members of criminal gangs is justified 
by the POCA in an attempt to act as a message of deterrence or to curb the increase of gang 
membership (Standing, 2006:53 – 54).  
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
113 
 
These aspects of the Act received much criticism from human rights organisations, arguing 
that banning gangs would violate the constitutional right to freedom of association. In 
addition, when the Act was passed it could not be applied retrospectively; thus, the 
government lost many court cases against alleged gangsters (Kinnes, 2000:48).  Furthermore, 
already in 2006 Standing (2006:270) noted that despite these measures, the POCA seemed 
unlikely to reduce the problems associated with gangs, as membership to such groups is 
driven by many factors (such as social elements) and that criminalising membership may 
inflame the situation. Furthermore, the POCA creates a conceptual difference between 
organised criminal activity and criminal gang activity, which further complicates the 
combating of criminal gangs, as their highly structured and organised nature is disregarded.  
Indeed, as previously mentioned, this study regards the conceptual difference between an 
organised criminal group and an organised criminal gang as insignificant.  
 
In contrast, Gastrow (1998:9 – 10) assumes the difference between a gang and a criminal 
syndicate or an organised criminal group and supports his point of view by the contrasts in 
defining the concepts. He describes gangs in general to be:  
 
 Less formally structured than syndicates and 
 That they are often territorially based; 
 Criminal activities involve less sophistication than those of syndicates do and  
 The members tend to be youths.     
 
An important point that arises out of the work of Gastrow (1998:9 – 10) is that the many 
different manifestations of criminal gangs, makes it highly unlikely that one single definition 
will ever be adequate to cover all the variations, as mentioned in the first section of this 
chapter. Indeed, he acknowledges that all criminal gangs are not necessarily youth gangs and 
when adults are members of these gangs their operations tend to be more organised. Thus: 
“…under certain circumstances…the criminal activities of gangs do amount to organised 
crime…” (Gastrow, 1998:9 – 10).  
 
Kinnes (2000) presents a different view in his work on the development of criminal gangs in 
the Western Cape.  He agrees with Gastrow (1998) that the many manifestations of gangs 
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make one definition highly unlikely. In addition, after a review of his conceptualisation, the 
distinction between gangs and organised crime starts to overlap (Kinnes, 2000:4 – 6).   
 
To explain, Kinnes (2000:5) states that gangs define themselves in relation to their social 
world and that this world engenders the loyalty, brotherhood and universality of their beliefs.  
The structure of gangs is open to change as the group expands their activities in a global 
changing environment. These groups will adapt and change, not only in the changing social 
environment but also in the changing criminal environment. Each gang will have its own 
unique handshake, tattoos that will distinguish members from different gangs and their 
rankings within the gangs, a specifically developed language and a dress code.  Out of this, it 
is clear that gangs are structured with relation to their social world. As the social world 
changes, the structure of gangs will change with it.  Furthermore, the attributes of gangs 
include members that range from youngsters to adults between 20 and 40 years of age, it can 
involve people from both inside and outside of prison: “…gang members may be anything 
from street level operators to sophisticated syndicate bosses…gangs may be involved in 
criminal activities for the sake of survival, or may be high-level, structured criminal 
organisations…” (Kinnes, 2000:5 – 6).  From this conceptualisation it is clear that the lines 
between an organised criminal group and an organised criminal gang are unmistakably 
blurred and this confirms the conceptual point of view held by this study.  Standing (2003:48) 
ends his discussion by stating that one element that distinguishes the two definitions is that 
organised crime represents a higher form of criminality. It is believed that even this element 
is eliminated by the growth and expansion of the gangs on the Cape Flats, as will be indicated 
below.  
 
4.4.2.2 Other Policing Methods  
Despite the POCA, organised crime in South Africa is combatted through several other pieces 
of legislation, including the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Act 38 of 2001), the Public 
Finance Management Act (Act 1 of 1999) and the Prevention and Combatting of Corrupt 
Activities Act (Act 12 of 2004).  
 
The South African Country Report to the 12
th
 United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice (2012:7) indicates that South Africa has ratified or acceded to six 
organised crime and corruption conventions. These are: UN Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; UN Convention against Transnational 
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Organised Crime; Protocol to Prevent, Supress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children; Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; 
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms and the UN 
Convention against Corruption. South Africa is also part of the Southern African regional 
Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation, which comprises the chiefs of the policing agencies 
in the SADC region. The organisation is specifically geared to target organised crime in the 
region. Furthermore, the country has agreements relating to the combatting of drug 
trafficking with Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Iran (South African Country Report to the 11
th
 
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 2004:12 and 13).     
 
On the domestic level, in February 2008 the specialised organised crime unit, the Directorate 
of Special Operations, the Scorpions, was disbanded. The Scorpions were established in 1999 
as part of the National Prosecuting Authority and as a tool to fight against the wave of 
organised crime in the country, and were widely regarded successful in their operations. The 
operations of the Scorpions were also described as tackling crime that had the greatest 
economic, social and security impact on South Africans. But high-level investigations led to 
the dismantling of the unit: There were allegations that the organisation became a political 
tool, rather than a crime fighting tool (Stratfor, 2008; South African Country Report to the 
11
th
 United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 2004:18). On the 
other hand, opposition parties in the country claimed that the African National Congress 
(ANC) dismantled the organisation in order to protect prominent ANC members from 
charges of corruption. In its place, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, or Hawks, 
was established in 2009, as part of the South African Police Service. The Hawks targets 
organised crime, economic crime, corruption, and other serious crime referred to it by the 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service and has been hailed to be largely 
successful in their operations (SouthAfrica.Info, 2012).  
 
4.4.3 Organised Crime in South Africa: A Transnational and Local Overview  
According to Minnaar (1999) the continuation of organised crime in South Africa can be 
attributed to several factors. These factors include South Africa's favourable geographical 
position on the major trafficking routes between the Far and Middle East, the Americas and 
Europe; the country‟s accessibility via land, sea and air routes; both the demand for and ready 
availability of illegal goods; criminal alliances; the presence of undocumented migrants and  
advanced computer and communications technology facilitates. With regards to geography, 
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South Africa‟s position between the Indian Ocean basin and Western Hemisphere contributes 
to the country being an excellent transhipment point for drugs, counterfeit goods and illegal 
imports. With specific reference to the global drug trade, South Africa is regarded as a central 
point for the shipment of both heroin and cocaine. Heroin producing countries like 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are located to the east, and cocaine producing countries like 
Colombia, Peru and Bolivia to the west of South Africa. As a result, the country is a very 
important transhipment point for drugs. Especially with Durban regarded as the busiest 
seaport in Africa. Of course, other illegal commodities are also traded on these routes, most 
notably abalone and other environmental resources (Stratfor, 2008).  
 
The following groups have been involved in criminal activities in South Africa since the early 
1980s. The Chinese Triads have a specific interest in abalone and other environmental 
resources such as ivory, shark fins and endangered hides. Some of these products, for 
example abalone, will be harvested in South Africa, but others will be provided from 
neighbouring countries to the Triads operating in South Africa. Groups such as the Wo Shing 
Wo, San Yee On, 14K-Hau and 14K-Ngai have been operational in South Africa with 
members in Johannesburg and Cape Town, amongst other areas (Starfor 2008; Gastrow, 
2001). Organised criminal groups from Nigeria also have a large presence in the country and 
are specifically involved in the drug-trade, car-theft rings and the weapons trade (Stratfor, 
2008). It is also known that international syndicates from Columbia, Russia and Bulgaria 
operate in the country and have formed partnerships with local groups (Haefele, 2003).    
 
South Africa also continues to be an attractive base for criminal operations from southern, 
central and western Africa. Groups from Zimbabwe, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Nigeria have established solid networks in the country and the country‟s established 
financial and telecommunications services and good transportation infrastructure continue to 
make it an attractive option for organised criminal networks to operate in (Stratfor, 2008). As 
noted by Irish-Qhobosheane (ed) (2007:149) regional organised criminal groups: “…are 
active not only in South Africa but also in one or more of its neighbouring states. In many 
cases, a criminal organisation contains nationals from several different SADC countries, 
including South Africa…”. It was reported in the media that the State Security Minister 
Siyabonga Cwele, reported in the National Assembly that it is estimated that South Africa 
loses 10% of the GDP (R178 billion) annually to the country‟s illicit economy (Hartley, 
2011).  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
117 
 
According to the South African Country Report to the 11
th
 United Nations Congress on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice released in 2004, there were 341 organised crime 
groups operating in South Africa, at the time that data was compiled for the report (See table 
3.2). The report further states that the majority of these groups were involved in drug-related 
crime, motor vehicle theft, hijacking of motor vehicles, fraud, corruption and the trafficking 
in non-ferrous metals, precious metals and stones (South African Country Report to the 11
th
 
United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 2004:11, 24). 
 
Table 4.2: Organised Crime in South Africa  
 
Criminal Groups  Quantity 
Number of Groups Identified and Infiltrated 341 
Type of Threat: Drugs 98 
Vehicle Theft 51 
Armed Robbery/Hijacking 20 
Corruption 16 
Fraud 37 
Precious Metals 10 
Precious Stones 9 
Non-ferrous Metals 11 
Number of Groups Infiltrated and Terminated 167 
Number of Leaders Arrested for Prosecution 467 
Number of Syndicate Members Arrested 1,229 
Number of Project-driven operations conducted by 31 March 2004 174 
 
(Source: South African Country Report to the 11
th
 United Nations Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, 2004:24). 
 
The 2009/10 SAPS annual report states that 121 organised criminal groups composed of 630 
targets were identified and investigated. The report further states that 43 of these targets were 
successfully terminated and 450 suspects arrested. The report then goes on to deal with a 
number of organised criminal activities including drug-related crimes, precious metals and 
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diamonds, cross-border crime operations, endangered species, human trafficking and 
commercial crimes. With regards to drug-related crimes, 31 clandestine drug laboratories 
were detected and dismantled, in comparison to 20 in the previous year. During the reporting 
period, 856 persons were arrested for the illegal purchase, theft and possession of uncut 
diamonds and precious metals. Furthermore, 83 people were arrested for illegal possession of 
abalone and other environmental resources. The total value of the items seized amounted to 
R88, 9 million. With regard to human trafficking, 72 victims were rescued from brothels or 
from the control of traffickers; 14 arrests were made and two convictions secured (SAPS 
Annual Report 2009/2010:102 – 104). The following paragraph provides a number of 
comments on the findings of the report.  
 
First, the report does not provide a conceptualisation of organised criminal groups. It is 
therefore assumed that the report uses the conceptualisation as set out in the POCA. 
Accordingly, criminal gangs are not included in this conceptualisation and not in these 
findings of the report. Second, it is also not clear if the groups mentioned in the report are 
domestic, international groups operating in South Africa or transnational organisations. This 
illustrates the already highlighted and discussed conceptual dilemma of organised crime. As 
will be confirmed below, the gangs on the Cape Flats need to be conceptualised as organised 
criminal groups.  
 
4.4.4 The Gangs on the Cape Flats 
The gangs on the Cape Flats are a direct result of the historical and social development of 
City of Cape Town. Various elements contributed to the transformation of these groups and 
the expansion of their activities. This has resulted in the present situation, where the gangs 
are an integral part of the society of the Cape Flats and where they continue to operate 
locally, but also beyond the borders of the Cape Flats, the City of Cape Town and South 
Africa.   
 
4.4.4.1 The Historical Development of Gangs on the Cape Flats 
The area of the Cape Flats was initially created following the forced removal of Coloured 
communities (as a result of the Group Areas Act) from many parts of Cape Town (including 
District Six) in the 1960s and 1970s (Gastrow, 1998:15). However, even before the 
manifestation of the forced removals, Coloured families that could not find space in housing 
districts in the City centre, such as District Six, were moved to the Cape Flats. What is also 
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important to note is that there was a rapid increase in the Coloured population between 1946 
and 1959 (Standing, 2006:3). The Cape Flats quickly expanded after the passing of the Group 
Areas Act of 1950, based on which the inner-city areas of Cape Town were restructured. This 
was based on the Apartheid policy of the spatial separation of races. Large areas of the City 
of Cape Town that were racially diverse were changed to whites only areas and as a result, 
non-whites were moved to the Cape Flats (Standing, 2006:4). The number of families re-
homed, was staggering: “…Each year between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, on average 
3,000 Coloured families were resettled. In sum, by 1982 official statistics showed that over 
50,000 families had been displaced…” (Standing, 2006:5). In many cases families were torn 
apart and the majority of the people moved, had to leave their jobs, creating large-scale 
unemployment and poverty (Pinnock, 1984:64; Dixon and Johns, 2001:10). Due to a lack of 
housing in the areas on the Cape Flats, which was blamed on the high growth rate of the 
Coloured population and the migration to urban areas by the rural poor, houses were 
overcrowded and other dwellings erected illegal structures. Improving the infrastructure and 
erecting sport and recreation facilities was not a priority and unemployment levels under the 
Coloureds were high and continued to increase (Standing, 2006:5 – 6).  
 
These conditions on the Cape Flats encouraged the formation and activities of loosely 
structured gangs as they provided structure, a sense of belonging and identity and a way to 
pass the time. As described by Legget (2003): “…with little room inside the house, Coloured 
youth in urban areas spend a lot of time on the streets. The playgroup becomes a kind of 
surrogate family, but with a different set of norms. When the norms of the street become 
more important than the norms of the home, you have a gang…”. This was the case on the 
Cape Flats and to further intensify the situation, there was also a rapid increase in the use of 
alcohol and drugs during the 1970s and 1980s. To provide a historical description of the 
gangs on the Cape Flats, Pinnock (1984:3) states that in 1982, 30 areas on the Cape Flats 
were researched and 280 groups were found who identified themselves as gangs. At that time 
already, the membership of these groups was staggering: Several of the members of gangs 
interviewed in the study referenced by Pinnock (1984:3) said that the group that they 
belonged to had as many as 2,000 members. Others said their groups had more than 100 or 
200 members. Pinnock‟s (1984) study suggested that there were around 80,000 gang 
members; 5% of the population of the City of Cape Town. As indicated in earlier sections, 
there was a significant increase in the activities of organised criminal groups in South Africa 
during the early 1990s. During times of political transition, social controls are invariably 
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relaxed. As mentioned before, after 1994 in South Africa, the political instability and the 
reopening of South African borders for trade provided ample opportunities for the growth of 
crime, especially crime of an organised nature. Stolen goods originating in South Africa 
could be exported overseas and used as currency in drug deals. This made it possible for the 
gangs of the Cape Flats to spread their operations (Standing, 2005:1). The gangs of the Cape 
Flats were confronted with new opportunities and markets, and as a result the gangs went 
through a process of corporatisation. Street gangs in the United States went through the same 
process during the late 1980s and it refers to the development of street gangs into well-armed, 
rational criminal businesses. An important feature of the corporatisation of street gangs is that 
the membership does not only constitute of youths, but also older members that act as leaders 
or kingpins (Standing, 2006:ix; 61). Again, this confirms the transformation of gangs on the 
Cape Flats into organised criminal groups.  
 
4.4.4.2 PAGAD 
Against the backdrop of the evolution of street gangs and the consequent intensification of 
organised crime on the Cape Flats, the vigilante group, People Against Gangsterism and 
Drugs (PAGAD) emerged. As the name states, PAGAD was called into action as a result of 
the escalation of drug-and gang-related crime on the Cape Flats and also as a result of the 
inability of the state to deal with the problem. The formation of the group stemmed from 
isolated community groups (anti-drug, anti-crime and neighbourhood watches) from the 
communities of Kensington, Salt River, Wynberg and Surrey Estate, who came together in 
order to mobilise: “…a critical mass of popular support for action against gangsters…” 
(Dixon and Johns, 2001:21). From 1995 to 2000 the group led a campaign on the Cape Flats 
and in the City of Cape Town to wipe out prominent gangsters, expose illegal activities and 
protest against the lack of government commitment to curb drug- and gang-related activities. 
The group organised marches to the houses of drug dealers across the Cape Flats in areas 
such as Hanover Park, Athlone and Mitchells Plain, but also in other areas of the Western 
Cape, such as Paarl, and in Gauteng. Some of these marches turned violent: For example in 
August 1996, Rashaad Staggie (the twin brother of Rashied Staggie and co-leader of the Hard 
Livings gang) was attacked and killed after a march by PAGAD to his house. What followed 
up to early 2000 was a phase of urban terror in the City of Cape Town. It was characterised 
by petrol- and pipe bomb explosions in public areas of the City, but also homes of both 
prominent gangsters and members of the PAGAD leadership. A few examples include:  
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 August 1998: The Planet Hollywood Restaurant at the Victoria and Alfred Waterfront 
was bombed.  
 January 1999: Bombs exploded outside the police stations in Caledon Square and 
Woodstock.  
 May 1999: A car bomb exploded outside the Athlone police station.  
 November 1999: The Blah Bar in Greenpoint was attacked with a bomb.  
 November 1999: A pipe bomb exploded inside the St Elmo‟s Pizzeria in Camps Bay.  
 July 2000: A bomb exploded at Cape Town International Airport (Dixon and John, 
2001:13 – 27, Botha, 2001).  
 
With many of the group‟s members either in jail or dead, the activities of the organisation 
were reduced; however, they continue to have a presence on the Cape Flats. The current 
activities of the group are limited to organising marches in communities against gang-and 
drug-related violence. As noted by Dixon and John (2001:40): “…PAGAD will continue to 
have a small popular, mainly middle-class, constituency in the Muslim community as 
gangsterism and drug dealing persist…”. This is still the situation today; however, the 
operations are much less organised, publicised and violent.  
 
4.4.4.3 The Firm and CORE  
During 1992, two years before the time that PAGAD was established, many of the prominent 
drug lords of the Cape Flats assimilated under an umbrella organisation. This organisation 
was called The Firm. The Firm was headed by convicted tax fraudster Colin Stanfield and 
included some of the most notorious gang leaders on the Cape Flats. As noted by Redpath 
(2001b) one of the aims of The Firm was to spread and consolidate the drug market, 
specifically the sale of Mandrax, of the Cape Flats. Furthermore, The Firm strived to achieve 
the following:  
 
 “…To co-ordinate and combine efforts for importing large quantities of narcotics 
(particularly cocaine); 
 effect control and dominance over the distribution of narcotics in larger geographic areas, 
specifically the Peninsula and the Western Cape; and 
 contain indiscriminate inter-gang violence in order to reduce the police presence in 
affected areas…”  (Haefele, 1998:21).   
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The Firm had the objective of ordering bulk shipments of drugs, distributing the drugs in pre-
arranged proportions, at an agreed price. The cartel also allocated distribution areas that 
derived from set principles that were negotiated at the formation of The Firm.  The number of 
gang-related shootings and deaths dropped significantly with the establishment of The Firm 
and most gangs diversified their activities to include a range of products, the majority of 
which were illegal.  They operated with great success, making large profits (Schärf and Vale, 
1996:33). In addition, by 1996, members of The Firm had generated enormous profits that 
had to be laundered and invested. One area of investment was the real estate market in rural 
areas along the Cape coastline. Some of the gangs that formed part of The Firm concentrated 
their activities to establish new branches in communities and to make contact with Chinese 
Triads and the Sicilian Mafia (Shaw, 2002:76). 
 
Accordingly, The Firm introduced new commodities in the form of new drugs entering the 
Cape Flats. There was also a merger and a closer working relationship between less 
structured street gangs and The Firm. These street gangs were used as foot soldiers to 
transport and deliver drugs and other merchandise. The Firm also constructed peaceful 
relations between various gangs on the Cape Flats (Shaw, 2002).  
 
In addition to The Firm, in October of 1996, several leading gang members (opposed to The 
Firm) formed another organisation: The Community Outreach Forum, or also known as 
CORE. It is believed that the formation of this group was done in response to PAGAD and 
they were seemingly committed to peace (Redpath, 2001b). The founders of CORE stated 
that it is an organisation that administers the funds for community development on the Cape 
Flats. However, it seemed that CORE was rather a cover for the further consolidation of 
gangs on the Cape Flats. As Standing (2006:43) notes: “…it is believed that CORE was the 
foil for a syndicate of leading gang leaders known as The Firm…”. Indeed, this organisation 
was intended to defend their criminal interests and included most of the gangs of the Cape 
Flats, headed by the surviving leader of the Hard Livings gang, Rashied Staggie. However, 
CORE claimed that they would assist communities across the Cape Flats with various 
projects to deal with the problem of unemployment and that they would fight crime (Kinnes, 
2000:37). In many sectors, CORE was not taken seriously as a community organisation and 
the members of CORE were criticised for the continued involvement in criminal gang 
activities (Haefele, 1998:21). Indeed, during the short lived time of CORE, the gangsters of 
the Cape Flats became so daring that they constituted a march to the Parliament in 1996.  
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Ultimatums were raised by CORE to the government, which resulted in a series of killings 
between CORE and PAGAD on the Cape Flats. Many people feared to criticise both CORE 
and PAGAD (Kinnes, 2000:37). Some of the most important aspects from the formation of 
both The Firm and CORE were the consolidation of criminal gang activity, the increase in 
sophistication and the ability to deal and trade with international syndicates. As a result of the 
attacks on gangsters and gang operations by PAGAD, some members of CORE wanted to 
create a militant wing of the organisation. The demise of the organisation, the time of which 
is unsure, came as a result of this effort for militarisation, but also the claim by CORE that it 
represented all the gangs on the Cape Flats. As noted by Kinnes (2000:43):  
 
“…In its campaign to build a defence fund, all gangs were asked to contribute money 
to CORE‟s war chest. This provided nothing more than a clever extortion racket and 
some of the gangs refused to pay, leading particularly to a confrontation between the 
Sexy Boys and CORE…At the heart of the matter was the control of The Firm over 
CORE. The Firm was run by members of the powerful Twenty-eight prison gang, 
while the other leaders were playing second fiddle…”.  
 
4.4.4.4 Class Structures and Operations  
As mentioned, it is unsure when exactly CORE and The Firm disintegrated (and there are 
speculations that The Firm is still in operation) but their presence made an impact on the 
structure and operational procedures of the gangs.  Although some gangs on the Cape Flats 
are still only loosely structured groups defending territory, or foot soldiers for bigger 
organisations, some gangs have indeed changed their structure and operational methods.  
There are no available statistics to assess the current number of gangs on the Cape Flats; 
however, in a 2006 study André Standing found that there were around 130 gangs believed to 
be operating in the area. As mentioned, these gangs included groups such as the Americans, 
the Hard Livings, the Sexy Boys and the Mongrels. At that time, the Americans were 
believed to have as many as 5,000 members (Standing, 2006:38).  
 
The structure of these gangs covers a vast range, from highly sophisticated drug smuggling 
syndicates, to securely established territory-based gangs, to lose groupings of criminals, to 
youths being recruited into gangs by drug lords, to youngsters only adopting the name of a 
well-known gang (Redpath, 2001b). With these different structures, the gangs have, over the 
course of a number of years, developed a unique hierarchical system that is based on the 
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division of four classes.  This structure has provided a framework for gangsterism to proceed 
to a higher level of sophistication. As Standing (2003) explains, the first class contains a 
small number of criminal elite. In this class, one will find the leaders of large gangs and 
major drug merchants. They import drugs to the Cape Flats and are loosely associated with 
one another. These individuals will own various legal businesses and substantial personal 
capital (Standing, 2003). “…The second class operates as a form of middle management.  
This comprises the second tier of larger gangs and leaders of mid-sized gangs who operate 
local drug markets.  These people do not import commodities into the Flats but rely on 
receiving consignments from the upper tier...” (Standing, 2003). The third class includes 
corrupt police, bodyguards, debt-collectors and advisors. This class provides support and 
services to the first two classes. What distinguishes the third class from the last is that the 
third class will receive remuneration for their services and support from the first two classes. 
This final class includes a large number of unskilled gangsters that are low ranking members 
of street gangs. They are controlled by the first three classes. They are the consumers of the 
goods and services that the first three classes produce and are relied on to fight in gang 
conflicts (Standing, 2003). With the erection of the above mentioned class structure on the 
Cape Flats, it has been fairly easy for the gangs on the Cape Flats to progress to bigger 
operations and to compete with international organised crime syndicates. It has also 
complicated matters for the police and authorities that have to deal with the growing problem 
of gangsterism. Their lack in understanding of the structure and operations of gangs has made 
the task to monitor and combat the dilemma complex, troublesome and even impossible.   
 
As mentioned, these class structures provided a foundation for the spread of economic 
operations by the gangs of the Cape Flats: “...Since late 1999 gangs have spread into central 
metropolitan areas, which provide a market for various criminal activities...” (Redpath, 
2001a:35). Contemporary organisations on the Cape Flats can be considered as adaptable, 
sophisticated, extremely opportunistic and active in a full range of illegal and legal activities. 
On the Cape Flats, gangs are still involved in lower level crimes, for example drug 
trafficking, prostitution and loan-sharking, but they have expanded to a „quasi-corporate‟ 
level. These activities include immigrant smuggling and a wide variety of frauds on various 
levels (Haefele, 2003:7). Criminal gangs on the Cape Flats have developed over the past 
decades into fully functional and very lucrative syndicates, with international links.  
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Shaw (1996) identifies four areas that need to be investigated in order to better understand the 
growth and expansion of organised criminal networks: A change in commodities that the 
criminal groups trade in, connections between criminal groups and links with the state, how 
organised criminal groups reacts toward policing and violence related to criminal groups. 
With reference to the Cape Flats, all of these areas can be observed. An example of change in 
commodities that organised crime networks trade in, is the introduction of new drugs, for 
example crystal methamphetamine or „tik‟. Second, the links between syndicates and street-
level organisations have been discussed in this section and to confirm: In the Western Cape, 
several large criminal networks are active and they concentrate on the smuggling of a wide 
variety of commodities. These include drugs, diamonds, weapons and abalone. These 
smuggling activities form an integral part of gangs on the Cape Flats. The expansion of the 
networks in the rest of the Western Cape and the increase in smuggling activities, secure the 
existence and development of gangs on the Cape Flats (Haefele, 2003:12).  The third area is a 
change in the policing methods and fourth, violence that can be linked to organised criminal 
operations. As Shaw (1996) notes: “…ironically, periods of comparative peace may signal 
the growth and consolidation of organised crime rather than its demise…”. This was the case 
during the glory days of The Firm and Core in the mid – to late 1990s.   
 
With the increase in the sophistication of the gangs on the Cape Flats and the expansion of 
their activities, violence in the area has also increased. In 2000, 10 children were killed, and 
33 injured in gang-related violence on the Cape Flats (Ntabazalila, 2002:6). Furthermore, in 
the first five months of 2001, there were 103 registered murders on the Cape Flats (Standing, 
2003c:2). In the same year, nine children were killed and 20 injured. These incidents 
happened despite attempts by the police to gain control over the area by establishing special 
anti-gangsterism units and special operations to reduce and control gang violence in the area 
(Ntabazalila, 2002:6). In June of 2002, it was reported that 50 children and young adults died 
of gunshot wounds during a number of weeks, and that gangsters were shooting people for no 
discernible reason. Guns were easily available and gangs were not showing any respect for 
the age or gender of their victims (Basson, 2002:18). In May 2003 there were 37 murders 
attributed to gang violence. In March 2003 stray bullets from gang fights hit five children, 
just one survived. In Manenberg, an electric fence and barbed wire surround the local school 
and bulletproof windows protect the other public buildings (Standing, 2003c:2). It is against 
this backdrop that the discussion now turns to the current situation of organised criminal 
groups on the Cape Flats.  
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4.4.4.5 2010 and Beyond   
As noted earlier, it is impossible to estimate both the number of gangs, but also the number of 
people belonging to gangs on the Cape Flats. What is certain, however, is that there has been 
a constant increase in both the number of groups and members. In one area, Hanover Park, it 
is alleged that more than 1,000 of the areas‟ approximately 40,000 residents are gang 
members, most of whom are under the age of 25 (Bezuidenhout and Lewis, 2011). This has 
also resulted in an expansion of the commodities that the groups trade in and the connections 
with other domestic and international groups. To illustrate: In early 2011 Cyril Beeka, an 
alleged underworld kingpin, was assassinated while driving in his car close to the University 
of the Western Cape. At the time of his death, Beeka controlled 90% of security operations in 
nightclubs in the City of Cape Town. Beeka was linked to underworld figures such as Yuri 
„The Russian‟ Ulianitski. In May 2007 Ulianitski was shot numerous times in the Cape Town 
suburb of Milnerton and at the time of his murder, Ulianitski was out on bail in connection 
with charges of conspiracy to kidnap, possession of illegal firearms and drugs, and numerous 
other offences. Beeka was further linked to Czech fugitive Rodavan Krecjir and another slain 
underworld boss and former owner of the adult entertainment group, Teazers, Lolly Jackson. 
Beeka allegedly had close links with prominent gangsters from the Cape Flats (Dolley and 
Nicholson, 2011).  
 
Although there are periods of relative calm in areas on the Cape Flats, since mid-2010 the 
Cape Flats has seen an increase in violence. During October 2010, gang violence erupted in 
many areas of the Cape Flats. Local newspapers published daily stories of gang killings, 
innocent residents getting caught in crossfire, and even the closure of a local community 
health centre. In the last mentioned case the gang violence in the area escalated to the level 
where the police had to provide 24-hour protection to the community health centre (including 
the escorting of personnel from the nearest police station to the clinic), after a doctor was 
threatened and a stray bullet narrowly missed another staff member (News24a, 2010).  
 
In two successive weekends in one area, seven people were killed and ten were wounded in 
gang violence (Hartley, 2010). The provincial government responded to the increase in 
violence by stating that decreasing organised criminal activity on the Cape Flats is a priority 
and that avenues are being explored to find the root causes of the problem. The government 
stated that the youth in the area need better role models and that they are busy developing a 
pilot project that is based on initiatives used in the US, to curb violence in neighbourhoods in 
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Chicago. The initiative is based on recruiting former gangsters and teaching them skills that 
they can share with other gangsters (News24b, 2010).
65
  
 
During the end of 2011, the army, the tactical response unit of the SAPS, metro police and 
traffic officers were sent into the area of Lavender Hill in an attempt to curb the gang 
violence. One report indicated that at least 64 people were shot dead in gang-related violence 
across the City of Cape Town, since June 2011 (Bezuidenhout and Lewis, 2011).  
 
In 2012, the violence continued. For example, during May and June of 2012 there were 11 
gang-related deaths in the area of Hanover Park (Solomons, 2012). Despite the fact that 
violence continues in the majority of the areas on the Cape Flats, there has been a number of 
arrests of both prominent gang members, but also lower-level foot soldiers. A specific gang 
unit of the City of Cape Town
66
 claimed to have arrested the following gang members 
between December 2011 and May 2012: Twelve members of the Americans, seven from the 
Junky Funky Kids, one from the Laughing Boyz, two Ghetto Kids, two prison numbers gang 
(26s), one from the Derwert Kids and one from the Fancy Boys (Jordaan and Prince, 2012).  
 
As this section was only aimed at providing a contextual overview of the gangs on the Cape 
Flats, the details of the current situation and perceptions of the community will not be 
discussed here. A comprehensive description of the presence and the activities of the gangs, 
community perceptions and the observations of local government will be provided in chapter 
six of this study.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
The main aim and objective of this chapter was to provide a contextualisation of the 
independent variable, organised crime. In order to successfully do this, several concepts were 
explained, both on a global but also local level. This provided a foundation for a discussion of 
organised crime in South Africa and more importantly, on the Cape Flats, as this is the focus 
of this study.  
 
In the chapter it was found that there is a lack of a universally agreed upon definition for the 
concepts of organised criminal groups and organised criminal gangs and it was clarified that 
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 This initiative will be further discussed in the following chapter.  
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 The structure and operations of this unit will be explained in detail in the next chapter.  
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for the purposes of this study the difference is regarded as inconsequential. If was further 
noted that there has been a general increase in the international activities of organised 
criminal groups and this trend was also observed in South Africa, and also on the Cape Flats. 
There has been an increase in the activities of organised criminal groups on the Cape Flats, 
and this has also facilitated the increase in the number and size of these groups. At the time of 
writing, there was also a significant upsurge in gang-related violence across the Cape Flats. It 
was emphasised that the historical development of the Cape Flats came as a result of the 
forced removals of families from the inner city and coupled with lack of housing, 
unemployment and the breakdown of social networks, it facilitated the formation of gangs.   
 
The following chapter will provide a contextualisation of the dependent variable, the state. As 
this study analyses the state at the level of local government, the focus will be on the local 
government of the City of Cape Town.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONTEXTUALISATION- LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
IN SOUTH AFRICA AND IN THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN   
 
5.1 Introduction  
The main aim of this chapter is to provide a contextualisation of the dependent variable, the 
state. As was explained in chapter two, the level of analysis of this study is the state at the 
local level. As a result, the contextualisation will first focus on a general conceptualisation of 
local government in South Africa and then move on to the City of Cape Town
67
, which is the 
focal point of this chapter. To conclude the chapter, there will also be a focus on one specific 
aspect of local government, namely the security services. This analysis will not only focus on 
the local branch of policing, the Cape Town Metro Police; but also on security agents 
operating on a local level, for example the office of the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
located in Cape Town and the operations of the SAPS located in Manenberg. 
 
The rationale behind this chapter is to provide a brief background to the establishment of 
local government in South Africa post-1993, to explain the framework of local government 
structures and to describe the environment that local government functions in, in South 
Africa, and more specifically, the City of Cape Town.  
 
5.2 Historical context of Local Government in the South African State 
In 1652 the Dutch East Indian Company established a settlement in Cape Town, then known 
as the Cape Colony. Before settlement, the area was predominantly occupied by local herders 
from the Khoikhoi or San tribe (c. 1000 BC) and Bantu-speaking farmers (300 AD) (Butler, 
2009:10). After subsequent occupations by the British Empire (1795) and the Batavian 
Republic (1803) the British Empire took possession of the colony again in 1806 until 1872, 
when it obtained representative self-governance (Robson and Oranje, 2012). In 1910 the 
Union of South Africa was established when one other British colony (Natal) was united with 
the Cape of Good Hope and two other Boer republics: The Orange Free State and the 
Transvaal. However, the Union remained under British sovereignty until 1931 when it 
became fully independent with the Statute of Westminster. As a result of functioning as a 
British Dominion, institutional features of the British state were enforced on the system of the 
Union (Venter, 2011:3). Venter (2011:4) explains: “…The formal state institutions of the new 
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 In this chapter, when referred to the City of Cape Town, this will suggest the municipal area. When referred 
to Cape Town urban area, this will suggest only the City.  
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Union were by and large informed and based on British constitutional customs and traditions. 
South Africa was organised as a unitary state consisting of four provincial governments and a 
large number of municipalities – thus it had a three-tiered government structure…”. Another 
important aspect of the Union of South Africa was that almost all people of colour were 
excluded of political participation and decision making. This was limited to mostly white 
adult men and although in some cases people of colour had the right to vote (for example in 
Natal where categories of Indian men could vote), political rights on all levels of the 
government, did not extend to representation (Venter, 2011:4). In 1956 the Coloured 
common roll voting rigths were abolished in the Cape (Welsh, 2009:53). 
 
The policy of racial segregation in South Africa were manifested through law, for example 
the Natives Land Act of 1913 that allocated more than 80 per cent of land to Whites and 
banned people of colour to purchase land (Butler, 2009:16). The Natives Land Act was 
“…the first statutory instrument of territorial segregation…” (Welsh, 2009:31). This Act also 
paved the way for the later establishment of homelands or bantustans, which were intended to 
be reserved areas for Black South Africans, within the borders of South Africa (Welsh, 
2009:32). Other Acts that enforced segregation soon followed: The Urban Areas Act of 1923 
prohibited people of colour to enter areas that were reserved for Whites only and introduced 
the pass laws, which regulated the movement of people of colour (Butler, 2009:16). In 1948, 
the National Party (NP) won the general elections and the victory placed them in a position of 
power to enforce stronger segregation policies. The term apartheid was used by the NP 
during their campaign for the 1948 elections and was further enforced through legislation 
after the victory. As explained in the previous chapter, the area of the Cape Flats was initially 
created following the forced removal of Coloured communities as a result of the Group Areas 
Act of 1950 (Butler, 2009:16 – 17). This Act enforced residential segregation across South 
Africa and had a significant impact on the structure and operation of local government.  
 
During the apartheid regime, local government in South Africa consisted of racially based 
authorities. Cloete (1997:31) writes that at that time the government attempted to create local 
government systems for Africans, Coloureds, and Indians; thus, separate systems than those 
for Whites. However, these separate structures were not accepted by the different groups. 
During the early eighties there was significant pressure to establish unified urban areas and 
the breakdown of the apartheid system manifested at the level of local government. Cloete 
(1995:1-2) explains that towards the end of 1992, the two major political parties at the level 
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of local government, the NP and the African National Congress, entered into discussions 
from April 1993 to January 1994, which culminated in an agreement on the future of local 
government. Accordingly, in 1993 the racially based local authorities were scrapped and 
planning started on the creation of non-racial municipal structures. Zybrands (2011:135) 
states that one of the great challenges that faced the post-apartheid regime was to eradicate 
the local government systems erected during the previous dispensation. Section 5.3.1 of this 
chapter will continue to explain the transition process of local government in South Africa  
 
5.3 A General Conceptualisation of Local Government in South Africa  
South Africa has a three-tier system of government. Chapter three of the South African 
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) states that the government is organised by national, provincial 
and local spheres and that each sphere is distinctive, interdependent and interrelated (Chapter 
three, section 40.1). Section 41 of the Constitution explains the principles of a co-operative 
government and accordingly, the Constitution asserts the country to be administered on a 
system of co-operative governance. Co-operative governance can be further explained as: 
“…The relationship between the spheres of government is one of close cooperation within a 
larger framework that recognises the distinctiveness of every component as well as their 
interrelatedness and interdependence…” (Malherbe, 2008:25). Each level of government has 
legislative and executive authority in their own spheres. The legislative authority of the 
country is vested in Parliament, which consists of two houses: The National Assembly and 
the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). Local government representatives may 
participate in the NCOP and are represented by the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA). Salga is entitled to ten representatives in the NCOP. These members 
can participate in debates and other activities of the NCOP, but they do not have the right to 
vote (Parliament of South Africa, 2012).  
 
5.3.1 Transition Process for Local Government in South Africa  
During the transformation period in South Africa and before the 1994 general elections, the 
Local Government Transition Act (Act 209 of 1993) (LGTA) was developed in order to set 
out a plan for the transformation of local government. The provisions of this act included the 
disbanding of race-based municipalities and the creation of transitional councils. As can be 
noted from figure 4.1, this act detailed a three phase transition process for local government. 
The three phases were:  Pre-interim phase (1993 – 1995), interim-phase (1995 – 2000) and 
the final phase (2000 – onwards). The first phase started with the publication of the LGTA 
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and ended with the elections of the transitional councils. It was dominated by negotiations 
between representatives from existing statutory bodies, such as municipalities, and non-
statutory representatives, such as members of the community and political organisations. The 
negotiations created the pre-interim councils that facilitated governance and service delivery 
during the transition phase (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2003:20; De 
Visser, 2005:61; Thornhill, 2008:59-61).  
 
The local government elections of 1995/1996 ushered in the interim phase. During this 
election, the councils were elected based on a system that combined ward representation with 
proportional representation. Wards represented 60% of the seats and proportional 
representation 40%. Despite the fact that this was the first election where all South Africans 
could vote for a local government, the wards were still based on the old racially-based wards.  
During the second phase, the structure of the new councils was tested, for example the 
Metropolitan councils for the largest metropolitan regions in the country. In addition, the new 
policy framework was developed for local government, initiated by the South African 
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996). Hereafter, the White Paper on Local Government was 
published in March 1998. Two other pieces of legislation were set out to clarify the 
institutional arrangements and administrative systems of local government, namely the Local 
Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) and the Local Government 
Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000). The interim phase ended on 5 December 2000, 
when local government elections were held. The elections took place in accordance with the 
1996 Constitution (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2003:19 – 21; De 
Visser, 2005:61-62).  
 
The final phase of the local government transition process was divided in three parts: 
Establishment, consolidation and sustainability. Establishment was aimed at the stabilisation 
of the newly demarcated municipalities; consolidation at the strengthening of systems and 
practices in local government and sustainability, where the capacity of each municipality 
was/is strengthened (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2003:21 – 23).  
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the Local Government Transition Process  
(Source: Adapted from Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2003:23).  
 
5.3.2 Constitutional Elements of Local Government in South Africa  
As mentioned, the South African Constitution establishes local government as a separate 
sphere of government. Chapter seven of the Constitution explains the establishment, 
objectives, powers and functions of local government in South Africa. Section 152 of the 
Constitution explains the objectives of local government as follows: 
 
“…a. to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities;  
b. to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner;  
c. to promote social and economic development;  
d. to promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
e. to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in 
the matter of local government…”.  
 
With regard to the establishment of municipalities, the Constitution stipulates that there are 
three categories that a municipality can fall under. These three are category A: A 
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municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area; 
Category B: A municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative authority in its 
area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls; and Category C: A 
municipality that has municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes 
more than one municipality
68
 (The South African Constitution, chapter 7). These categories 
are further set out in the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 177 of 1998). The 
categories are described as category A: Metropolitan Municipalities, category B: local 
municipalities and category C: District Municipalities (Thornhill, 2008:68). South Africa 
currently has eight Metropolitan Municipalities, namely: Buffalo City (East London), City of 
Cape Town, Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (East Rand), City of eThekwini (Durban), 
City of Johannesburg, Mangaung Municipality (Bloemfontein), Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality (Port Elizabeth) and the City of Tshwane (Pretoria). There are a 
further 44 district municipalities and 226 local municipalities (South African Government 
Information, 2011).  
 
The powers and functions of municipalities are described in sections 156 and 229 of the 
South African Constitution. Under section 156 of the Constitution, the powers and functions 
of municipalities are described as including local government matters listed in Part B of 
Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 and any other matters assigned to it by national or 
provincial legislation.
69
 These functions will be assigned (in agreement with) to a 
municipality by the national and provincial government. Furthermore, Thornhill (2008:73) 
summarises the functions and powers of municipalities to include amongst other things: 
“…the authority to make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the 
matters assigned to it, and to impose rates, taxes and surcharges for the services provided by 
or on behalf of the municipality…”. To conclude and summarise, municipalities are 
responsible for: “…the traditional core services, such as water provision, electricity 
distribution, refuse removal and sanitation…” (Thornhill, 2008:74). In addition, and of 
particular importance for this study, is the responsibility  to provide a safe environment; thus, 
the provision of safety and security. Major responsibilities, such as health matters, are 
assigned by the South African Constitution; however, such matters will only be administered 
by a local authority if it can be effectively managed (Thornhill, 2008:74). As has been stated 
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 Subsection two and three of section 155 of the Constitution explains that National legislation must define 
under what circumstances what category municipality may be established.  
69
 For a complete list of matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution, see 
Appendix A.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
135 
 
in the introduction, this study focusses on the local government of the City of Cape Town, 
and consequently the next section will centre on a general overview of the City, namely the 
demographic clarifications and operational explanations.  
 
5.4 The City of Cape Town: A Contextualisation 
The following section will provide a contextual explanation of the structural and functional 
features of the City of Cape Town. Specific attention will be directed at the political and 
administrative structures of the City, demographical statistics and safety and security 
organisations and their structure and method of operation.  
 
5.4.1 A General Overview of the City of Cape Town 
As can be noted from map 4.1, the City of Cape Town Metro Council is an amalgamation of 
seven former municipalities: Blaauwberg, Cape Town, Helderberg, Oostenberg, South 
Peninsula and the Cape Metropolitan Council. During December 2000 these seven areas were 
integrated into the Cape Town UniCity. Currently, the area that is covered by the City of 
Cape Town spans over 2,455 km
2
, and is located in the Western Cape Province of South 
Africa (City of Cape Town, 2011:4-5).  
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Map 5.1: The City of Cape Town  
(Source: Adapted from City of Cape Town, 2012d).  
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5.4.1.1 Political and Administrative Structures, Local Elections  
The City of Cape Town is governed by a City Council, the legislative body responsible for 
governance, which comprises of 221 members (See Figure 4.2). The tasks of the City Council 
include the formulation and implementation of by-laws.
70
 The Council also elects the 
Executive Mayor, who in turn selects a Mayoral Committee that has 11 members. 
Furthermore, the Council elects the Deputy Mayor, the Speaker
71
, the Chairs of the Section 
79 committees, the Chief Whip and Section 57 managers. The City Council serves for a five 
year term. Decisions taken by the City Council are implemented by the executive 
management team of the City.  By-laws and policies are formulated and monitored by the 
City Council‟s Portfolio Committees (City of Cape Town, 2011:10-12; City of Cape Town, 
2012a).  
 
In terms of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998) the Council can 
appoint several Committees. As mentioned, one such committee is specifically there for the 
establishment of Portfolio Committees. Portfolio Committees are also known as „section 79‟ 
committees. The role and function of Portfolio Committees is to have an oversight role over 
the design and execution of by-laws. The Committees are comprised of councillors. The City 
Council can also appoint Ad Hoc Committees on occasion, which will be tasked to manage 
specific projects. Section 80 Committees can be appointed by the Council, in order to support 
the Mayor or an Executive Committee. One such example is the Energy Committee, which 
focuses on all energy matters in the City, including climate change and global warming, the 
reduction in carbon emissions and pollution and non-fossil fuel-generated energy sources. 
The Schedule 1 Disciplinary Committee investigates cases of breach of the Code of Conduct 
for Councillors and conducts investigations on non-attendance of meetings. The Section 62 
Planning and General Appeals Committee consider appeals against decisions taken in terms 
of delegated or sub-delegated authority by political structures, political office bearers or 
councillors of the City of Cape Town. There are also  further four Section 79 Committees: 
Homeless Agency Committee (deals with issues relating to people living on the street), Rules 
Committee (concerned with the rules and procedures of Council and its Committees), Spatial 
Planning, Environment and Land Use Management Committee (relates to spatial and town 
planning, and environment and related matters) and the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (mechanism through which the Council exercises oversight over the expenditure of 
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 By-laws are laws specifically formulated for the City of Cape Town.  
71
 The Speaker is the Chairperson of Council and presides over council meetings (City of Cape Town, 2011).  
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public money). In the governance structure of the City of Cape Town, there is also a Section 
166 Audit Committee. Each municipality must have an audit committee of which the 
members must be appointed by the Council. The Audit Committee will provide Council with 
the financial position of the City and the financial efficiency and effectiveness (City of Cape 
Town, 2007; City of Cape Town, 2011:10-12; City of Cape Town, 2012a).
72
  
 
Figure 5.2: Administrative structure of the City of Cape Town  
(Source: Adapted from City of Cape Town, 2011).  
 
The City of Cape Town is divided into 111 geographic areas called wards. Wards are 
represented by ward councillors elected by registered voters. Each ward directly elects one 
member of the council. The other 110 councillors are elected by a system of party-list 
proportional representation. Thus, half of the councillors are ward councillors and the other 
half are elected on the proportional representation list, according to strength of the political 
party that the councillor is a member of (City of Cape Town, 2012a; City of Cape Town, 
2012f). The rationale behind the 50/50 system is so that ward councillors can promote the 
matters concerning the ward that they represent and proportional members, matters that 
concern the entire municipality (Thornhill, 2008:67). Furthermore, the City is divided into 23 
sub-councils. Sub-councils consist of geographically clustered wards with proportional 
councillors assigned to them and led by a sub-council chairman, who is elected by a majority 
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 The Civilian Oversight Committee will be explained in section 5.4.2.  
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vote of each sub-council (City of Cape Town, 2012a, City of Cape Town, 2012f). The city 
also has a Manager, who functions as the non-political head of the administration of the city. 
The Manager is supported by a Deputy City Manager. The Executive Management team has 
a further 12 members which are the Chief Audit Executive and the Executive Directors of 11 
sectors: Community Services; Human Settlements; Safety and Security; Economic, 
Environment and Spatial Planning; Transport, Roads and Stormwater; Social and Early 
Childhood Development; Tourism, Events and Marketing; Utility Services; Corporate 
Services; Finance and Health (City of Cape Town, 2012b).  
 
During the 2011 Local Government Elections, the Democratic Alliance (DA) won an 
absolute majority of council seats in the City of Cape Town. The DA received 135 seats, with 
the African National Congress (ANC) winning second most seats, 73. For a full breakdown 
of the voting statistics of the City of Cape Town, refer to table 4.1 below
73
 (IEC, 2011b; City 
of Cape Town, 2012e).  
Table 5.1: Number of Seats and Percentage of Votes for the City of Cape Town, Local 
 Government Elections 2011  
PARTY NUMBER OF SEATS PERCENTAGE OF VOTES 
African Christian Democratic 
Party 
3 1,22 
Al Jama-ah 1 0,37 
African Muslim Party 1 0,34 
African National Congress 73 32,80 
Cape Muslim Congress 1 0,29 
Congress of the People 3 1,11 
Democratic Alliance 135 60,92 
National Party of South Africa 1 0,53 
Pan African Congress of Azania 1 0,21 
United Democratic Movement 1 0,39 
Vryheidsfront Plus 1 0,18 
Total 221 100
74
 
(Source: Adapted from IEC, 2011b; City of Cape Town, 2012e).  
                                                 
73
 The ANC won 62 % of the vote and as a result the highest number of seats and councils (5,633 seats and 198 
councils) during the 2011 local elections in South Africa. The ANC was followed by the DA, with 18 
councils, 1 555 seats and 23.9% support (IEC, 2011a).  
74
 Final percentage of votes rounded off to 100%.  
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5.4.1.2 Economy and Finances  
In 2011 the City employed more than 25,000 people. It produced 10,58% of South Africa‟s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and accounted for more than 70% of the Western Cape 
province‟s economic activity (City of Cape Town, 2011:4-6; City of Cape Town, 2012c).  
For South Africa in general, the Western Cape contributes 14% to the GDP, behind Gauteng 
with 33,9% and Kwa-Zulu Natal with 16,1% (Diamant, 2011:119). Between 2005 and 2009 
the economy of the City of Cape Town grew at an average annual growth rate of 4, 06% 
(City of Cape Town, 2011:4-6; City of Cape Town, 2012c). The urban area of Cape Town
75
 
alone had an economic growth rate of 2% in 2010 and the GDP per capita  for the urban area 
increased from R46,720 in 1996 to R58,017 in 2006 to 61,662 in 2010 (Diamant, 2011:119).  
The majority of the city‟s economic activity is driven by small, medium and micro 
enterprises (SMMEs). SMMEs account for 50% of the City‟s output. Other economic drivers 
of the City include finance, insurance, real estate and business services, manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade, catering and accommodation (City of Cape Town, 2011:4-6; City 
of Cape Town, 2012c). 
 
In 2011 the City of Cape Town was one of only seven municipalities in South Africa to have 
received a clean audit for 2009/10, and the only metro to achieve a clean audit. In the report 
by the Auditor General, of the 237 municipalities audited, 53 received disclaimers, seven an 
adverse opinion, 50 received qualified opinions, and 120 received financially unqualified 
reports (Mabuza, 2011). The good financial and economic management and performance of 
the City was confirmed when the global rating agency, Moody‟s, rated the City an Aa2, 
indicative of a very low credit risk (City of Cape Town, 2011:4-6; City of Cape Town, 
2012c). In 2008, the then mayor of the City of Cape Town, Helen Zille, received the best 
mayor in the world award, by urban affairs think-tank City Mayors.  
 
5.4.1.3 Population, Households and Public Services  
The City has an annual population growth rate of 3% and in 2010 the population was 
estimated to be 3,7 million people. The population is described as relatively young, with the 
median age at 26. In 2010 the estimated number of households was 1,060 964. Of these 
households, 72,5% were formal dwellings, 17,1% was informal dwellings and 10% were 
                                                 
75
 The urban area of Cape Town refers to the central business district, the southern and northern suburbs.  
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„backyarders‟.76 With regards to public services, 89% of households in the City are connected 
to an electricity supply and 90% of houses have refuse removed. In 2009, 93,2% of 
households had access to a toilet connected to the public sewer system and 99,6% had access 
to piped water (City of Cape Town, 2011:5-6).  
 
5.4.1.4 Education, Unemployment and Health 
Statistics from the City of Cape Town state that there is an increase in the number of adults 
that have grade 12 as the highest level of education. The statistics from 2009 indicate that 
48,3% of the population of the City had grade 12 or a higher level of education. In the same 
year, the percentage of the population that had no formal education was 1,4% (City of Cape 
Town, 2011:7).  
 
For the urban area of Cape Town there was an increase in the proportion of people living in 
poverty.
77
 In 1996 the statistic was 15,9% and that increased to 19,7% in 2010 (Diamant, 
2011:120). In the City, 34,6% of households have an income of less than R3,500 (City of 
Cape Town, 2011:7). In 2001 the unemployment statistics of the City of Cape Town were at 
29,2%. This rate declined in 2006 to 15,1%; however, in 2010 there was an increase to 
25,82% (City of Cape Town, 2011:7). During the first quarter of 2012, the unemployment 
statistic of South Africa was at 25,2% (Statistics South Africa, 2012).  
 
As can be noted from the table below, there has been a decrease in the infant mortality rate
78
 
in the City. According to the mid-year population estimates from Statistics South Africa in 
2009, the infant mortality rate in South Africa was 45,7% (Statistics South Africa, 2009:3).
79
 
Thus, the infant mortality rate of the City of Cape Town is significantly less than that of 
South Africa in general. Despite the drop in the infant mortality rate, there has been an 
increase in the incidence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in the City of Cape Town. 
In 2005, the incidence of HIV was 17% and in 2009, 18,2% (See table 4.2). Despite the 
                                                 
76
  Backyarders refer to an informal dwelling, located on a property that already has a formal dwelling. It is also 
referred to as an informal dwelling in a yard.  
77
  People living in poverty are defined as those living in households with income less than the poverty income. 
In 2010, Poverty income levels ranged from R1,315 per month for one individual to R4,729 for a household 
of eight people or more (Diamant, 2011:120).   
78
  The infant mortality rate is measured by looking at the number of deaths of children under the age of 1, out 
of every 1,000 live births.  
79
  The national infant mortality rate of 45,7% in 2009 is down from 63,4% in 2001 (Statistics South Africa, 
2009:7).  
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increase, the figures for the City of Cape Town in 2009 were  still lower than that of South 
Africa in general, which for the same year were  29,4% (City of Cape Town, 2011:8).  
 
Table 5.2: Health Indicators of the City of Cape Town  
 
HEALTH INDICATOR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Infant Mortality Rate 25,16% 23,74% 22,28% 21,40% 20,28% 19,78% 20,76% 
Incidence of HIV - - 17,0% 18,2% 17,6% 18,3% 18,2% 
 
(Source: Adapted from City of Cape Town, 2011:7).  
 
5.4.1.5 Crime  
According to the City of Cape Town, there was a decline in the overall reported crime rate 
from 9,513 per 100,000 persons in 2003/4 to 8,032 per 100,000 in 2009/10. Despite this 
overall decrease there was a sharp increase in drug related crime: In 2009/10 39,175 incidents 
were reported, which is more than a 300% increase from 2003/4 (See table 4.3) (City of Cape 
Town, 2011:8). The annual police plan from the City of Cape Town Metro Police 
(2009/2010) states that drug related offences in the City have increased five times in the past 
seven years (with the report compiled in 2009). Furthermore, 80% of all the crimes 
committed in the City of Cape Town are related to drug and substance abuse (Cape Town 
Metropolitan Police Department, 2009). The majority of drug related crime is directly linked 
to organised criminal groups in the City (specifically on the Cape Flats). In addition, 90% of 
gang-related crime in the Western Cape takes place within the borders of the City of Cape 
Town (Prince, 2011). This is confirmed when looking at map 4.2 below, as the areas with the 
highest incidences of drug related crimes are situated on the Cape Flats, with the exception of 
Cape Town Central, Kraaifontein and Kuilsriver. The areas with the highest incidents of drug 
related crimes include Mitchell‟s Plain, Grassy Park, Steenberg, Delft, Bishops Lavis and 
Manenberg (Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2011:24-25). As will be explained 
in section 4.4.2 the City of Cape Town has established several specialised units in order to 
deal with the sharp increase in drug related crimes.   
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Map 5.2: Drug Related Crimes in the City of Cape Town, March 2009 – April 2010 
(Source: Adapted from Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2011:25).  
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Table 5.3: Crime rates of the City of Cape Town  
 
CRIMES 2009/10 
Overall Crime Rate 8,032 per 100,000 
Murder 1,521 reported 
Commercial Crime 9,280 reported 
Drug Related Crime 39,175 reported 
 
(Source: Adapted from City of Cape Town, 2011:8).
80
  
 
With regard to murder rates in the City, information provided by the Metro Police states that 
murder in the City has stabilised over the past number of years. Nevertheless, as indicated in 
table 4.3, the rate remains very high with more than 1,500 reported murders in the 2009/10 
period. Map 4.3 below provides an outline of reported murders in the City of Cape Town. As 
can be noted, areas on the Cape Flats had high to very high reported murders. The statistics 
for the Cape Flats, but also for the entire City of Cape Town, are attributed to the high 
number of gang related deaths (Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2011:22-23).  
 
                                                 
80
  Crimes measured by reported crimes.  
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Map 5.3: Reported murders in the City of Cape Town, March 2009 – April 2010 
(Source: Adapted from Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2011:23).  
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In order to increase the safety of the citizens of the City through crime prevention, the City of 
Cape Town, in cooperation with the German Development Bank, launched the Violence 
Protection through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project in 2004. The main aims of the VPUU 
are to contribute to the reduction of violence, improve community safety, and in the end the 
quality of life. The programme is designed to reduce crime by improving the overall 
environment in a community and the methodology is to involve numerous stakeholders from 
the community, civil society and local and national government. The first phase of the project 
was introduced in Khayelitsha in 2004 and in 2009 a baseline survey on crime and violence 
was conducted in Manenberg, with the objective to extend the project to other prioritised 
areas (Giles, 2009:14 – 16). The next section of this chapter will focus on local security 
services, including agents of security, functioning on a local level.  
 
5.5 Local Security Services 
Security services in South Africa are regulated by several pieces of legislation, as will be 
explained in the section below. Chapter 11 of the Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 
1996) explains the security services of the country, including the police service. It stipulates 
that: “…the national police service must be structured to function in the national, provincial 
and where appropriate, local spheres of government…” (Chapter 11, section 205). Section 
205 of the Constitution furthermore states that the statutory objectives of the police service 
are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain public order, protect and secure the 
inhabitants of South Africa and their property and to enforce the laws of the country. The 
Minister of Police is a member of the Executive Cabinet of South Africa and the political 
responsibility of the Department of Police resides within this position. The Minister is 
responsible for the determination of policies and the direction and overall execution of the 
Department‟s mandate. Furthermore, the Minister will give account to the Cabinet and 
Parliament on all matters relating to policing (ISS, 2012). 
 
As will be further explained in section 5.5.2 of this chapter, the South African Constitution 
also makes provision for municipal police services: “…National legislation must provide a 
framework for the establishment, powers, functions and control of municipal police 
services…” (Chapter 11, section 206). Thus, with regards to the execution of the powers of 
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policing, the operational command and the control over policing in South Africa is divided 
between the SAPS and the Metro Police Services.
81
  
 
5.5.1 Policing in South Africa: The South African Police Service 
The South African Police Force (SAP) was established on 1 April 1913. The organisation 
was disbanded in the early nineties and after the first democratic election in South Africa in 
1994 the SAPS was formed. The SAPS was an amalgamation of the SAP and the homeland 
and self-governing territory police agencies (Young, 2004:10 – 12). As mentioned 
previously, the responsibilities and duties of the SAPS are regulated in the Constitution of 
South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) and the South African Police Service Act (SAPS Act 68 of 
1995).  
 
The SAPS is headed by the National Commissioner. The National Commissioner is 
appointed by the President of the country and the Commissioner is responsible for exercising 
control over and managing the police service, as regulated by legislation and the national 
policing policy. In addition, there may also be directions by the Minister of Police. The 
National Commissioner has six Deputy National Commissioners. Each of the Deputy 
National Commissioners oversees one of the following sections: Priority crime investigation, 
operational services, crime detection, physical resource management, human resource 
management and chief operations officer. These sections are in turn divided into Divisional 
Commissioners. In addition, each of the nine provinces of South Africa has a Provincial 
Commissioner. In turn, each province is divided into several Areas and the Area 
Commissioner will be the Commander of each area. (ISS, 2012; SAPS, 2012b; Young, 2004) 
(See figure 4.3). 
 
                                                 
81
  Since late 2009 there have been discussions on a national level to reintegrate the Metro Police Services 
under the SAPS. This is opposed by opposition parties, most noticeably the DA. The main rationale behind 
the reintegration is that it will enhance uniform policing standards and improve service delivery.  
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Figure 5.3: Organisational Structure of the South African Police Service  
(Source: Adapted from SAPS, 2012).  
 
With specific reference to organised crime, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
was established in 2009.
82
 The main functions of the Directorate are to prevent, combat and 
investigate national priority offences and any other offence or category of offences referred to 
by the National Commissioner. The Directorate focuses on serious organised crime, serious 
corruption and serious commercial crime. The composition of this division of the police 
service comprises of five components: Commercial Crime Unit, Financial Investigation and 
Assets Forfeiture Unit, Organised Crime Unit, the Priority Crime Management Centre and 
Support Services. In May 2012, the division had 3,000 members of staff trained in areas such 
as Basic Organised Crime, Commercial Crime courses, Serious and Violent Crime, Firearm, 
Vehicle Crime Investigation, Narcotics, Precious Metals and Diamonds, Endangered Species, 
Human Trafficking and Cyber Crime (SAPS, 2012a).  
 
A report from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) indicated that in 2011 the SAPS had 
193, 892 members of staff throughout the country. The administration of the SAPS takes 
                                                 
82
  As explained in chapter three, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, or Hawks, was created to 
replace the Scorpions, the Directorate of Special Operations that investigated and prosecuted organised 
crime and corruption, when it was disbanded in 2008.  
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place at the National Headquarters in Pretoria. The SAPS further has nine Provincial 
Headquarters and 1,122 police stations.  In October 2011 the police force had 150, 356 police 
officers. This meant that there was one police officer for every 311 citizens. The Western 
Cape was below the national average and had one police officer for every 244 citizens (ISS, 
2011).  
 
5.5.2 Policing in South Africa: The Metro Police Services 
As with the SAPS, the establishment and regulation of municipal and metropolitan police 
services in South Africa is encapsulated in the South African Police Service Act (SAPS Act 
68 of 1995) and the South African Police Service Amendment Act (SAPS Act 83 of 1998). 
South Africa currently has five metropolitan police services, namely: Johannesburg 
(established in 2001), Cape Town (established in 2001), Ethekwini (established in 2002), 
Tshwane (established in 2002) and Swartlands (established in 2002) (ISS, 2012).  
 
In terms of the South African Police Service Act (SAPS Act 68 of 1995) municipal police 
have to fulfil three core tasks: Traffic policing
83
, the policing of municipal by-laws and crime 
prevention.
84
 Consequently, their tasks will not be executed in isolation, but they will assist 
and be assisted by the SAPS, the Traffic Department, Law Enforcement and other 
Departments of the City of Cape Town, for example, Housing and Disaster management. 
With specific reference to the City Of Cape Town, the Cape Town Metro Police was 
established in terms of Provincial Notice 347/2001 in the Provincial Gazette 5786 on 2 
November 2001. The Cape Town Metro Police was restructured in 2007 and took on the 
name of the Metro Police, as it was formerly known as the Cape Town City Police.
85
 In 2006 
the Civilian Oversight Committee (COC) was established with the main aim of dealing with 
misconduct, corruption and unethical behaviour in the Metro Police. The approach of the 
metropolitan police service is accordingly set to be guided by community policing principles 
and there has to be a close working relationship between the Metro Police, the COC, 
Community Policing Forums (CPFs) and the City‟s portfolio committee for Safety and 
                                                 
83
  This responsibility includes, amongst other tasks, to conduct roadblocks, issue traffic fines and general 
traffic enforcement (Brackenfell Community Police Forum, 2012a).  
84
  This responsibility includes the execution of search warrants, patrols, safety and awareness campaigns and 
the implementation of social crime prevention initiatives. The Metro Police do not have the legislative 
authority to investigate crimes and as a result they hand over criminal suspects to the SAPS for investigation 
(Brackenfell Community Police Forum, 2012a).  
85
  The Cape Town Metro Police Department services an area of 2,461 km² (City of Cape Town, 2009).  
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Security (Western Cape Government, 2012b; Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 
2009; Cape Town Partnership, 2012).  
 
Since the implementation of the Metro Police in Cape Town, the City has established several 
specialised units, such as the Ghost Squad
86
, Copperheads
87
, Vice Squad
88
 and the Drug 
Busters.
89
 To be more specific, with regards to the increase of drug use and drug-related 
crimes, the City launched a comprehensive Drug and Alcohol Combatting Strategy in mid-
2007. The main aims of the strategy are to prevent the abuse of drugs and alcohol, to focus on 
the treatment of drug and alcohol abuse and law enforcement (Cape Town Metropolitan 
Police Department, 2009). Other current operations include Operation Razor
90
 and Operation 
Choke. In the last mentioned campaign, the Metro Police targets specific areas of the City for 
a determined period, facilitating roadblocks and searches of suspected drug houses (Cape 
Town Partnership, 2012).  
 
During December 2011, the City of Cape Town launched another specialised unit to deal 
specifically with gang violence, referred to as „G-Unit‟. The specialised unit is based in the 
City‟s Metro Police and consists of ten members. The unit gathers information on people 
believed to be involved in gang activity and uses that information to construct a case against 
the suspects. The information can also be used to apply for arrest warrants and eviction orders 
(Prince, 2011; Mrwebi, 2012). During the pilot phase of the launch of the unit, the focus was 
on two areas in the City, namely Hanover Park and Mitchell‟s Plain. In May 2012 the unit 
claimed to have arrested more than 80 people since their operations started in December 
2011. The unit is planning on extending their activities to other areas of the Cape Flats, such 
as Elsies Rivier, Bishop Lavis and Gugulethu (Raubenheimer, 2012).  
 
As can be noted from figure 5.4 below, the Metro Police is under the command of the Chief 
of the Metro Police Department. The Chief reports to the Security Portfolio Committee of the 
City and the COC
91
 (Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2011:30). The 
                                                 
86
  This is a traffic unit focussing on collision-causing traffic offences.  
87
  The Copperheads is the Metal Thefts Unit.  
88
  The Vice Squad specifically deals with prostitution and other sexual offences.  
89
  The Drug Busters is the Substance Abuse Unit.  
90
  Operation Razor focuses on combating drug-related crime and drunken driving offences. 
91
  As explained earlier, the Civilian Oversight Committee oversees the membership conduct, thus discipline 
and ethical aspects, of the Metro Police. The Committee makes recommendations to the City Manager on 
improving the ethical climate and operations of the Metro Police (Cape Town Metropolitan Police 
Department, 2011:30).  
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management structure is then divided into five second tier positions, namely: the Deputy of 
Central Operations, the Manager of Support Services, the Manager of Finances, the Director 
of Close Circuit Television Surveillance and Radio Communication
92
 and the Deputy of 
Civilian and Internal Affairs.  
 
The Deputy of Central Operations oversees five directors, including four areas of Cape Town 
(north, south
93
, east and west) and the Directorate of Special Operations. Map 4.4 below, 
indicates the boundaries of the areas and the jurisdiction of the Metro Police. There is an 
average of 100 members of the Metro Police per operational area, and a total of 533 of 
members are deployed across the City of Cape Town and 400 officers operate on ground 
level (Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2011:21).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 5.4: Geographical Division and Jurisdiction of Cape Town Metro Police  
(Source: Adapted from Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2011:21).  
                                                 
92
  The areas that is covered by closed circuit television surveillance include Vanguard Drive Corridor, Sea 
Point, Woodstock, Salt River, Observatory, Gugulethu, Khaelitsha, Mitchell‟s Plain, Belville, Bonteheuwel, 
Manenberg, Cape Town CBD, Green Point and Klipfontein Corridor (Cape Town Metropolitan Police 
Department, 2011:15).   
93
  Manenberg falls in the South area.  
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The Deputy Chief of Civilian and Internal Affairs oversees four positions: The Director of 
Information Management, the Director of Internal Affairs, the Director of Civilian Affairs 
and the Manager of Training. The generic structure of each area is that each Area Director 
should have the services of two Senior Superintendents, each who will have another two 
Superintendents and four Sergeants per Superintendent (Cape Town Metropolitan Police 
Department, 2009; Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2011:28).       
 
Figure 5.4: Organisational Structure of the City of Cape Town Metro Police  
(Source: Adapted from Cape Town Metropolitan Police Department, 2009).  
 
5.5.3 Community Policing Forums  
CPFs are best described as a partnership between the police and the local community. Schärf 
et al (2001) write that after 1994 in South Africa, the new regime created CPFs in order to 
establish a link between the state providing security and the community having an influence 
in crime prevention. The rationale behind establishing this link is that when the state lacks the 
capacity to provide particular services, with specific reference to crime prevention, citizens 
will take it upon themselves to deliver such services. Accordingly, in order to prevent this, 
CFPs were established through the South African Police Service Act (SAPS Act 68 of 1995). 
In the Act, section 18 deals with the objects of CPFs, section 19 with the establishment of 
CPFs and sections 22 and 23 with the functions of CPFs. Section 18 of the Act states that the 
SAPS will interact with: “…community police forums and area and provincial community 
police boards…with a view to… 
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 establishing and maintaining a partnership between the community and the Service; 
 promoting communication between the Service and the community; 
 promoting co-operation between the Service and the community in fulfilling the needs 
of the community regarding policing; 
 improving the rendering of police services to the community at national, provincial, 
area and local levels;  
 improving transparency in the Service and accountability of the Service to the 
community; and promoting joint problem identification and problem-solving by the 
Service and the community…” (SAPS Act 68 of 1995).  
 
Schärf et al (2001:70) summarise section 18 of the Act by stating that the purpose of CPFs 
are twofold: “…to allow communities an opportunity to express their priorities about crime 
intervention with the police and secondly, to become active partners in crime prevention 
projects…”. After the creation of CPFs their effectiveness was however questioned, as there 
was a dramatic increase in the activities of vigilante groups around the country in the late 
1990s. These groups included taxi associations, Mapogo a Mathamaga in the Northern 
Province, the Mfelandawonye Wamapondomise Burial Society and the Ilisolomzi in the 
Eastern Cape and the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) on the Cape Flats 
(Schärf et al, 2001:70).  
 
Nevertheless, in theory, CPFs should include organisations and institutions such as schools, 
ratepayers associations, civic organisations, business and religious institutions. The 
establishment of CPFs is the responsibility of the Station Commissioner at a local police 
station. Each CPF will have its own constitution, aims and executive committee. The Station 
Commissioner needs to be part of the Executive Committee. In consultation with the local 
Station Commissioner and as part of the operational plan of the police station the CPF needs 
to develop annual community safety plans. This will include safety and security priorities and 
needs in the area, as identified by the community (Western Cape Government, 2012b).  
 
In theory, CPFs should work closely with the local Neighbourhood Watch. A Neighbourhood 
Watch is a group of residents and businesses in a specific area, established with the objective 
to create public awareness with regard to safety, crime prevention and protection of property. 
Such organisations also seek to encourage the community to work with the SAPS, local 
government and CPFs. The recognition of a Neighbourhood Watch is recorded with the local 
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CPF and at the local SAPS station. In order to be recognised by the local SAPS station the 
Neighbourhood Watch needs to be affiliated to the CPF. The Western Cape Provincial 
Constitution and Code of Conduct for Neighbourhood Watch Structures further stipulate that 
the Neighbourhood Watch shall support all activities of the local CPF. In addition, the officer 
responsible for social crime prevention at the local SAPS station needs to encourage local 
communities to organise themselves in Neighbourhood Watch Structures and the SAPS will 
provide all possible assistance to such structures (Western Cape Neighbourhood Watch, 
2003).   
 
On the Cape Flats, the majority of communities work as part of CPFs with the local police 
stations. The majority of the campaigns and operations of the CPFs focus on drugs and gang-
related activities. In Manenberg specifically, the CPF continuously appeals to the local 
community to provide information to the police on local drug houses and gangsters operating 
in the area. The CPF will also profile alleged offenders and supply the local SAPS with the 
information (Voice of the Cape, 2012). The seemingly good working relationship between 
the CPF and the local SAPS branch does not however, extend to all community organisations. 
There have been claims that a community organisation called Proudly Manenberg
94
 has 
connections with gang leaders in the area. This is a claim that has been confirmed by the 
Manenberg CPF.  In addition, the CPF claims that Proudly Manenberg often takes the law in 
their own hands and work against the police (Voice of the Cape, 2012). The relationship 
between the CPF, community organisations, the local SAPS station and the Metro Police in 
Manenberg, will be further explained and analysed in chapter six of this study.  
 
On the topic of security in the community of Manenberg, it has to be noted that the presence 
of private security firms (for example ADT, Fidelity, Coin and Chubb) were not observed 
during the field research process. Accordingly, the services of such firms were not analysed.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter was to provide a contextualisation of local government in 
South Africa. As explained earlier, the dependent variable of this study is the state, and the 
level of analysis is the local level. As the focus of this study is on the City of Cape Town, 
specific reference was given to the demographical and operational features of the municipal 
                                                 
94
  The organisation, Proudly Manenberg, will be explained in detail in chapter six.  
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area of the City of Cape Town. In addition, specific attention was given to safety and security 
elements of the City of Cape Town. The chapter also conceptualised key terms in both local 
government in general, but also with specific reference to the City of Cape Town, as these 
concepts will be utilised throughout this study.  
 
This chapter provided a general conceptualisation of local government in South Africa, which 
included a historical overview of the development of local government. Of importance for 
this study is that the local government structures was a direct result of South Africa‟s colonial 
legacy and also the policy of segregation. This also resulted in the formation of the Cape 
Flats. The Cape Flats is under the local authority of the City of Cape Town and it was 
illustrated in this chapter that the City of Cape Town provides mostly adequate household and 
public services. Indeed, the good financial and economic management and performance of 
was confirmed when the global rating agency, Moody‟s, rated the City of Cape Town an Aa2, 
indicative of a very low credit risk. With regards to crime, statistics indicated that areas on 
the Cape Flats have very high levels of crime, especially drug-related crimes. The chapter 
further explain that both the Metropolitan police and the SAPS are present in the City of Cape 
Town, with however different functional capabilities. Last, CPFs are present in most of the 
communities and are required to work with the local SAPS branch.   
 
The following chapter will present the empirical analysis of the data collected. Thus, it will 
describe the findings of this study with the principal objective of answering the main and 
supportive research question of the study.  
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CHAPTER SIX: ORGANISED CRIME AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN 
MANNENBERG  
 
6.1 Introduction 
During June and July of 2012, gang violence on the Cape Flats intensified. Local newspapers 
and radio stations had daily reports of shootings and killings in many areas of the Cape Flats. 
In many of the cases, it was gang members wounded or killed, but members of the 
community (not involved in gangs) were also caught in the cross fire. It was speculated that 
the fighting was about territory, but there were also speculations that it was just a result of 
long-standing feuds between groups. Despite the reasons for the violence, the Cape Flats 
turned into a warzone
95
, to such an extent that members of the community called for the 
national army to be brought in, in order to quell the violence. Local authorities reportedly 
increased police patrols and arrested several suspects. The premier of the Western Cape 
Province, Helen Zille, gave her support to the community and wrote an open letter to the 
president, Jacob Zuma, where she requested the backing of the national army. This request 
was denied by the president, stating that the problem instead required a long term and 
multidisciplinary approach (Gerber, 2012).  
 
This describes the situation on the Cape Flats, two years after the data for this study was 
collected. This chapter will analyse the data collected in Mannenberg and the City of Cape 
Town, during June, July and August of 2010. The first part of the chapter will explain the 
interview themes and the data analysis process. After that, the chapter is structured in two 
parts. The first part of the chapter will use the indicators of social control; compliance, 
participation and legitimacy, in order to analyse state-society relations. The second part of the 
chapter will analyse the criminalisation of the state, at the level of local government.  
 
6.2 Interview Themes  
For the small group discussion and key informant interviews, in-depth and open-ended 
questions were used. Loosely structured questions were formulated before the collection of 
data, based on the three indicators of social control by the state, as explained in chapter three 
of this study: Participation, legitimacy and compliance (see table 6.1).  
                                                 
95
  The use of the word warzone refers to the intensity of the violence, even though none of these skirmishes are 
technically warfare.  
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(Source: Produced by the author for this study). 
 
The above mentioned operational indicators were identified for each concept (compliance, 
participation and legitimacy) and were used to guide the interviews. The operational 
indicators were derived from the discussion in the theoretical chapter (chapter three). 
Table 6.1: Themes used as probes during the interviews  
THEMES TO BE 
DISCUSSED 
CONDENSED DESCRIPTION OF PROBES 
Compliance  
 Taxes (pay taxes)  
 Protection money (pay protection money to gang) 
 Reliance on gang to solve community related / personal 
problem  
 Bus / taxi fares determined by what authority (stay within 
the parameters of the law) 
 Public transport / use of public transport / control of 
transport routes. Taxi routes.  
 Effectiveness of Law enforcement (police)  
 Presence of police in community  
 Relationship between police and gangs  
 Illegal activities in community – drug trade  
 Housing (allocation of houses and illegal occupants of 
council houses)  
Participation  
 Elections in general / participation in electoral process 
(national) 
 Use of local elections / participation in local elections / 
what form of participation  
 Knowledge of local government representative (knowledge 
of local gang boss / leader) Mayor of CT 
 Requirements for doing business in the community (gangs 
or state/community members stay within the parameters of 
the law)  
 Elections 2011: Participation. Relevance?  
 Participation in street protests , if any (legal or illegal)  
Legitimacy  
 Participation in street protests , if any (legal or illegal)  
 Participation in vigilante groups, if any. (Pagad)?  
 Support from community (to vigilante group)  
 Law enforcement. Courts (structure and 
function/effectiveness of the courts)  
 Participation in community policing / security initiatives  
 Role of local government in: security. (Local/Metro police)  
 Occurrence of armed violence / confrontations in 
community 
 Access to firearms. How do you get a gun? 
 Role of local government in: service delivery  
 What are the functions of local government in community  
 Child and Youth Involvement: effectiveness of school 
system. School violence.  
 Knowledge of local government representative (knowledge 
of local gang boss / leader) Mayor of CT.  
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6.2 The Data Analysis Process  
The data collected for this study was analysed by using Computer-Aided Qualitative Data 
Analysis Software (CAQDAS). More specifically, the programme that was used was 
ATLAS.ti. When making use of a CAQDAS package it is important to note that the 
programme will not provide a complete analysed dataset, as in the case of Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) or other packages that are used when working with 
quantitative data, as noted by Babbie and Mouton (2001:503). Despite the multiple functions 
and abilities of CAQDAS packages, it is rather used to better manage data and not to analyse 
the data. The researcher is still the one doing the coding and analysis. 
 
In this study, ATLAS.ti was used to code the data; thus, to add tags to sentences and 
paragraphs in order to ease analysis of the interviews. The auto-coding function of the 
programme was not used. Instead, each text was reviewed and examined individually and 
tagged with the predetermined codes. It is acknowledged that the conclusions of this study 
are predominantly based on the quality of the coding of the text, examination and analysis of 
the data. In this context, codes refer to: “…tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the 
descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study…” (Miles and Huberman, 
1994:56). During the data analysis, each transcript was treated as a separate source of data 
and scrutinised several times and categorised according to a conceptual framework. Codes 
were attached to words, sentences and paragraphs. The coding of the text went through three 
phases: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. As explained by Neuman (2006:461 
– 464) open coding is the first attempt to organise data. The data are placed in preliminary 
analytical categories. In the phase of axial coding, the preliminary analytical categories are 
organised and the focus moves from the data to the analytical themes or codes. New codes 
can be added, sub-categories developed or codes can also be merged or deleted. When 
reaching the stage of selective coding, the main themes of the study should be clear: 
“…Selective coding involves scanning all the data and previous codes. Look selectively for 
cases that illustrate themes and make comparisons and contrasts after most or all data 
collection is complete…” (Neuman, 2006:464). As explained above, the codes that were used 
in conducting the analysis were based on the three indicators of state social control: 
compliance, participation and legitimacy. During the interview phase, the three indicators of 
social control were operationalised in specific themes that were used as probes during the 
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interviews. During the data-analysis phase, the themes were used to code the texts. For a 
summary of the codes, see table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2: Codes used during analysis of the data  
FAMILY CODES 
Compliance 
 The payment of taxes (legal or illegal)  
 The payment of protection money (to a gang)  
 Solving problems in the community (rely on criminal groups)  
 Public transport (the use of and controlling the routes)  
 Law enforcement (effectiveness, visibility and response)  
 Illegal activities in the community 
 Armed violence in the community (Access to firearms)  
 Housing in the community(lack of)  
Participation 
 Doing business in the community (authority in control, informal 
structures of authority, requirements of doing business)  
 Elections (usefulness and participation in the local electoral 
process)   
 Knowledge of local government (representatives)  
 Participation in protests in the community  
 Participation in community initiatives 
Legitimacy  
 Function of local government (in community and service 
delivery) 
 Vigilante groups (participation and support by the community)  
 Trust in law enforcement agents  
 The role of local government in security  
 Youth, gangs and schools (effectiveness of the school system, 
youth involvement in gangs and school violence)  
 
(Source: Produced by the author for this study). 
 
Comments and memos were added to specific quotations during the analysis of the text, in 
order to deepen the investigation of the data. The coding process stopped when a level of 
saturation was reached. It is noted that the level of saturation, implicated by qualitative 
researchers as the end of the coding process, can be misleading. A researcher can for example 
return to a dataset after a number of years or when the context changes in another way. 
Nevertheless, a level of saturation can be reached depending on what the data will be used for 
(Barbour, 2007:126 – 127). In this study the dataset was analysed and coded in order to 
provide answers to the research questions. Accordingly, when themes reoccurred throughout 
the data, it was regarded as vigorously coded and no amendments were needed in order to 
complete the analysis. 
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6.3 Indicators of Social Control: Compliance, Participation and Legitimacy  
In the following section social control will be discussed by using the three indicators of social 
control; compliance, participation and legitimacy. As explained in section 2.6.2 of chapter 
two, in order to avoid state breakdown, a high level of state social control is needed. This can 
be measured by three indicators: The compliance by the populace with the formal rules of the 
state, the level of participation by the citizens in state sanctioned institutions, and the 
legitimacy of the state (Migdal, 1988:32).  
 
Each indicator is measured according to the presence of social control by the state, the 
absence of social control by the state, the absence of social control by rival social 
organisations and the presence of social control by rival social organisations.  
 
6.3.1 Indicator of Social Control: Compliance 
In this study, compliance with state rules, or the lack thereof, is measured by observing the 
extent to which the following actions are evident, or not:  
 
 The payment of taxes to the state or tariffs paid to a rival organisation 
 The payment of protection money to an organised criminal gang 
 The reliance on organised criminal groups to solve community related or personal 
problems  
 The use of public transport, and the control of public transport routes by gangs 
 The effectiveness of law enforcement (especially the police), police visibility and 
police response  
 The interaction (if any) between the police and organised criminal groups 
 The illegal activities in the community, especially the drug trade (if any) 
 
As explained in chapter one and two, semi-structured interviews were conducted. The above 
mentioned seven themes were used as guidelines and were embedded in the interviews. As 
the name indicates, it is not possible to conduct semi-structured interviews bullet for bullet. In 
this case, a number of the themes also overlapped and spread across to the other two 
indicators of social control. The research process observed if these seven themes were present 
to a greater or lesser extent.  
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6.3.1.1 The Illicit Economy in Manenberg 
The Cape Flats in general is an impoverished area. A socio-economic profile of ward 45 
(which at that stage included Gugulethu and Manenberg) compiled in 2006 by the City of 
Cape Town indicated that at the time, 20,61% of males and 18,76% of females in the ward 
were unemployed (City of Cape Town, 2006).
96
 However, during the small group discussions 
and interviews with community members, the respondents placed the level of unemployment 
in Manenberg as much higher. Unemployment and the lack of development in the area were 
also cited as one of, if not the main reasons, why young people will join a gang and why 
gangs persist.
97
 Thus, the issue of gangs as the providers of the community or the „Robin 
Hood‟ phenomenon was very prominent in all of the interviews. Three elements of the gangs 
as providers emerged from the research: Gangs employing members of the community, gangs 
investing in the community and gangs providing goods to the community. On the first aspect, 
during the community small group discussions, all the respondents agreed that there are very 
little opportunities for young people on the Cape Flats and that as a result, many turn to the 
gangs, but more specifically drug merchants (dealers), for an income. One respondent from a 
small group discussion reacted to the issue of unemployment as follows:  
„…There is also not a lot of work for the youth. Now they maybe go to the merchant 
and go look for a job there. They deal for that man and he will buy you sneakers, he 
will sort you out…‟ (Community small group discussion 2, Respondent 2). 
This was further confirmed when a local newspaper interviewed drug merchants from the 
Cape Flats. The merchants stated that they support a network of families, as they employ 
drug sellers. The merchants pay the water and electricity bills of the sellers, buy food for their 
families and also pay for those who are killed in gang-related violence to be buried 
(Cruywagen, 2010). A member of the Cape Town South African Police Service (SAPS)
98
 
agreed that gangs buy the community goods that they need every day, such as bread and milk 
(Key informant group discussion, respondent N). The sellers or „foot soldiers‟ can also be 
paid in drugs, or clothes and shoes (Community small group discussion 2). As stated by a 
respondent:  
 
                                                 
96
  As explained in section 5.3 of chapter five, in 2006 the unemployment rate for the City of Cape Town was 
15,1%. 
97
  See appendix B for an illustration of housing on the Cape Flats.  
98
 As stated in chapter two, local agents of governance or agents that are part of the security apparatus on a 
local level were also considered essential for research on local governance. Accordingly, respondents of the 
SAPS that functions on the local level were included in this study.  
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„…They (foot soldiers) get money or tik or whatever. They buy them clothes, tekkies99 
and jackets and Levi jeans…‟ (Community small group discussion 2, Respondent 2). 
 
There are numerous stories of criminal bosses carrying out acts of charity through community 
investment; however, not many of these stories can be verified.
100
 One example that came 
from this research is that a crime boss in Manenberg is believed to have provided money for 
the establishment of a religious community centre. Certain crime bosses also provide full 
sponsorships to many local football teams. During the interviews, many of the respondents 
could not confirm incidents of direct community investment by organised crime bosses. The 
only respondent that acknowledged an incident involving organised crime bosses investing 
money in a venture was one of the reformed gangsters. He acknowledged that a crime boss 
gave him money to sponsor his soccer team. The respondent did not care where the money 
came from; stating that if it was not for that, he would not have been able to present the 
children with trophies after they participated in a tournament. He also stated that he knows of 
a leader of a prominent gang who gave money to churches and schools in the area (Key 
informant interview, respondent L). The respondent said:  
 
„…That man, he is an American. The leader of the Americans. He is also in jail. He 
gave to them, churches and schools. He gave them. When I had my soccer team, he 
sponsored everything. He sponsored everything…For me that is not really dirty 
money madam. Because the day that you don‟t have enough to have that presentation 
for those children. Then you need trophies to give to them to say that they have 
worked. I cannot just say no. I have to take it…‟ (Key informant interview, 
respondent L). 
 
The final element of gangs as the providers of the community links to the provision of goods 
such as food and clothing to needy families. Many of the respondents agreed that this „Robin 
Hood‟ phenomenon has diminished to a certain extent. They stated that it still takes place in 
Manenberg, but is linked to specific individuals in gangs that will, for instance, provide food 
to families. None of the respondents during the community small group discussions 
acknowledged that they had taken goods from gangsters, but they all knew of someone who 
had done it or will do it in the future (Community small group discussion 1; Community 
                                                 
99
 „Tekkies‟ can refer to sneakers or shoes used for exercise.  
100
  See for example Standing 2006.  
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small group discussion 2). A local religious leader stated that the people of the community 
know that they can come to the church for help, but they are as likely to go to a gang:  
 
„…They know which churches, like they know that we do help. So they will come to 
me, as likely they will go to the gangs as well for money and to the drug dealers 
because of course then they owe those people a favour…‟ (Key informant interview, 
respondent C).  
 
As a result of the „Robin Hood‟ phenomenon, some respondents claimed that parts of the 
community see gangsters as heroes and even protect them. For example, the houses of people 
receiving goods may also be used to hide drugs (Key informant group discussion, respondent 
N; Key informant interview, respondent F). There have also been cases in the past where the 
community would throw stones at law enforcement officials when they searched the houses 
of gangsters (Key informant group discussion, respondent N).  
 
„…You can go to places like Manenberg and Valhalla Park and search their 
premises now and you‟ll have the community on your shoulders or throwing stones 
at you because of (names of gangsters)…They buy the community with the basics that 
we all need every day, bread, milk, and electricity. They‟ll buy…‟ (Key informant 
interview, respondent N).  
 
Thus, there is a mutually beneficial or mutually dependent relationship between segments of 
the community and gangs, where criminal groups are not actively opposed.  
 
In addition to the high levels of unemployment in this area, the infrastructure in Manenberg is 
also underdeveloped, and in general very poor. During the time spent in the field, it was 
observed that the local state schools in Manenberg are under-funded and there is little outside 
investment from the private sector.
101
 A local teacher highlighted the fact that Manenberg has 
a negative image that contributes to the issues of unemployment and underdevelopment: 
 
„….But you know Manenberg has got that negative connotation, even abroad… If 
they hear Manenberg, we‟ll rather go around it, but we don‟t want to be near to 
                                                 
101
  See appendix D for an illustration of a local school in Manenberg.  
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Manenberg…There are a lot of our youngsters, when they go through their primary 
school and high school years and they go and study further, the mere fact that they 
are from Manenberg, impacts negatively on them when they apply for jobs…‟ (Key 
informant interview, respondent K).  
  
Many respondents also felt that they were neglected after 1994 and that development is only 
geared towards the black
102
 communities. Development in the community will be further 
discussed under the indicator of participation, in section 6.2.2.  
 
6.3.1.2 Guardians and Gatekeepers: Provision of Security 
The themes of taxes and the payment of protection money to an organised criminal group 
overlap somewhat. In addition, this can be linked to the issue of territory or turf. What all the 
respondents acknowledged is that specific gangs are in control of specific areas of 
Manenberg. The gangs in a specific territory will act as the guardians and gatekeepers of that 
area, including the local businesses and organisations.
103
 Thus, they will guard it from 
intruders, rival gangs and other criminals. This was confirmed by a local religious leader:  
 
„…When I came here the church was fenced with barbed wire which was very old 
and rusty and people were getting in all the time. So on weekends, at least once on a 
weekend, I‟d wake up hearing somebody breaking down the door or somebody 
breaking in to our church hall and stole everything that was in the hall and then still 
came back sometimes when I was supposed to be inside. So I asked for funding … to 
put up electric fence … Then when we were putting up the electric fence, people 
interfered with the guys who were putting up the fence. They robbed them and caused 
trouble. Of course I was very upset and then one of my parishioners came and said: 
Unless you speak to the gangsters, this is not going to stop and also the gangsters 
are upset with you for putting up the fence. So I said: Why are they upset with me for 
putting up the fence? And they said: No, because they feel that they have to protect 
the church. It is their job…‟ (Key informant interview, respondent C).  
 
In order to explain the territories of the different gangs in Manenberg, see map 6.1 below.  
                                                 
102
  As explained in chapter five, Manenberg is a predominantly Coloured neighbourhood.  
103
  See appendix C for an illustration of gang signs used to mark turf.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
165 
 
 
Map 6.1: Gang Territories in Manenberg 
(Source: Produced by the author for this study).  
Map 6.1 indicates the five main gangs in the area, namely: The Americas, the Hard Livings, 
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the Jesters, the Schoolboys and the Clever Kids. The numbers of each gang on the map 
indicates the area that they control. The local police station can be found in the top right side 
of the map and the trauma hospital in the middle on the right side. It is important to note that 
the Schoolboys and the Clever Kids are youth gangs and accordingly, they control the areas 
where schools are located, such as Red River. As will be explained later, these gangs recruit 
children attending these schools. 
 
On the topic of territory, for businesses to operate in the gangs‟ respective areas, the gangs 
would request the payment of „tax‟ or protection money. It seems that there is no choice but 
to pay the protection money, because if „taxes‟ are not paid to the gang controlling the 
territory, intimidation and threats will occur. As a rehabilitated gang member noted:  
 
„…See, sometimes the HL‟s (Hard Livings Gang) can come in and rob you…They 
can take the stuff anytime if they want to, but if you want protection you‟ve got to pay 
us for the protection so that you don‟t get robbed and if you don‟t want to die, you 
also have to pay for protection…‟ (Key informant interview, respondent B).  
 
Another respondent, a religious leader, described the members of organised criminal groups 
as „…benevolent dictators…‟. As long as the people of the community do what the gangsters 
tell them to do, they will leave you in peace (Key informant interview, respondent C). The 
respondent said the following:  
 
„…So they are sort of benevolent dictators, as long as people go along with what 
they tell them to do, they leave you alone and they know that I‟m not going to phone 
the police. Sometimes I hear somebody saw. There must be a chop shop very close to 
where I live, or it was. I haven‟t heard it for a while, but I used to be able to hear 
sounds of grinding
104
 and I also feel that it is not my work to phone the police 
because the police know very well where all these criminal things are…‟ (Key 
informant interview, respondent C).  
 
The themes of taxes and protection of turf also relate to the subject of public transport and 
control over public transport routes. During interviews, local law enforcement agents agreed 
                                                 
104
  The respondent here explains the process of modifying stolen cars.  
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that the taxi industry is an integral part of gangsterism in the Western Cape. There are 
specific street gangs who would control specific routes; therefore, if a taxi driver is driving 
through a specific area, and does not belong to a larger gang grouping, he will be taxed (Key 
informant interview, respondent N). In addition, money is paid to gangs not only to operate or 
drive through their territory, but also to ensure that the taxis are not vandalised (Key 
informant group discussion, respondent O). Second, the leaders of prominent gangs have in 
the past used taxi businesses to conceal money, acquired through organised criminal activity 
(Key informant group discussion, respondent O). Consequently, the taxi industry is usually 
used to launder money, obtained through illegal activities, of which drugs and prostitution 
seem to be the most prominent on the Cape Flats. Both respondents from local law 
enforcement agencies and rehabilitated gangsters confirmed that prostitution and drugs are 
part and parcel of gangsterism (Key informant group discussion, respondent O; Key 
informant interview, respondent B; Key informant interview, respondent L). As noted in 
section 3.4.4 of chapter three, the well-organised structure of the gangs has provided the 
ability to significantly expand their activities beyond the boundaries of the Cape Flats. Many 
of the respondents in all the interviews agreed that the bigger gangs have strong links with 
international organised crime syndicates, for example groups from Nigeria and Russia. This 
was confirmed by a member of the SAPS as a response to the question if the gangs on the 
Cape Flats can be regarded as organised criminal groups:  
 
„…We have found in the past that they are operating within a certain structure. They 
commit crimes that are in line with the crimes set out in the Prevention of the 
Organised Crime Act which is needed for a criminal organisation to be regarded as 
an organised crime syndicate. They have a leader, they have a well-maintained 
structure. There is often an enterprise and there is an element of money laundering 
and there is definitely elements of racketeering within any of our, I won‟t say all, of 
the gangs on the Cape Flats, but especially the larger gangs on the Cape Flats. They 
are definitely often organised crime natured as far as I‟m concerned… The West 
Africans, especially the Nigerians will be the supplier of the drugs which the gangs 
then distribute within their specific area of governance if I can call it that…We have 
picked up a lot of individuals which at the end of the day forms part of a bigger 
syndicate which is couriering drugs from South America via our ports of entry, and 
especially our airports, into South Africa and if you look at the type of drugs and the 
quantity of drugs that‟s being couriered into South Africa it is also destined for the 
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local market and it cannot only be distributed by those individuals that is bringing it 
in…‟ (Key informant group discussion, respondent O).  
 
Rehabilitated members of gangs further explained the relationship with international groups 
and the drug trade as follow:  
 
„…One of the Americans in Mitchells Plain; he is one of the biggest drug dealers and 
influence on the community, because he buys billions of Rands of drugs and it just 
influxes on the community…‟ (Gang small group discussion 1, respondent 1)…The 
Nigerian Mafia brings in the heroine and the tik and they must deal direct with the 
big buyers, the people that manufacture the stuff. Now they must get a connection to 
them because then it will be much cheaper…‟ (Gang small group discussion 1, 
respondent 2). 
 
In the drug trade on the Cape Flats (and in Manenberg), „dagga‟105 and „tik‟106 are the most 
prominent drugs. A medical doctor working at a trauma hospital in Manenberg stated that 
drugs, and especially „tik‟, are responsible for the majority of violence in the community 
(Key informant interview: respondent H).
107
  
 
„…I think the two biggest problems is the cheap stuff. Tik is one of them. It‟s freely 
available. Dagga is also very big. It‟s responsible for a lot of violence within the 
community. You‟ll find a lot of mothers and parents bringing children in here 
because they just can‟t deal with them at home. They‟re just breaking things up at 
home. So the drug side of things especially has an impact on the Cape Flats 
significantly. And I think all of that, if you look at the little circle it all stems back to 
unemployment and lack of education…‟ (Key informant interview, Respondent H).  
 
Thus, these drugs are freely available and are regarded as relatively cheap. Community 
members confirmed that they know houses in the area where drugs are sold and where they 
can be used. They are also familiar with who the local drug merchants are (Community small 
                                                 
105
  The drug „dagga‟ is also known as cannabis or marijuana and is usually smoked.  
106
 The drug crystal methamphetamine is better known on the Cape Flats as „tik‟. The drug is usually smoked 
through a straw, by heating the crystals through a light bulb.   
107
  This confirms the statistics provided in section 4.3.1.5 of chapter four that 80% of all the crimes committed 
in the City of Cape Town are related to drug and substance abuse.  
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group discussion 2). It emerged during the interviews that the people of the Cape Flats make 
up a substantial part of the consumers of the drugs. This relates back to the mutually 
dependent relationship between gangs and specific cohorts of the community, who will 
provide protection to the gangs as they are the consumers and receivers of goods and 
services. The cohorts of the community who oppose organised criminal activity have a hard 
time working with local law enforcement agencies.  
 
6.3.1.3 Keeping the Peace 
The themes of the effectiveness of law enforcement (especially the police), police visibility 
and police response, and the relationship between police and organised criminal groups were 
very popular in all of the discussions. In a small group discussion, one respondent claimed 
that she waited for three hours after she called the police to an incident. After three hours she 
left the scene and the crime went unreported (Community small group discussion 2, 
respondent 1). Another described the response time of police as „…it could be anything to 
never…‟ (Key informant interview, respondent C). Furthermore, the respondents agreed that 
the most effective way of contacting police is to call a specific individual that they know. 
This will usually guarantee a response. The need was expressed, however, to work more 
closely with police – it was especially the respondents who were part of a community 
security initiative, who stated that they would like the police to patrol the streets with them at 
night (Community small group discussion 2). Some respondents also felt that the police deal 
with different crimes in different ways; if there is a call for a public disturbance for example, 
the response time would be much quicker than if it is an incident involving gangsters 
(Community small group discussion 3). Thus, feeling amongst community members was that 
the law enforcement in Manenberg was not effective. As one of the respondents noted:  
 
„…I do find it astonishing that they (gangs) operate openly and if I wanted to buy 
drugs or whatever I could send one of the children and they would know exactly 
where to go… There is an attitude that this is Manenberg and it had always been like 
this and it will always be like that and I saw that the year before last year when there 
was a bad gang war between the Americans and the Hard Livings and for two/three 
months there was shooting all the time. Quite a number of people were 
murdered…There was all this going on and like the police would sit in their cars till 
midnight and then go home. So then the shooting starts. Then they come and it is 
over and I was saying why they don‟t search house to house for where these firearms 
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are and the bullets. That never happens. Their interaction is very reactive…‟ (Key 
informant interview, respondent C).  
 
One reason for the alleged ineffectiveness of the police can be that they are understaffed. At 
the local police station in Manenberg, there are around 150 police officers. This brings the 
ratio to roughly one policeman for every 1,000 people. The policing area is divided into three 
sectors, with two vehicles per sector (Key informant interview, respondent A). The lack of 
manpower also strains the relationship between different state institutions, for example the 
police and the local hospital. A doctor at the local hospital said that he knew of at least three 
episodes on the hospital premises, where people were hijacked or held up at gunpoint, and 
where the police could not respond as a result of limited resources (Key informant interview, 
respondent H). However, it seemed that both the police and the hospital were working 
towards fostering a better relationship.  
 
There are specific initiatives in place to combat the problem of drugs and gang violence on 
the Cape Flats, such as the Drug Busters
108
, a special operations team which works with 
Community Policing Forums (CPFs) (Key informant interview, respondent F). The 
effectiveness of these initiatives is unfortunately limited by a number of contextual factors.  
 
The first is the fact that gangsterism is embedded in the community and part of the culture. 
This can be cited as one of the main reasons why initiatives to eradicate gangsterism on the 
Cape Flats have not been successful. As one rehabilitated gangster commented during a small 
group discussion:  
 
„…Yes gangs will be part of communities for a very long time because gangs are part 
of the coloured community. I would even go as far as to say it has become part of our 
culture. If you look at it, my grandfather was a gangster, my father was, and my 
uncle was now I feel I also have to, but the conditions then and the conditions now is 
totally different...‟ (Gang small group discussion 2, respondent 1).  
 
This was echoed by a local government member of the City of Cape Town, in response to the 
question whether you are born a gangster when you come from the Cape Flats:  
                                                 
108
  The Drug Busters and other specialised units are explained in section 4.4.2 of chapter four.  
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„…I‟d debate that. I think you are born into a culture that glamorises it and tolerates 
it and tells you it‟s an ok career option…‟ (Key informant interview, respondent F).  
 
6.3.1.4 On the „Payroll‟  
A second contextual factor that hampers the eradication of gangsterism is the alleged corrupt 
relationship between law enforcement and organised criminal groups. Respondents from the 
community small group discussions agreed that not all, but some police officers work with 
the gangsters. It is important to note that respondents regarded the difference between police 
officers from the Metro and officers from the SAPS as insignificant. Some respondents 
claimed that the police are friends with the drug merchants (Community small group 
discussion 1; Community small group discussion 2).  
Many of the reformed gangsters acknowledged that they have seen or experienced corrupt 
dealings with the police, for example tip offs of a raid. They referred to it as some members 
of the police force being on the „…payroll…‟ of the drug merchants. According to this group 
of respondents, police officers are not only on the payroll, they will also resell drugs obtained 
during a bust (Gang small group discussion 1; Gang small group discussion 2; Key informant 
interview, respondent B). One reformed gangster commented the following on the question of 
what is the relationship between the police and gangsters:  
„…They (police) come by the merchants. Now they pay off. R1 000/R5 000. Now he is 
on the payroll. Now when the police is going to raid, they come by his place and they 
find nothing, because that policeman tipped him off…That policeman already tipped 
him off because he is on the payroll. Now he is going to get his wages, because his 
salary is weak. Nothing left from his wages. Now by that peanuts he is getting now, 
he must earn something extra on the side line. So he goes there by the merchant. Hey 
kyk hier, ek gaan vir jou net information gee. I give you information whenever they 
come to raid your place. Then you know you must like get the drugs vanish. Now he 
hide the drugs and that police …..What is he doing? He is corrupting the whole 
system. Because now, that person that is selling the drugs, is selling the drugs not 
only to the gangsters there, but to kids also…‟ (Gang small group discussion 1, 
respondent 2).  
Corruption in the police can take several forms. For example, one respondent reported that he 
has bribed a police officer to lose his file:  
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„…I have been there. I also bribed some policemen to take my folders away, so that I 
don‟t go to court on that day because they don‟t get my files. And there were times I 
got away with it, because then my files just disappeared. The case against me just 
goes dead in its tracks because they don‟t have anything on me. But in Manenberg it 
happens a lot, not just in Manenberg, Hanover Park as well...‟ (Gang small group 
discussion 1, respondent 1).  
 
A local ward councillor also agreed that there is a corrupt relationship between specific law 
enforcement officials and gangsters, and that it discourages cooperation.  
 
„…It makes it difficult for us. Look, maybe I saw something now. Now I want to 
inform the police, but I am afraid to do so. Because the police are going to inform 
the gangsters...‟ (Key informant interview, respondent E).   
 
Respondents from the local SAPS and the City Of Cape Town government were adamant 
that, they act immediately if they receive information of corruption occurring on a local level 
and that it will not be tolerated. Corrupt individuals have been arrested and prosecuted in the 
past, for dealings with gangs. However, in order to investigate an individual on charges of 
corruption, the community needs to report suspicious behaviour or incidents. Thus, action can 
only be taken if they receive complaints (Key informant interview, respondent A; Key 
informant interview, respondent F; Key informant group discussion, respondent M). 
Unfortunately, the community‟s point of view that the police are not effective deters them 
from sharing information with law enforcement agents. Members of the community are also 
afraid that they will be victimised by gang members if they provide the police with 
information. Also, the strained relationship between different branches of local government 
further hampers operations.  
 
One last important element on the topic of keeping the peace is that, during gang wars, local 
agents of governance, most noticeably the Western Cape Community Safety Member of the 
Executive Committee, have negotiated peace treaties with gangs. There is no consensus 
between agents of governance if negotiations with gangs should take place, as other 
individuals oppose it (Booi, 2012 and Adams, 2012). However, such negotiations confirm 
that the identity of local gang leaders are known to state officials, and also that gangs are 
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regarded as an important actor in ensuring peace on the Cape Flats. In addition, peace 
agreements have also been reached between community leaders and gangsters, without the 
assistance and presence of the local government, facilitating a decrease in violence (Booi, 
2012 and Adams, 2012). This indicates that security is obtained without the actions of local 
government.  
 
6.3.1.5 Summary  
Compliance in this study has been conceptualised as the extent to which citizens yield to the 
rules of the state, and the element of use of force may be present. Compliance is also 
determined by the ability of the state to reallocate resources to citizens. When compliance as 
an indicator of state social control is analysed, based on the selected case study, it is found 
that compliance in Manenberg is split between the state at the level of local government and 
organised criminal groups. It is acknowledged by members of the community that gangs 
operate a tax system (with regards to public transport routes as well) and community 
members and rehabilitated gangs confirmed that the payment of these taxes are non-
negotiable, irrespective of it being done as a result of fear or intimidation. It is a similar 
situation with protection money, where gangs view it as their duty to provide security to the 
areas that they control, even if it is only superficial. As gangs are viewed as the security 
regulators, they do maintain a position of authority, even over local government, and are on 
occasion relied on to solve community related problems. What also emerged during the 
interviews is the impression that provision of these services by gang leaders has diminished; 
and the provision of services has been taken on by the entire criminal community. However, 
community and family relations were the most important connection noted by the 
respondents. Accordingly, when there is a domestic problem, other members of the 
community or family members will first be contacted. Law enforcement is viewed as 
inefficient, non-reliable and corrupt, by members of the community and rehabilitated 
gangsters that were interviewed. Nevertheless, their relevance is still acknowledged, 
indicating that there is a desire for a legitimate source of security. In addition, illegal 
activities in the community are rife, despite operations by local government to eradicate such 
actions.  
 
Last, there is a lack of resources in the community and the area is, in general, viewed as poor 
and impoverished. The social and economic development of Manenberg is viewed as one of 
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the only ways in which gangsterism can be curbed.  
 
6.3.2 Indicator of Social Control: Participation  
In this study, participation in state structures, or the lack thereof, is measured by observing 
the extent to which the following actions are evident, or not:  
 
 The requirements of doing business in the community, the authority in control of 
doing business, informal structures of authority, and what authority is trusted 
 Voting in elections and the participation in the local electoral process  
 The perceptions of the usefulness of local elections, participation in local elections 
and local governing structures, and the relevance of the 2011 local elections  
 The knowledge of local government representatives versus knowledge of members of 
local organised criminal group (especially the leader of the group)  
 Participating in community initiatives 
 
As explained in chapter one and two, semi-structured interviews were conducted. The above 
mentioned five themes were used as guidelines and were embedded in the interviews. As the 
name indicates, it is not possible to conduct semi-structured interviews bullet for bullet. In 
this case, a number of the themes also overlapped and spread across to the other two 
indicators of social control. The research process observed if these five themes were present 
to a greater or lesser extent.  
  
6.3.2.1 Doing business in the community  
As explained during the discussion of the themes, payment of taxes and payment of 
protection money (under the indicator compliance); some businesses in Manenberg have to 
pay protection money to gangs. This will protect the business from intimidation by the gang 
in whose territory it is located, but also provide security against intrusion from rival gangs. A 
member of the SAPS stated during an interview, that in order to operate a business you have 
to have the permission of the local gang boss. He said that:  
 
„…You cannot go and operate a shebeen…without being connected to one of the 
gangs or part of your money will be given back to them…‟ (Key informant group 
discussion, respondent N).  
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Consequently, here the authority in control of doing business in Manenberg is the respective 
gang in command of the territory. In addition, these shebeens (illegal bars) operate without a 
valid liquor license. There are reportedly a number of these bars in Manenberg that serve as a 
source of income to many families. According to one respondent, they operate with the 
awareness of the police (Key informant interview, respondent I). The respondent commented 
as follows:  
 
„…Manenberg is a good example here with the selling of liquor illegally. The 
shebeens, they don‟t have licenses. They will in fact resort to those activities. Now 
from a moral point of view we can say no, that‟s in correct, goes against the grain of 
our society. So we need to try and steer those people into a different direction. The 
thing is, what are you going to do tonight? Are you going to put something on the 
table for them to eat? That‟s why I‟m saying. Where will they get something to eat? 
Therefore there‟s a common saying here in Manenberg. It‟s an Afrikaans saying: 
Ons smokkel vir die potjie. Om kos op die tafel te sit
109
. We can have our moral 
objections about it; however, it‟s a reality thing. It is a survival mechanism. It‟s a 
survival tactic. And then even the police are aware of it…‟ (Key informant interview, 
respondent I).  
 
6.3.2.2 Voting and Local Politics  
During the interviews, the common view of local government was not positive. Many 
respondents stated that they do not vote in the local elections, and they will not vote in the 
next elections, because there has been no improvement in their community since 1994. Thus, 
the general feeling was that it makes no difference if you vote for the African National 
Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA) or any other party; the outcome is the 
same – no development in the community. These respondents largely did not see the use of 
local elections. Although some of the respondents said that they do vote in the elections, they 
claimed that despite their vote, not much has changed in Manenberg. The subject of race and 
the divide between the black and coloured communities were prominent during the 
interviews. Some respondents felt that they were better off before 1994 and that the 
government of the day does not care for their community (Community small group 
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  The direct translation of this phrase is: We smuggle for the pot. To put food on the table.  
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discussion 1; Community small group discussion 2). This relates specifically to the issue of 
unemployment and the lack of development in Manenberg. One respondent from a small 
group discussion said that he has been waiting for a house for 15 years, but that residents 
from a predominantly black informal settlement close to Manenberg had received houses 
(Gang small group discussion 1). This was echoed during a key informant interview:  
 
„…They say it‟s for the people but nothing is for the people. The biggest thing: 
houses. They just make promises…They build houses, but not for me…No water, no 
nothing. Now it is their time. Now they take. Corruption, corruption, fraud, fraud: 
Xhosas all the way…‟ (Key informant interview, respondent B).       
 
However, a local ward councillor denied tensions between the black and coloured 
communities. The respondent also acknowledged that the people who make the most use of 
the services of the local councillor are the black community, and that the coloured 
community in general is apathetic (Key informant interview, respondent E).  
 
Alarmingly, some respondents said that they only vote because they are manipulated into it, 
by representatives of political parties who visit the area before and during election time. To 
the question of „why do you vote‟ one member of the small group reacted in the following 
way:  
 
„…They said if you‟re not going to vote and one day when you go and look for a job 
and they see you didn‟t vote you‟re not going to get a job…‟ (Community small 
group discussion 1, respondent 1).   
 
The opinions on local councillors by members of the community were also not very positive. 
In general, respondents were not familiar with their local councillors. Only one small group 
discussion from the community could provide the name of a local councillor (Community 
small group discussion 3). However, all the respondents from the small group discussions 
were familiar with the local gang bosses, their names and where they stay. The function of 
local government will be further explored under the indicator of legitimacy.  
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Through the interviews conducted for this study, no gang involvement in local political 
parties could be confirmed. This is, however, not an indication that there are no traces, but the 
respondents who participated in this study did not have any knowledge of such involvement. 
A local school teacher and operator of a community centre acknowledged that during the 
1994 national elections, gangs would support a specific political party by displaying the 
party‟s flag. However, the respondent stated that the new generation of gangsters are not 
particularly interested in party politics (Key informant interview, respondent I).  
 
In general, it seems that there is a breakdown between local government structures and the 
community of Manenberg. One possible rationale for this is, that the research indicates, that 
government structures are not viewed by community members as effective. In addition, 
gangsters are viewed as part of the community.  
 
As explained in chapter five, the City of Cape Town is involved with urban renewal 
programmes in other suburbs of the city, for example in Kayelitsha and Mitchells Plain. 
According to a member of the City of Cape Town mayoral committee, the partnerships 
between local government and the community are very effective in these two areas (Key 
informant interview, respondent F). Despite the negative view of local government, many of 
the small group discussion participants were involved in civic organisations. There are 
several community organisations in Manenberg, including Silvertree Youth Centre, 
Manenberg Advice Office, Self Help Manenberg and Proudly Manenberg. Proudly 
Manenberg was created in 2005 after the death of a learner at a school, as a result of gang 
violence. The organisation is based on the idea of community ownership and has as its slogan 
„The people shall govern‟. Initially, the organisation worked closely with the City of Cape 
Town and the provincial government of the Western Cape. Funding was also received, from 
amongst others, the Development Bank of Southern Africa. It was designed to function as an 
umbrella organisation for other civic organisations in Manenberg. In addition, the structure is 
based on several committees or sectors, including the education, health, environment and 
safety sector, with the main idea to create community ownership of local development. For 
example, in the safety sector there are around 200 people with the main responsibility of 
keeping Manenberg safe and implementing safety plans (Key informant interview, 
respondent G). However, a number of problems emerged within the organisation. One of the 
members of the executive committee stated during an interview, that the relationship between 
the organisation and local and provincial government disintegrated. One possible reason for 
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this is the change in government in the Western Cape and the City of Cape Town, from the 
ANC to the DA. The respondent replied to the question if they work with local government 
as follows:  
 
„…No, we always said that we want to work with them, but it doesn‟t exist. They are 
dysfunctional. The city, from the mayor‟s side is dysfunctional…We‟ve got a festival; 
electricity was asked…We haven‟t received electricity. What kind of government is 
that, that doesn‟t even support the community‟s activities that unite the community? 
They don‟t support us. So they are in the game of competing with the community and 
that is a sad day when that happens. The city is in competition with the community 
instead of working with us and they see us as a threat…‟ (Key informant interview, 
respondent G).  
 
In addition to the breakdown of the relationship between the organisation and local 
government, Proudly Mannenberg has also experienced financial troubles. During 2010, a 
local newspaper reported that workers in the different sectors were not paid and that one of 
the main funders requested a forensic audit of the organisation‟s financial records (Cupido, 
2010a:3 and Cupido, 2010b:7). Indeed, during the small group discussions many of the 
respondents who were working with Proudly Manenberg complained of not getting paid 
(Community small group discussion 1; Community small group discussion 2; Gang small 
group discussion 2). As the respondents from a small group said:  
 
„…Every month it‟s the same story with the money, with the wages. When it comes to 
the wages, they say next week or next month (Community small group1, respondent 
1). „…This is the second month. But (worker at Proudly Manenberg) told some of our 
colleagues that they already deposited last month‟s money…‟ (Community small 
group discussion1, respondent 2).  
 
Furthermore, and specific to the security sector of Proudly Manenberg, respondents said they 
are afraid of patrolling the streets, as gangsters may assault them. They also do not have any 
equipment, and as a result their mandate and functionality are questioned. They can only 
patrol the areas, as they have no weapons or warrants to search property. As one respondent 
said:  
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„…We can‟t just search anyone, because we don‟t have any proof to search the 
person. And we aren‟t bullet proof. What if they start shooting at us…They (Proudly 
Manenberg) will do nothing. They won‟t say that you were a good worker…‟ 
(Community small group discussion 2, respondent 1).  
 
As mentioned, the people who work in the safety sector expressed the need to have a closer 
working relationship with the police. It seems that the main problem is with the organisation 
itself. Indeed, there are other community-based organisations that reportedly work more 
closely with local government, such as Self Help Manenberg, but the majority of these 
organisations function independently from one another. The lack of cooperation in civil 
society and the tainted relationship between local government and Proudly Manenberg 
(which was designed to create continuity between the different community initiatives) 
hampers development and reconciliation in the community.  
 
6.3.2.3 Summary  
For the purposes of this study, participation, as an indicator of state social control, was 
conceptualised as the successful mobilisation of citizens by the state, to repeated voluntary 
participation in different institutional sectors of the state. From the analysis of this case study, 
it is found that participation does occur; however, it is limited and if it occurs, the value of it 
is not clear. As with regulating security and the payment of taxes, as indicated previously; 
some businesses, most noticeably the taxi industry but also illegal businesses, are regulated 
by the gangs. The presence of informal structures of authority can be confirmed. Although 
there is some level of participation in local elections, little value for the electoral process is 
expressed. In accordance to this view, the use for local councillors is not viewed as important 
and the knowledge of such representatives is limited. The knowledge of local gang bosses 
was much greater. A link between gangs and local politicians could not be established. A 
mostly positive relationship between agents of local governance and community groups was 
expressed and there is the need and desire from both sides to foster stronger connections. 
Members of the community interviewed, actively participate in community initiatives.  
 
6.3.3 Indicators of Social Control: Legitimacy 
In this study, legitimacy of the state, or the lack thereof, is measured by observing the extent 
to which the following actions are evident, or not:  
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 The function of local government in community and service delivery 
 The participation of the local community in vigilante groups and support for such 
groups  
 Trust in law enforcement agents (including the courts)  
 The role of local government in security 
 The occurrence of armed violence or confrontations in the community  
 Access to firearms (illegal) 
 Effectiveness of the school system: child and youth involvement in gangs and school 
violence 
 
As explained in chapter one and two, semi-structured interviews were conducted. The above 
mentioned seven themes were used as guidelines and were embedded in the interviews. As 
the name indicates, it is not possible to conduct semi-structured interviews bullet for bullet. In 
this case, a number of the themes also overlapped and spread across to the other two 
indicators of social control. The research process observed if these seven themes were present 
to a greater or lesser extent.  
 
6.3.3.1 Education: On the Street or in School? 
There are a number of primary and secondary schools located in Manenberg. As with the 
greater Manenberg area, the majority of these schools lack resources and are understaffed. As 
an example, one specific primary school has around 1,030 learners with 26 staff members, 
bringing the learner – teacher ratio to around 40 – 1.110 The school fees are R150 per year, of 
which the school only receives around 30 – 40 % (Key informant group discussion, 
respondent K), meaning that only that percentage of the fees are paid. Staff at the school cited 
a lack of resources, including human resources, as the biggest obstacle to ensure effective 
teaching and learning at the school. The headmaster of the school also commented that the 
usual intake for grade 8 at a high school in Manenberg is around 180 learners. However, the 
same school only has around 40 learners in matric each year (Key informant group 
discussion, respondent K). This indicates a drop-out rate of around 78%. The respondent said:  
 
„…Now what happens to those learners outside, at home, unemployed, not completed 
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  The national learner-teacher ratio in public ordinary schools was 32 - 8 in 2005 (Department of Education: 
2006) 
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their high school years, did not want to study further. We are actually feeding into 
the gangs…‟ (Key informant group discussion, respondent K).   
 
Taking this into consideration, it is then not surprising that a number of respondents felt that 
there has been a definite increase in youth gangs (Community small group discussion 1; 
Community small group discussion 2; Gang small group discussion 1). Respondents from 
one small group discussion agreed that boys, from as young as ten years old, participate in 
gang-related activities. The youth gangs are sometimes used by larger gangs to execute 
specific tasks (Community small group discussion 2). The one respondent commented on 
youth gangs:  
 
„…They are more dangerous. One afternoon I was coming from the school with my 
grandchildren, so I came across the field. So two of them came, I assume they are 10 
and 12 years old. So they came and went into Grieta Court. And they were shooting 
and they shot one man. Just like that…‟ (Community small group discussion 2, 
respondent 1).  
 
As with the larger gangs, the youth groups are also linked to a specific territory that 
corresponds with a high school in the area. As a member of the Manenberg SAPS stated:  
 
„…We look at these youth gangs and they also have their territories. If you look at 
the flats close to community centre…there you‟ll get the Vikings and most of them 
attend to Manenberg High. Then you come down the road from there you get 
Playboys, No Fears - they attend to Silver Stream High, some of them. Then you get 
to Phoenix High and you get your Luxury Kids, Down Town Players…If you pick up 
some of these kids almost 40% of them - their fathers are in prison. A lot of them - 
their mothers are still kids. So there is not proper parental guidance and they get 
acceptance on the road, they get fed on the road so to them the road is fine...‟ (Key 
informant interview, respondent A).  
 
As a further result of the break down in family structures, gangsters are viewed as role 
models for many youngsters. One respondent told the story of a teacher who told a learner in 
primary school that he should go to school, so that he can study and earn a good salary and 
have a stable life:  
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„… (He) told the teacher that it does not work like that. Look at (name of gang boss). 
He is not educated and he has a car and tons of houses and he lives in wealth...‟ 
(Key informant group discussion, respondent N).  
 
The issue of free education came up in a number of interviews. Respondents mentioned that 
during apartheid they did not have to pay for a good education, but now some parents cannot 
afford to pay school fees, and as a result, their children drop-out of school (Key informant 
group discussion, respondent J; Key informant interview, respondent D). One respondent said 
that it was an embarrassment for the children to be asked for their outstanding school fees by 
a teacher, and as a result, the child would rather not attend school (Key informant interview, 
respondent J). Consequently, it seems that the issue of youth gangs is not only the result of 
the lack of resources at schools, but also relates very strongly to the social dynamics of 
Manenberg.  
 
As some of the schools are located in the territory of gangs, gang violence is inevitable. A 
police officer from Manenberg SAPS said that as a result of the 1998 Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act (POCA), gangsters have moved underground, as they are afraid to be 
exposed as gangsters, but the new upcoming trend is youth gangs. The respondent said that:  
 
„…They are still scholars, minors and according to law you know, they are not 
accountable to their actions because they are minors, but they are upcoming and 
some of them do quite violent crimes…‟ (Key informant interview, respondent A).  
 
As mentioned, one respondent from a community small group said that, one day while she 
was walking her grandchildren from school she encountered two young children around 10 – 
12 years old shooting a man (Community small group 2, respondent 1). From the interviews 
it seemed that it is relatively easy to obtain a firearm in Manenberg, and that guns move 
around between members of the gangs, as they are needed to commit crimes or defend their 
territory. A member of the Manenberg SAPS confirmed that the larger gangs will use youth 
groups to do specific tasks:  
 
„…So in order to do a job, they will give you a gun and say please go and execute 
….So they get a hold on you. They will have a grip over you…‟ (Key informant 
interview, respondent A).  
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Needless to say, it is suspected that the majority of these firearms are owned, bought and 
resold without a valid license. One reformed gangster was adamant during an interview that it 
was so easy to obtain a gun, and that he could have brought one to the interview if he knew 
that it would have been a topic of discussion (Key informant interview, respondent L). Many 
of the reformed gangsters also agreed that it is very easy to obtain a firearm. One respondent 
claimed that guns mostly come from „…over the border…‟, meaning the black informal 
settlements, indicating some relationship between gangs in Manenberg and criminal groups in 
areas outside of the Coloured neighbourhoods of the Cape Flats. He said that:  
 
„…It‟s very easy to get a gun…Guns mostly come over the border especially with 
people like the Africans…When you‟ve got connections over the line, Nyanga, 
Langa, Gugulethu. Those are the places where most guns are. When you‟ve got 
friends on that side and when you‟ve got friends that you are doing crime with on 
that side, it‟s very easy because then they trust you. Then they give you guns and you 
can use it here and afterwards you can take it out of Manenberg and store it there…‟ 
(Key informant interview, respondent B).  
 
This same respondent also claimed that corrupt members of the police would, on occasion, 
search houses in Manenberg and although they would find guns, they would not remove 
them, but come back the next day for payment from the gangsters.  
 
6.3.3.2 Trust in the Law 
In the first category of respondents, members of the community, the majority confirmed that 
they have no trust in their local police station. Nevertheless, some felt that there were 
individuals at the Manenberg police station that they could trust. It emerged that the general 
lack of trust stemmed from a lack of police visibility, and also a very slow response time, if 
they responded at all. Thus, although there is not a great deal of trust in the police, the 
community will still contact them, in the hope that they will respond. However, the statement 
by a member of the Cape Town SAPS, that in the past people would go and report criminal 
activities in the area, such as theft or housebreaking, to a prominent gang boss, rather than to 
the police, did not come as a surprise. The respondent said that the community probably had 
more faith in the criminal boss, as the criminal was dealt with immediately (Key informant 
group discussion, respondent N). The respondent explained:  
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„…And you‟ll find that in the case of (name of gangster), people would in the past go 
and report criminal activities or theft or housebreaking to (name of gangster) and 
not to the police. Maybe because they had more faith in (name of gangster) and it 
has been dealt with immediately. He would send out people or a message to 
perpetrators and say: “You must bring back the goods” and if they don‟t they‟ll be 
fetched and punished and the goods be retrieved…‟ (Key informant group 
discussion, respondent N).  
 
It has to be noted, however, that such incidents could not be confirmed by other respondents, 
with the exception of a local religious leader. Although this respondent did not request the 
help of a local gang after his church was repeatedly burgled, gang members (and not an 
individual gang leader) did view it as their responsibility to protect the church. In addition, 
the respondents reported that they knew who the criminals were and that it would stop, which 
it did (Key informant interview, respondent C). In the cases where someone was arrested by 
the police and appeared in court, a lack of trust in the court system was also exposed. 
Respondents felt that a suspect usually gets bail relatively easily, which is then paid by a drug 
merchant (Community small group discussion 2). A reformed gangster had the following to 
say about the court system during an interview:  
 
„…I have been in and out the courts for a couple of months. My son, he was involved 
in theft. Corruption is there because I have seen it. Policemen, lawyers taking money 
outside the court, when you go inside, the man come out...‟ (Key informant 
interview, respondent B).  
 
During the interviews, the lack of trust in law enforcement did not only relate to the police 
and the court system; a lack of trust in the prison system and other local government 
structures was also expressed. Many reformed gangsters expressed the view that they were 
not rehabilitated while in prison and that they interacted with corrupt prison officials. One 
respondent claimed that prison warders would come and fetch money from him in the 
evening and supply him with parcels of dagga in the morning. This will then be sold to fellow 
prisoners (Key informant interview, respondent L). The respondent explained corruption in 
prison as follows:  
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„…They (prison warders) are very corrupt. Do you know why I say they are corrupt? 
The warders eat prison food…and then a second thing is every night they come and 
fetch money with me, and then they go and buy parcels of dagga for me. Then they 
bring it to me the next morning…Then I just sell my stoppe.111 A stop here on the 
outside is R1. A stop there inside is R5…I also sold buttons there inside. One piece of 
button, such a piece of button is R25. Half a button is R50…during the time that I 
was there inside…‟ (Key informant interview, respondent L).  
 
With regards to other structures in local government, respondents from the community stated 
that they do not have trust in their local councillor. It appeared that respondents would rather 
rely on friends or relatives in the community when they had a community related problem, 
than on a local councillor, thereby confirming a lack of trust. In addition, respondents did not 
see the value that a local councillor added to the community. As a business owner said about 
local councillors:  
 
„…They have never done anything for me and I don‟t believe that in the future they 
will do anything for me. So I am not interested...‟ (Key informant interview, 
respondent D).  
 
Respondents in the small group discussion who were familiar with their ward councillor still 
said that they would rather rely on themselves, than on a local councillor (Community small 
group discussion 3).  
 
„…People make promises to us, but it‟s best if we work for our own, what we want in 
life and that‟s the way we sort our problems. We are a group of women and only one 
man, but we do it in Manenberg. So we are very proud of ourselves…‟ (Community 
small group discussion 3, respondent 4).  
 
One respondent reported that the only time that a member of the ANC or DA visits the area, 
is before elections, or during a community meeting. But that they do not stay long or get their 
hands dirty and work in the community (Gang small group discussion A, respondent 1). 
Despite that many of the respondents not trusting local government, they still expressed the 
                                                 
111
 A stop refers to one helping of dagga. Buttons are the street name for Mandrax tablets.  
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necessity of local government structures, particularly in the area of development in the 
community, and more specifically, housing. Accordingly, there is still a preference for a 
legitimate government. Thus, for the community, the main function of local government, 
besides security, was the provision of development in the community. A member of the City 
of Cape Town mayoral committee stated that, especially before the 2010 Football World 
Cup, the city had invested significantly in infrastructure that had created a great deal of jobs 
in the city, particularly in construction (Key informant interview, respondent F).  Although 
this may be true in other areas of the City of Cape Town, Manenberg has seen little to none of 
these investments. Indeed, a local councillor cited unemployment and lack of development as 
the biggest challenges for local government in Manenberg. The respondent replied to the 
question of what he/she will do if re-elected, as following:  
 
„…I actually want to try and increase the creation of jobs. Look, there are people 
that are maybe panel beaters, and those people should try and have workshops, so 
that other children can learn how to do those jobs...‟ (Key informant interview, 
respondent E).  
 
The same respondent also stated that there are local government structures in place to assist 
the people, for example, places where they can apply for a grant at the council if they are 
behind with payments on their house, but that these structures are not used often.  
 
The theme of local government and security also relates to the topic of the effectiveness of 
local government as discussed under the indicator of compliance. An important distinction is 
needed here, with regards to the policing of gangsterism and the policing of organised crime. 
As explained by a member of the SAPS during an interview at the Cape Town police station, 
the local police station would be the first line of defence to deal with gangsterism. In terms of 
dealing with organised crime, a more structured approach is necessary, based on the POCA 
(Key informant group discussion, respondent O).  
 
As mentioned earlier, under the banner of the City of Cape Town Metro Police, a number of 
specialised units have been created to deal with gangsterism and organised crime in 
particular, that will execute, amongst other things, raids on alleged drug houses. Although 
CPFs were not a prominent topic during interviews with members of the community, this 
structure is in place in Manenberg. Two respondents, of which one was a local councillor, 
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reported that the CPFs are successful in combating crime and improving security in 
Manenberg (Key informant interview, respondent I; Key informant interview, respondent E). 
However, it seemed that the biggest obstacle was, again, the lack of continuity between the 
local government and other structures, such as Proudly Manenberg, erected in the 
community, with the purpose of providing security. Members of the security sector of 
Proudly Manenberg patrol specific areas in the morning from 06:00 – 10:00 and in the 
evening from 19:00 – 23:00 in groups of 12 – 14 people. Sometimes they will try to solve a 
problem on their own; if this does not work, they will call the Manenberg police (Community 
small group discussion 2). Thus, Proudly Manenberg has created a separate security initiative 
and although the organisation is not working against the police, there is no proper working 
relationship between the organisation and the local police. This is clear from the following 
statement by the local councillor:  
 
„…Actually here are neighbourhood watches that patrol over this area and I must 
say, from this side…no crime. Proudly Manenberg now has its own policing, but they 
don‟t pay their people. They phoned me today, they want to have a meeting with me 
because Proudly Manenberg has not paid them and I can do nothing about that. I did 
not tell them to work for Proudly Manenberg...‟ (Key informant interview: 
respondent E, 2010).  
 
Despite the difficulty of ensuring security in Manenberg, the majority of respondents stated 
that there is no immediate presence of vigilante groups in the community. During the 
community small group discussions, the respondents were aware of the group People Against 
Gansterism and Drugs (PAGAD), but said that it is not operational in Manenberg, if the 
organisation is still operational at all (Community small group discussion 1; Community 
small group discussion 2; Community small group discussion 3). Similarly, a local police 
officer from Manenberg stated that there was no presence of informal courts or „kangaroo‟ 
courts in Manenberg. This is reportedly limited to the black communities (Key informant 
interview, respondent A). The lack of vigilante activity, despite the community‟s negative 
feelings towards both gangsterism and law enforcement agents, can be attributed to both the 
earlier mentioned mutually dependent relationship between gangs and the community, as well 
as to community apathy. This is clear from the following two statements in response to the 
question if vigilante groups are still active and if there is a feeling in the community to stand 
up against gangsterism: 
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„…No. I don‟t think so…‟ (Community small group discussion 1, respondent 2).  
„…Because some of them (the community) is with them (the gangsters) and some of 
them (the community) is against them (the gangsters). But the most of them (the 
community) is with them (the gangsters)…‟ (Community small group discussion 1, 
respondent 1).    
„…For me it has been the other extreme. People just not caring. Every time 
something terrible happens people say this has to stop. They don‟t want to see it 
anymore, but there is never any real effort made or any project that‟s aimed at this 
because people simply are too scared...‟ (Key informant interview, respondent C).  
6.3.3.3 Summary  
The final indicator of social control by the state is legitimacy. Legitimacy has been 
conceptualised as the voluntary acceptance and approval of state authority, by citizens. Thus, 
citizens accept the state‟s right to rule. Legitimacy further translates to an un-coerced 
acceptance of all the systems of the state by the citizens. Once legitimacy is established, then 
compliance will follow. Based on the analysis of the case study, it is clear that there is a not 
high level of state legitimacy. As mentioned, the function of local government in the 
community is not clear, and even the leader of the most prominent community organisation 
(Proudly Manenberg) views the local government as ineffective and working against the 
community. That does not, however, eliminate the need to create a stronger relationship with 
local government, with specific reference to community organisations. Although the 
respondents had knowledge of a vigilante group, the need and importance of such 
organisations is not viewed as high, indicating that there is some level of legitimacy in the 
state. However, the most alarming aspect is the level of distrust in law enforcement agents, 
which also relates to the role of local government in security provision. Despite numerous 
efforts, it is evident from the interviews that local agents of governance are not the primary 
security provider, nor is security ensured by the local government in Manenberg. Instead, 
security in Manenberg is enforced by informal structures, erected and maintained by the 
gangs, but rivalry between these groups also destabilises the security situation, as there are 
regular incidents of armed violence between gangs. This is exacerbated by the readily 
availability of firearms. Last, schools have a very high drop-out rate, which does not 
necessarily indicate a problem in the school system, but rather relates back to the very high 
levels of youth involvement in gangs, as a result of the lack of opportunities after the 
completion of a senior certificate.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
189 
 
 
6.4 The Criminalisation of the State  
The following section will apply the framework for the analysis of the criminalisation of the 
state, developed in section 3.7 of chapter three. The indicators of the criminalisation of the 
state will be used in order to measure the level of criminalisation of the state, at the local 
level, with specific reference to the City of Cape Town. The site of the research remains 
Manenberg and the citizens‟ perceptions of and actions towards the City of Cape Town. As 
the primary data has already been analysed in the previous part of this chapter, the following 
section will only summarise the relevant data, based on each indicator of the criminalisation 
of the state.  
 
6.4.1 Use of Organs of the State to Accumulate Wealth 
This indicator was operationalised as: The state at the local level uses organs of the state, 
with reference to the security sector, in order to accumulate wealth. In the data collected, this 
indicator was only observed in the case of individual corrupt law enforcement officials. More 
specifically, it was clear from testimonies by members of the community and reformed gang 
members, that police officials have engaged in activities normally associated with criminal 
organisations for the main purpose of gathering money. However, this was limited to specific 
individuals and was not observed to be common in the other institutions of the state, for 
example the office of the mayor and the mayoral committee of the City of Cape Town. It was 
limited to the security sector of the state. Accordingly, in the City of Cape Town this criminal 
behaviour by individuals has not resulted in the state as an entity to become a criminal 
enterprise. As noted in chapter four, the City of Cape Town received a clean audit for 
2009/10 and a double Aa2 credit rating from Moody‟s.  
 
6.4.2 Clandestine Structures of Power  
Clandestine structures of power refer to the presence of underground structures of power on 
local level that control local state institutions and rival state structures. What the research 
confirmed, was that there are clandestine structures of power in the form of organised 
criminal groups that operate in the City of Cape Town. However, these structures of power 
(the criminal community) are not in control of local state institutions. This also confirms the 
hypothesis that the criminal community functions in a parallel system, to that of the legal 
state. When local agents of governance were interviewed, it was clear that local state 
institutions of the City of Cape Town were not under control of criminal gangs, and that it 
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was only individual agents of the state that functioned in the illegal economy.  
 
6.4.3 Illegal Activities Impacting Structure and Functions of the Local Community   
With regard to illegal activities, this indicator is operationalised as follows: Illegal activities 
have an important impact on the structure and the way the local community functions. The 
analysis of the primary data confirmed the presence of this indicator in Manenberg, on the 
Cape Flats. Illegal activities, with specific reference to the drug trade, illegal trade in alcohol 
and firearms and prostitution, occur daily. The location of houses were drugs are sold, were 
also know to members of the community. Illegal firearms were also found to be readily 
available on the Cape Flats. More importantly, the illegal trade in drugs and alcohol where 
confirmed to provide an income to many households. Members of the community also 
benefitted from the goods and money provided by the criminal community. The idea of a 
criminal economy in Manenberg, on the Cape Flats was accordingly confirmed and also the 
impact that it has on the structure and the way the local community functions: Segments of 
the community of Manenberg depends on the criminal economy.  
 
6.4.4 Acceptance of the Presence and Activities of Organised Criminal Groups  
According to this indicator, the state at local government level accepts the presence and 
activities of organised criminal groups in the local community. As described, the City of 
Cape Town has implemented several security operations in order to deal with organised 
criminal activities. The success of these operations is not important in this discussion, but 
rather that there are on-going efforts to address gang activity on the Cape Flats, and in the rest 
of the City. This is, however, contradicted by the fact that state officials have in the past 
negotiated with gang members in order to establish peace deals. This indicates that the 
authority of criminal gangs is acknowledged by local government officials. Nevertheless, as a 
result of the on-going combatting efforts, it cannot be said that the state at the level of local 
government accepts the presence of organised criminal groups, and accordingly there is only 
minimal presence of this indicator.  
 
6.4.5 Acknowledgement of the Benefits of Organised Criminal Activity  
This indicator focuses on the acknowledgment by the state at local government level that 
organised criminal activity benefits the local economy, society and agents of the state, and as 
a result, organised criminal groups are protected. This indicator is more complex than the 
previous indicator of acceptance, in that the benefits of criminal activities are acknowledged 
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by agents of the state. While conducting this research, it was found that agents of the state are 
aware that the criminal community provides the social community with goods and services. It 
was also acknowledged that there is a criminal economy in Manenberg, on the Cape Flats, in 
which many members of the community participate. However, if the on-going efforts to 
eradicate criminal operations are taken into account, it cannot be said that the local 
government acknowledge that there are benefits, from criminal activities, for the society or 
the local community. In addition, the only benefits that were confirmed were those for 
individual state officials that have corrupt relationships with gangs.  
 
6.4.6 Symbiotic Relationship between Local Government and Organised Criminal Groups  
Mutually dependent relationships refer to the mutually dependent relationship between the 
state, at local government level, and organised criminal groups. Similar to the indicator of 
accumulation of wealth, a mutually dependent relationship exists between individual local 
state agents and the criminal community. This can be confirmed with specific reference to 
members of the police, having corrupt relations with gangs and individuals working at local 
courts. In the last mentioned case, the research indicated that files from cases against alleged 
criminals have been lost in the past and, as a result, the cases cannot be trialled in court. 
However, it only relates to particular individuals and, as a result, the presence of this 
indicator is limited to only the security sector of the state.  
 
6.4.7 Provision of Safe Haven for Organised Crime  
This indicator of the criminalisation of the state refers to a situation where the state at local 
government level provides a safe haven for organised crime and combatting efforts are 
limited. This research found that, although members of the community have in the past 
provided a safe haven for organised crime, the same cannot be said for the state at the local 
level. In addition, several combatting efforts have been highlighted throughout this study, 
which extends to combined efforts between the Metro Police and the SAPS geared at 
contending organised criminal groups. The presence of this indicator is minimal to none.  
 
6.4.8 Local Environment as Market for Organised Crime  
According to this indicator, the local environment (Manenberg) acts as a market for organised 
crime. The analysis of the data, confirmed that this indicator of the criminalisation of the state 
is present in Manenberg. The community of Manenberg on the Cape Flats, but also in the 
City of Cape Town are the consumers of the drugs traded by the gangs. The gangs have 
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managed to establish links with international crime syndicates and this has provided them 
with the opportunity to expand their activities and the commodities that they trade in. Not 
only does the community of Manenberg consume the drugs traded by the gangs, but segments 
of the community also function as actors in the illicit economy, as they are employed by drug 
traders in return for either drugs or clothes and food.  
 
6.5.9 Ease of Illegal Operations  
The indicator, ease of illegal operations, refers to the weak local capacity of the state at local 
government level and how this contributes to the ease of illegal operations. It was clear from 
the data analysis that the gangs on the Cape Flats have a level of operational ease. This was 
confirmed by the fact that members of the community were aware of where criminal 
activities take place. Respondents from the police were also aware of who the most 
prominent gangsters were and where they stay. However, through security operations by the 
SAPS and the Metro Police, the ease of illegal operations is continuously hampered. These 
efforts are continuous and constantly expanded, reflecting back to the point of the acceptance 
of the presence of organised criminal activity. The presence is not accepted by the local state 
and the operational ease of criminal groups is continuously obstructed by security services.  
 
6.4.10 Assistance in Activities of Organised Criminal Groups  
Assistance in activities refers to a situation where local government assists organised criminal 
groups to advance their activities. As mentioned with the indicator of the accumulation of 
wealth, the research found that assistance to organised criminal groups was only executed in 
the form of corrupt officials. This ranged from corrupt officials losing files and dockets, to 
policemen confiscating drugs and weapons, but returning them, to warnings about potential 
raids. This was done in return for money, and such security officials were regarded to be on 
the payroll of gangsters. No assistance of activities was found with regard to the process of 
making legislation or policy, indicating that it is limited to the individual officials of the state. 
Although there are indications that local state agents assist organised criminal groups in their 
activities, it is limited to individuals operating in the security sector of the state.  
 
6.4.11 Ineffective Criminal Justice System  
An ineffective criminal justice system on local level results in operational ease for organised 
criminal groups, facilitating the criminalisation of the state. From the research conducted for 
this study, it was confirmed that corrupt dealings between prison warders and gang members 
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have occurred in the past. In addition, although the prison system should rehabilitate 
prisoners, it rather acts as an opportunity for individuals to be recruited into a gang. It also 
emerged that illegal activities, such as dealing in drugs, have occurred in prisons. Coupled 
with state security agents acting fraudulently, it points towards ineffectiveness in the criminal 
justice system. This was further confirmed by a lack of trust in the criminal justice system by 
members of the community of Manenberg.  
 
6.4.12 Citizens Operating in the Illegal Economy  
This indicator is operationalised as citizens operating in the illegal economy, as a result of the 
lack of provision of political goods by the state at local government level. As mentioned with 
the indicator of illegal activities, there is a strong criminal economy present in Manenberg. In 
addition, it has also been mentioned that members of the community function in the illegal 
economy. This is a direct result of a lack of capacity by the government to provide political 
goods, with specific reference to security and development. As a result of a lack of 
development in Manenberg, there are little employment opportunities and the school system 
is neglected and has limited facilities. This has brought about the notion that individuals in 
the community will be forced to participate in the illegal economy. The criminal community 
has in the past provided funding for development. In addition, the criminal community has 
claimed to provide security in the area under their control. This is, however, insignificant, as 
the same groups also facilitate insecurity, as a result of wars between rival gangs. This 
indicator of the criminalisation of the state is to a large extent present in Manenberg.  
 
6.4.13 Organised Criminal Groups as Business Regulators  
With regards to business regulation, organised criminal groups act as the business regulators 
in the local community. The analysis confirmed the presence of this indicator. Through 
controlling specific territories or turfs, organised criminal groups in Manenberg have 
managed to erect tax systems for business such as the taxi industry and illegal stores where 
alcohol is sold. Respondents confirmed that money needs to be paid to gangs to ensure 
security, even if it is only superficial, but also so that the business can operate in the area 
under control of a gang.  
 
6.4.14 Relationships between Organised Criminal Groups and Citizens  
This indicator refers to a situation where relationships with organised criminal groups are 
more important to citizens, than loyalty to the state at local government level. The analysis of 
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the data confirmed that this indicator is to a large extent present in Manenberg on the Cape 
Flats. Although, it is through fear and intimidation that the gangs on the Cape Flats have 
secured loyalty from the community, by controlling areas and setting up tax systems. 
Accordingly, gangs do not necessarily have legitimacy; loyalty to them is based on coercion. 
In addition, the fact that members of the community did not see the value of the local 
councillors and local elections, confirms that there is limited loyalty to the state at the level of 
local government. As mentioned, the criminal community has absorbed some of the loyalty 
from the civic community, but there is also loyalty to friends and family, and civic 
organisations.  
 
6.4.15 Influencing Electoral Outcomes  
The last indicator of the criminalisation of the state is operationalised as: Organised criminal 
groups have the ability to influence local electoral outcomes. From the research conducted for 
this study, the interest and activities of organised criminal groups in local elections could not 
be confirmed. It was stated that this may have been the case in the past, but that there is no 
current need from the side of the criminal community to influence electoral outcome. 
Accordingly, this indicator goes beyond voting, and rather to the opportunity to influence 
electoral outcome, through funding. This confirms a very important finding: The criminal 
community operates in a structure parallel to that of the legal system, with no need to 
dominate structures of the state. Their interest is not the acquisition of political power, or to 
influence legislation and policy, but only operational ease. Although the social community 
did not see the value of elections or local government agents, there were no traces of 
incorrect voters‟ rolls, stuffing of ballot boxes or corrupt electoral officials, confirming that 
the presence of this indicator of the criminalisation of the state is minimal to none.  
 
6.5 Analysis  
The above description of social control and the presence of organised crime in Manenberg 
confirm a number of theoretical propositions, as provided in chapter three of this study. First, 
the state at the local level is weakened. It was observed in the site of Manenberg that the state 
has difficulty to provide political goods to citizens and therefore it has limited ability to have 
full control over its entire territory. In addition, lack of security is an indicator of state 
weakness and in Manenberg on the Cape Flats, the City of Cape Town has difficulty 
providing security. Furthermore, state weakness can also be noticed when the state is not 
regarded as legitimate by groups of the population (Mentan, 2004) as is the case with some of 
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the communities on the Cape Flats. Traces of other elements of state weakness, such as a lack 
of business regulation and an ineffective criminal justice system (Williams, 2002) have also 
been identified at the research site. The City of Cape Town in the site of Manenberg exhibits 
indicators of state weakness. As a result, there has been the opening of capacity gaps and 
functional holes (Williams, 2002), that are utilised by a non-state actor, the gangs on the Cape 
Flats, for their own benefit. However, the state is regarded as weakened and not weak, as 
there is no general absence of the rule of law, nor are there extremely high levels of 
corruption, and it is evident from the interviews that there is a genuine desire for a legitimate 
state on behalf of the community. Moreover, while there is no lack of a legitimate 
government in the City of Cape Town (in fact, the City has received excellent credit and 
service delivery reviews) there are however, gaps in the capacity of the state at the level of 
local government. This has facilitated a breakdown in state-society relations and a decline in 
the levels of social control by the state.  
 
As social control by the state has deteriorated, a weblike society came into existence, similar 
to what was described in section 2.6 of chapter two, when Migdal‟s (1988) explanation of 
weblike societies was analysed. On the Cape Flats, several systems of rule operate at the 
same time. The social control is scattered between the state at the level of local government 
and the gangs operating on the Cape Flats. Migdal (1988) describes weblike societies in that 
they operate around strongmen, who usually attempt to facilitate the disintegration of social 
control, by dominating aspects of the state. Here, a difference is observed between the 
situation on the Cape Flats and Migdal‟s (1988) description: Although there were gang 
bosses on the Cape Flats that may have acted as strongmen in the past, this power 
configuration has been in decline; and now, an important actor in the weblike society on the 
Cape Flats is rather the gangs themselves, as a collective, and not the individual leaders. 
Thus, there is a criminal community that operates as a rival actor to that of the state at the 
local level, imposing different survival strategies. The survival strategies that the criminal 
community provide are not reconcilable with those of the state. The state at local government 
level faces opposition from the criminal community for the control of the territory of 
Manenberg on the Cape Flats. In addition, the authority of the criminal community in 
Manenberg is however not based on legitimacy, but coercion.  
 
As mentioned, Migdal (1998) states that in a weblike society there may be a triangle of 
accommodation, involving three actors: State officials, implementers and strongmen. State 
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officials will formulate policy at the national level, the implementers will oversee policy 
execution on the local level and strongmen will control local territories. However, the 
implementers may become involved in bargaining relationships with strongmen and with 
other implementers and other state and political officials. Accordingly, collusion between 
local bureaucrats and strongmen will occur. The result may be that mutually profitable 
agreements will be arranged between the actors, and that the strongmen will succeed in 
creating numerous sets of rules for social control. In this context, strongmen have a high 
ability to mediate demands and control local residents. Similar to strongmen, the criminal 
community on the Cape Flats has the ability to control local residents, by establishing 
different sets of rules for social control. Despite this similarity, there are a number of other 
differences in the weblike society on the Cape Flats, and the one as described by Migdal 
(1988).  
 
In Migdal‟s triangle of accommodation (1988), the implementers represent the state on a 
local level. Furthermore, the state is represented by two sets of actors; the implementers and 
state officials, last-mentioned which are located at the apex of the triangle. However, as this 
study focuses only on the local level, the important actor in the weblike society on the Cape 
Flats is agents of governance that function on a local level. This category will include both 
implementers and state officials. Based on the analysis of the case for this study (as in the 
example of strongmen and implementers) there is limited collaboration between the state and 
the criminal community. To explain: This study is not suggesting that all components of local 
governance are in a collaborative relationship with the criminal community in Manenberg; 
however, such arrangements exist. This was confirmed several times during the analysis of 
the data; in for example, corrupt dealings with law enforcement officials and gangs and the 
negotiations between government officials and gangs in order to establish peace deals. 
Similar to Migdal‟s (1988) triangle of accommodation, the collaboration between the 
criminal community and local agents of governance holds benefits for both actors. However, 
in accordance with the nature of other organised criminal groups as described in chapter 
three, it is not the aim of the criminal community on the Cape Flats to take over the local 
government. Their aim is only to be able to manipulate structures of the state (most 
noticeably the police: SAPS and Metro Police), in such a way that it will further the ease of 
their operations. The criminal community is not in direct competition with the state; rather it 
functions parallel to the state.  
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It is clear from the analysis of state-society relations in Manenberg on the Cape Flats, that 
there is the presence of a weblike society. Thus far, the criminal community and local agents 
of governance have been identified as two actors in the weblike society. Although Migdal‟s 
(1988) analysis of weak states and strong societies takes place in the framework of state-
society relations, the society in his triangle of accommodation is only represented by the 
strongmen, functioning as part of the society. The society (or community) is not regarded as 
an actor on its own. Through the research conducted for this study and the analysis of the 
data, the community emerged as an important actor in the weblike society in Manenberg. 
Thus, the social community is highlighted as a third actor. As with the relationship between 
local agents of governance and the criminal community, parts of the social community 
collaborate with both the criminal community and the state on the local level. In the first 
collaborative relationship, this research has shown that the social community cooperates with 
the criminal community in several ways. Most importantly, there is a reliance on the criminal 
community to provide development and basic goods and services. In turn, the social 
community tolerates criminal operations and in some cases, it even promotes it, in order to 
obtain the benefits of the criminal acts. Thus, in this weblike society, the survival strategies 
proposed by the criminal community are followed. Second, the social community still views 
the state as necessary, as there are levels of participation in the local government, with 
specific reference to participation in elections and the working relationship (and increased 
need for a closer relationship) between the majority of community organisations and local 
agents of governance. In turn, the state continues to maintain a level of legitimacy. The 
relationships of collaboration between local agents of governance, the criminal community 
and the social community found in the weblike society in Manenberg on the Cape Flats, are 
described as a system of local level power dynamics (See figure 6.1 below).  
 
What is clear from the above explanation is that, in the system of local level power dynamics, 
different configurations of power exist. However, what is also important to note is that these 
configurations of power have the potential to change, as the position of the actors in the 
system may change. The actor that occupies the apex of the triangle will be in the position of 
power. The power dynamics in the triangle will shift and change, based on a specific 
situation. For example, in the case of bribery and corruption between gangs and police, the 
criminal community will be in the position of power. This will also be the case in situations 
where the gangs succeed in providing goods and services to members of the community. 
During elections and when operations are launched and executed, in order to address 
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organised criminal activity, local agents of governance will occupy the position at the apex of 
the pyramid. Where the social community is successful in executing tasks in the context of 
community organisations, it will be in the position of power. This research indicates that all 
of these situations do play out regularly in Manenberg, and it occurs in the system of local 
power dynamics. However, all three actors are not jointly engaged in actions. Thus, only two 
parties function in a mutually dependent relationship, and as such the connections are 
explained as dyadic.  
 
 
Migdal (1988) noted on the triangle of accommodation, that once it is in place, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible for the state to turn the situation around and prevent further social 
fragmentation. Similarly, as this system of local power dynamics is present in Manenberg, it 
will be very challenging for the state to break the system down, as a result of the various 
dyadic relationships between the actors. This relates back to what Chabal and Daloz (1999) 
described as the political instrumentalisation of disorder. The authors postulate that, as a 
result, of ineffective institutions and corruption, there is a unique development pattern for 
Africa that works. Although this cannot be directly applied on the Cape Flats, a system of 
disorder is in place. This system of local level power dynamics carries benefits for all three 
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actors involved, but as mentioned, the power dynamics can change with implications for each 
actor: For example, the criminalisation of the state.  
 
In chapter three, the criminalisation of the state was discussed with specific reference to 
states in Africa. Several points where highlighted, for example, that politics in Africa is 
becoming markedly interconnected with crime (Bayart et al, 1999). The criminalisation of the 
state was also discussed in the context of shadow states (Reno, 2000), de jure and de facto 
states (Jackson and Rosberg, 1986), political instrumentalisation of disorder (Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999) and kleptocracies (Bayart et al, 1999). A framework was also developed to 
analyse the extent of the criminalisation of the state, and applied on the site of Manenberg in 
the City of Cape Town, in this chapter. The main findings are as follows: Although some of 
the indicators of the criminalisation of the state can be observed in Manenberg, it cannot be 
said that the state is in the process of becoming a criminal state. Where the indicators of 
criminalisation were observed, it was only related to the criminal economy in Manenberg on 
the Cape Flats and corrupt officials, operating mostly in the security sector. Accordingly, 
criminalisation does not extend to all the institutional levels of the state and is not present in 
the legislative and policy processes of the state. Although there are visible symptoms of the 
criminalisation of the state, the state at the local level in the City of Cape Town is not 
increasingly being criminalised by the presence of organised criminal groups. The criminal 
activities in Manenberg have not resulted in the entire City of Cape Town to be considered 
criminalised. Rather, what can be observed is that, there is an established illegal economy in 
place in Manenberg, based on the trade in illegal goods and the provision of illegal goods to 
the social community. This occurs outside of the scope of the local state, and instead of the 
activities of organised criminal groups resulting in the criminalisation of the state, there has 
been the statification of the organised criminal community. Accordingly, organised criminal 
groups fulfil functions of the state, as a result of weakened capacity of the state, in order to 
control a society. To conclude the analysis; in Manenberg there is the statification of the 
organised criminal community, where the gangs fulfil some of the functions of the state, but 
the authority of the gangs is not based on legitimacy and the public good, but instead it is 
based on coercion and the desire to control segments of the state for its own benefit. The 
statification of the organised criminal community is alarming, as the expected outcomes for 
organised criminal groups is personal gain and not public gain. Consequently, these functions 
should be fulfilled by the state and not non-state actors.  
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6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter analysed the primary data collected for this study, during the fieldwork process. 
The data was analysed according to the indicators of social control, as identified by Migdal 
(1988): Compliance, participation and legitimacy. In addition, the framework to analyse the 
criminalisation of the state at the level of local government was applied on the case study, 
with Manenberg as the site of the research. The main aim of this chapter was to answer the 
research questions, as posed throughout this study. With regards to the first supportive 
question, this chapter described the power dynamics between local governance, criminal 
agents and society. It was found that these three actors function in a system of local level 
power dynamics, with dyadic collaboration between the actors. Furthermore, it was also 
found that the configurations of power between the criminal society, social community and 
local agents of governance have the potential to change, as the position of the actors in the 
system may change. This indicates a difference to the triangle of accommodation, as 
explained by Migdal (1988) and as a result demonstrates that another system is in place in 
Manenberg on the Cape Flats.  
 
With regards to the second supportive research question, it was explained that one of the 
possible impacts of organised crime on the state, is the criminalisation of the state. This 
research question accordingly assesses to what extent the state has been criminalised, as a 
result of the activities of organised criminal groups. This study found that, although there are 
symptoms of criminalisation present at the site of Manenberg, this is limited and accordingly, 
does not point towards the criminalisation of the state. Rather, what has occurred is the 
statificaion of organised crime. This was described as where the criminal community fulfils 
functions of the state, operating parallel to the state.  
 
The following chapter will conclude this study. The chapter will review the research process 
and pose the main research questions and lay out the main findings of this study. Last, 
questions for future research on state-society relations will be posed.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
7.1 Introduction  
This study has provided new insight into state-society relations. More specifically, it provided 
insight into what impact a domestic non-state actor has on the authority and position of the 
state, but also the influence on the relationship between the state and the social community. 
In this final chapter the key aspects of this study are reviewed and the main contributions of 
the study are summarised. The chapter will begin by providing an overview of the research 
process and a summary of each of the chapters. The following section will review the 
research questions, providing a description of the insights gained from the analysis of the 
data. The last section of this chapter will provide themes for future research on state-society 
relations, building on the theoretical foundation provided by this study.  
 
7.2 The Research Process 
The first chapter provided an introduction to this study and an overview of the research 
process. The problem statement that was provided focused on the influence of a local non-
state actor on the role and authority of the state, in the domestic environment. It was 
explained that the research problem of this study will centre on the impact of a domestic actor 
on the association between the state and the society. The chapter further explained that the 
focus of the study will only be the state at the local level and the impact of one specific actor, 
organised criminal groups. Accordingly, the chapter clarified that state-society relations will 
be discussed in this context. The main and two supportive research questions were stated as 
follows: What is the impact of organised crime on the social control by the state? What are 
the power dynamics between local governance, criminal agents and society? Has the state 
become criminalised at the level of local government, as a result of the activities of organised 
crime, and if so, to what extent? It was explained that the contribution of this study is to 
expand on research done on the influence of organised crime on state-society relations and 
more specifically, the influence of this local non-state actor on the domestic authority of the 
state. Theoretical points of departure and a literature overview were also provided and the 
work of Migdal (1988) was highlighted as the main theoretical framework of this study. The 
research design, a single case study, and research process were explained. It was made clear 
that the dependent variable is the state and the independent variable, organised criminal 
groups. Furthermore, the level of analysis was set as the state at the local level and the units 
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of analysis demarcated as actors of local governance functioning in the geographical 
jurisdiction of the City of Cape Town (with a specific focus on the security sector), the 
community and organised criminal groups. It was clarified that the research will 
predominantly be done in a qualitative framework, using key informant interviews and focus 
groups. The chapter also established that the main limitation of the study was doing research 
on criminal groups, as the nature of such groups has an impact on the research ethics and 
research process. As was explained in chapter five, this limitation was overcome by 
employing a triangulation of research methods, in order to identify similar themes using 
different methods of research. Strict ethical guidelines were also set out at the beginning of 
the study, which were followed throughout the fieldwork process. Last, an outline of the 
remainder of this study was provided.  
 
In chapter two, the research process of this study was explained, including the research 
design. It was clarified why a case study research design was deemed the most applicable, in 
order to research the impact of organised crime on local governance and state-society 
relations. A case study research design created the opportunity to describe the context in 
detail and to connect the micro level of analysis to the macro level; thus, it provided insight 
that enabled the researcher to expand/build theory. The selection of the City of Cape Town 
and Manenberg as the site of the research, was also justified. The City of Cape Town was 
selected as the case study, due to the large presence of organised criminal groups. More 
specifically, there are significant and continuous gang activities in the area known as the 
Cape Flats. On the Cape Flats, Manenberg was selected as the site for the research, as there is 
an omnipresence of gangs in the area, but at the time of doing the field work, the community 
experienced a period of relative calm with regards to gang wars. The field research process 
was reviewed, together with the ethical guidelines that were followed during the research 
process. The chapter concluded with comments on basic safety while doing fieldwork on 
sensitive topics.  
 
The third chapter provided the theoretical foundation of this study, based on state-society 
relations. Four classical theories of the state were described and it was argued that this study 
will follow a neo-pluralist view of the state. The chapter provided a summary of definitions 
of the state, ending with a conceptual clarification of how the concept will be used in this 
study. An overview was provided of the process of state decay, with the most important 
element being that a gap in the abilities of the state will leave a vacuum of authority, which 
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may be filled by non-state actors. The following two sections focused on state-society 
relations, with specific reference to the work of Migdal (1988) and his analysis of state social 
control, pyramidal and weblike societies. The last section of the chapter focused on the 
criminalisation of the state, which is regarded as a possible result of the impact of organised 
crime on the state. In order to analyse the criminalisation of the state, a framework was 
constructed from four main avenues of empirical observation.  
 
Chapter four provided a contextualisation of organised crime. In the chapter it was found that 
there is a lack of a universally agreed upon definition for the concepts of organised criminal 
groups and organised criminal gangs and it was clarified that for the purposes of this study 
the difference is regarded as inconsequential. If was further noted that there has been a 
general increase in the international activities of organised criminal groups and this trend was 
also observed in South Africa, and also on the Cape Flats. The chapter contextualised the 
historical development of gangs on the Cape Flats. In the end the focus was on the on-going 
in gang-related violence in other areas of the Cape Flats, which proved to be a background 
for the discussion of the empirical data in chapter six.  
 
In chapter five, the context was provided for an analysis of local government in South Africa. 
The chapter started with a historical context of local government in the South African state, 
clarifying some of the underlying reasons for the formation of the Cape Flats and the gangs 
on the Cape Flats. In a detailed discussion, the demographical and operational features of the 
municipal area of the City of Cape Town were explained, with specific reference to safety 
and security elements: It was observed that the City of Cape Town provide mostly adequate 
public services and continues to improve the operational features of the City. The chapter 
concluded with an analysis of security services, and it was observed that the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) and the Metropolitan Police Service both have jurisdiction over the 
same area, but with different functions.  
 
In chapter six the case study was analysed, based on the theoretical foundation set out in the 
third chapter. The main aim of the sixth chapter was to answer the research questions by 
analysing the primary data collected during fieldwork. The data was analysed according to 
the indicators of social control (compliance, participation and legitimacy), as identified by 
Migdal (1988). In addition, the framework to analyse the criminalisation of the state at the 
level of local government was applied on the case study. Based on the analysis, a different 
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system, to what was described by Migdal (1988) in his narrative of a triangle of 
accommodation, is in operation in Manenberg. It was confirmed that there is the presence of 
a weakened state and accordingly a weblike society, where social control is fragmented 
between local government and the criminal community. However, in this weblike society a 
system of local power dynamics exists between the criminal community, social community 
and local agents of governance, where dyadic collaboration occurs between all three actors. 
However, despite the collaboration, the criminalisation of the state does not occur, but rather 
the statification of the organised criminal community, as it provides goods and service to the 
social community. These findings will be further explained in the following section.  
 
7.3 The Research Questions and Main Findings 
This study did not attempt to question the importance of the state in a legitimate world order. 
It was acknowledged in the first chapter that the state is regarded as the most essential 
institution in the global and domestic sphere. Rather, this study set out to research the 
influence of one specific actor on the state. In addition, the impact of this actor was only 
researched on a local level and limited to only the interactions between selected state 
institutions and societal groups; accordingly in the context of state-society relations. The 
domestic actor was identified as organised criminal groups. Consequently, the main research 
question was posed as: What is the impact of organised crime on the social control by the 
state? As noted in the first chapter, the aim of this study was also not to investigate why 
states weaken. This was already confirmed by literature on state decay, as explained in 
chapter two. Rather, the aim was to assess the influence of an actor, detached from the state, 
on the association between the state and the society.  
 
In order to assist in answering the main research question, the first supportive research 
question set out to research the dynamics between the governance by the state, the position of 
the social community, criminal control and criminal authority. The question asked: What are 
the power dynamics between local governance, criminal agents and society?  
 
The second supportive research question was also proposed to contribute to the answering of 
the main research question. It was hypothesised that one possible impact of organised crime 
on the state is the criminalisation of the state. This hypothesis was accordingly tested in this 
study, by posing the second supportive research question: Has the state become criminalised 
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at the level of local government, as a result of the activities of organised crime, and if so, to 
what extent? 
 
In order to answer the research questions, state social control was analysed by using the 
indicators of social control set out by Migdal (1988). It was found that with regards to the 
first indicator, compliance (for a state to demand compliance the citizens should readily yield 
to the rules of the state) is divided between the state and organised criminal groups. This 
finding was based on gangs operating informal tax systems, and the gangs that are viewed as 
the security regulators and benevolent dictators. In addition, law enforcement was viewed as 
generally inefficient, by the social community, but the relevance of such structures was still 
acknowledged.  
 
When the second indicator, participation (the key factor is that the state should be able to 
mobilise citizens to „repeated voluntary‟ participation in the different institutional sectors of 
the state) was analysed, it was found that participation does occur; however, it is limited and 
if it occurs, the value of it is not clear. This was predominantly a result of the presence of 
informal structures of authority, established and maintained by gangs. Another important 
finding was that no link between gangs and local politicians could be established. In addition, 
a mostly positive relationship between agents of local governance and community groups was 
expressed, and the social community actively participates in community initiatives.  
 
Legitimacy (defined as citizens accepting and approving the rule of the state, thus citizens 
trusting all the aspects of the state and viewing it as worthy) was the final indicator of social 
control analysed, and it was confirmed that there is not a high level of state legitimacy. This 
finding was based on a poor understanding of the function of local government by the social 
community, distrust in law enforcement agents and that security is enforced by informal 
structures, erected and maintained by the gangs. Despite this, the social community expressed 
the need to create a stronger relationship with local government and the significance of local 
government is recognised.  
 
When these findings were applied on Migdal‟s (1988) theoretical propositions on state-
society relations, a number of similarities were confirmed. It was confirmed that the City of 
Cape Town is weakened in its social capabilities (but not weak), as it has difficulty to 
penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and use resources 
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appropriately, in Manenberg, on the Cape Flats. As a result of the weakened state, there is 
restricted social control by the state and the social control is split between the state and rival 
social organisations, most noticeably organised criminal groups in Manenberg. Due to the 
fragmented social control, a weblike society exists in Manenberg. The social community is 
still governed by the state, but it is not centralised governance. The systems of rule of the 
gangs operate at the same time as the systems of rule prescribed by the state at the local level. 
In Migdal‟s (1988) explanation of weblike societies, triangles of accommodation exist with 
three actors: State officials at the apex of the triangle and local strongmen and state 
implementers at the basis of the triangle.  
 
Despite the fact that these similarities with Migdal‟s (1988) theoretical propositions were 
confirmed after the analysis of the case, noteworthy variances were also observed. First, it 
was found that, although strongmen had previously functioned as an important actor on the 
Cape Flats, this is not the current situation. Rather, the criminal community as a collective 
has emerged as a significant role-player. Segments of the social community in Manenberg are 
not anchored around strongmen, but rather the criminal community as a whole. Second, when 
state-society relations are researched, the importance of the social community as an actor 
needs to be acknowledged. In Migdal‟s (1988) triangle of accommodation, the society is only 
represented through strongmen. This study proposes that the recognition of the social 
community as an actor is essential when researching state-society relations. The last actor is 
local agents of governance, and collaborative actions take place between all the three actors 
in a system, where the position of authority is dynamic and can change. This is another 
difference to what is described in Migdal‟s (1988) triangle of accommodation. Consequently, 
the first core finding of this study is that: In Manenberg, a system of local power dynamics is 
in place. This analytical framework clarifies the associations between the state at the local 
level, the criminal community and the social community. Additionally, the analytical 
framework indicates a gap in the current literature on state-society relations. This is noticed 
with specific reference to the presence of a domestic non-state actor. Accordingly, the 
analytical framework is a contribution to theories on state-society relations in that it indicates 
differences to what is described by Migdal (1988) and the explanation of a triangle of 
accommodation.  
 
The second core finding of this study came from the application of the framework for the 
analysis of the criminalisation of the state. When the framework was applied, two factors 
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were confirmed. First, there is a well-established criminal economy in Manenberg. The 
criminal economy is based on gangs employing members of the community, gangs investing 
in the community and gangs providing goods to the community. In addition, the local 
environment acts as a market for organised crime. Second, the criminalisation of the state 
only extends to the level of corrupt individuals operating in the security sector of the state. 
Consequently, the state has not been criminalised to a great extent and only symptoms of 
criminalisation were observed. Criminalisation is not spread throughout all the sectors of the 
state and was not noticed as significant, with the exception of corrupt agents of the state. This 
was also confirmed in chapter five, when it was stated that in 2011 the City of Cape Town 
was one of only seven municipalities in South Africa to have received a clean audit for 
2009/10, and the only metro to achieve a clean audit. This is the situation, despite the 
substantial presence of organised criminal groups. Therefore, if the state at the site of the 
research (Mannenebrg) is not significantly criminalised as a result of the activities of 
organised criminal groups, what is the impact then? Rather than the criminalisation of the 
state, the presence of organised crime has led to the statification of the organised criminal 
community. This has created a situation, where organised criminal groups take on 
characteristics of the state, such as the provision of political goods, most noticeably security 
and economic well-being. The statification of the organised criminal community takes place 
despite constant efforts by the state to eradicate and eliminate organised criminal activity. An 
explanation for this is that organised crime functions in a system parallel to the legal 
structures and is embedded in the social community. The case study analysis further confirms 
that the criminal community has little need to overtake the authority of the state and that the 
level of operational ease that exists is sufficient for the continuation of organised criminal 
activities.   
 
After this analysis, the research questions can be answered as follows: The impact of 
organised crime on the social control by the state has led to the manifestation of a system of 
local power dynamics, which will hamper the promotion of stronger state-society relations. In 
this system there are three actors: The criminal community, the social community and local 
agents of governance. Collaboration between all three actors exists, and the relationships of 
the actors are dynamic and the position of authority can change depending on the situation 
where it is applied. As this system is in place, it is proposed that the authority of the state will 
not necessarily further decline, as the collaboration that takes place accommodates the needs 
of the actors. This was confirmed by the fact that, the state at the local level has not been 
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noticeably criminalised as a result of the presence of organised criminal groups, but rather 
that there has been the statification of the organised criminal community. This concept is 
used to describe a situation where organised criminal groups fulfil some of the roles of the 
entity of the state; however, in a system parallel to the state. This has led to a distinctive 
description of organised crime, the state and society:  
 
If a state lacks extensive social control and a rival authority has claimed a level of 
social control, this will not necessarily lead to the further weakening of the state, 
as a result of a system of power dynamics in place, where collaboration between 
the social community, the criminal community and local agents of governance 
occurs. This system is kept in place by: On-going efforts by the state to maintain 
(or regain) compliance, participation and legitimacy; corrupt agents of the state 
(specifically in the security sector); a level of operational ease that exist for the 
criminal community (and the interweaving of the criminal community in the social 
community) and a relatively strong society that acknowledges the benefits of 
criminal activities for the social community, but also recognises the authority and 
control of the state.  
 
7.4 Recommendations for Future Research  
In the context of the delimitations of this study as set out in the first chapter, the following 
proposals for future research are made.  
 
One aspect that fell outside of the scope of this study was a longitudinal analysis of the 
system of local power dynamics in the City of Cape Town. As this study was a single case 
study, it provided a snapshot of state-society relations at a specific point in time, in a specific 
community. It is believed that research that can repeat the observations made in this study, 
between the criminal community, the social community and the local state over a longer 
period of time, can provide additional insight into the system of local power dynamics. As 
explained, the positions of the actors in the system may change, depending on the situation. 
In addition, it is anticipated that the methods by which collaboration between the actors takes 
place can also change over time. It is proposed that a longitudinal study will be able to trace 
the possible changes in the power dynamics between the actors. In addition, it will also track 
if the conceptualisations of the actors change and if, over a period of time, all the actors will 
be accommodated in the system or if new actors will enter the system.  
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Similarly, the statification of the organised criminal community only focused on an analysis 
of one point in time. As this was described as a process, it It is proposed that further research 
on monitoring the development of the statification of the organised criminal community over 
time, can provide valuable insight into the process of the statification of a domestic non-state 
actor.  
 
Second, as mentioned, this study was based on a single case study and the analytical 
framework of the system of local power dynamics emanated from observations from this one 
case. It is accordingly proposed that the analytical framework is applied on similar cases, in 
order to either confirm the findings of this study, or to supplement and expand the analytical 
framework. Cases for comparison need to have the same attributes as the case selected for 
this study: A system of local state governance and the presence of organised criminal 
elements. Furthermore, other important elements are: A weakened state or limitations on the 
capabilities of the state, and also fragmented social control by the state. Possible cases for 
comparison include Rio de Janeiro in Brazil and Nairobi in Kenya. Both of these cases have 
the presence of an organised criminal community that functions in the social community, 
imposing similar superficial security services, such as protection rackets and the taxing of 
local businesses, as is the case with the gangs on the Cape Flats.  
 
A last element that fell outside of the scope of this study is the political and social culture on 
the Cape Flats. What is clear is that there is a very specific and unique political and social 
culture on the Cape Flats based on, amongst other elements, perceptions of the society on the 
Cape Flats. This contextualisation warrants more understanding.  
 
7.5 Conclusion  
At the time of writing this final chapter, the Western Cape Provincial government, together 
with local and national stakeholders were engaging in dialogue on how to address 
gangsterism on the Cape Flats. It was not the purpose of this study to formulate 
recommendations on how to address gangsterism on the Cape Flats. The purpose was to 
describe, explain and explore how organised crime has influenced the state at the local level, 
referring only to the relationship between the state and the society. This was done through the 
development of an analytical framework, guided by theoretical propositions and based on the 
analysis of the primary data collected and the contextualisation of the City of Cape Town and 
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the gangs on the Cape Flats. This study only provided a micro level analysis of one area of 
the City of Cape Town: Manenberg. Consequently, the conformation of the system of local 
power dynamics and the statification of the organised criminal community is limited to 
Manenberg; however, it was also observed that there is rapid expansion of organised crime in 
the City of Cape Town.  
 
The gangs on the Cape Flats are not only a Cape Flats phenomenon anymore. The operations 
of these groups have progressed beyond the boundaries of the Cape Flats, into other urban 
areas and even rural towns in the Western Cape Province. As a result of this expansion, the 
system of local power dynamics and the statification of the organised criminal community 
have the potential to manifest in other areas of the City of Cape Town. The dynamic and 
opportunistic nature of organised criminal groups makes this a real possibility. The 
manifestation of the statification of the organised criminal community in other areas beyond 
the Cape Flats will be, in the long run, disadvantageous for both the social community and 
the state, as the expected outcomes of the operations of organised criminal groups is personal 
and not public gain.  
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Appendix A  
Schedule 4 Part B and Schedule 5 Part B (The South African Constitution, 1998): 
Matters that Municipality has executive authority and the right to administer  
 
Schedule 4 Part B 
 Air pollution 
 Building regulations 
 Child care facilities 
 Electricity and gas reticulation 
 Fire fighting services 
 Local tourism 
 Municipal airports 
 Municipal planning 
 Municipal health services 
 Municipal public transport 
 Municipal public works only in respect of the needs of municipalities in the discharge 
of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned to them under the 
Constitution or any other law 
 Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers and harbours, excluding the regulation of international 
and national shipping and matters related thereto 
 Storm water management systems in built-up areas 
 Trading regulations 
 Water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic 
waste-water and sewage disposal systems 
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Schedule 5 Part B 
 Beaches and amusement facilities 
 Billboards and the display of advertisements in public places 
 Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria 
 Cleansing 
 Control of public nuisances 
 Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public 
 Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals 
 Fencing and fences 
 Licensing of dogs 
 Licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public 
 Local amenities 
 Local sport facilities 
 Markets 
 Municipal abattoirs 
 Municipal parks and recreation 
 Municipal roads 
 Noise pollution  
 Pounds 
 Public places 
 Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal 
 Street trading 
 Street lighting 
 Traffic and parking  
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Appendix B 
Housing on the Cape Flats  
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Appendix C 
Gang signs used to mark turf  
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Appendix D 
A local school in Manenberg  
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